Spare the Rod, the Time-Out, and Every Other Kind of Childhood Punishment Too: Why Parents Ought Not to Punish Their Children by Ryder, Zena
SPARE THE ROD, THE TIME-OUT, AND EVERY OTHER KIND OF CHILDHOOD
PUNISHMENT TOO: WHY PARENTS OUGHT NOT TO PUNISH THEIR CHILDREN
Zena Ryder
A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy.
Chapel Hill
2017
Approved by:
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
William G. Lycan
Gerald J. Postema
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
Douglas MacLean
©2017
Zena Ryder
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ii
ABSTRACT
Zena Ryder: Spare the Rod, the Time-Out, and Every Other Kind of Childhood
Punishment Too: Why Parents Ought Not to Punish Their Children
(Under the direction of Geoffrey Sayre-McCord)
It is a default rule of behaviour to avoid intentionally causing distress to others, which is 
why parental punishment of children requires justification. I consider how various theories that 
have been offered as justification for state criminal punishment might apply in the case of 
parental punishment of children. I argue that none of those theories is successful, usually largely 
on empirical grounds. While retributivism is unsuccessful in justifying parental punishment of 
children, it nevertheless gets some significant things right: the importance of censure, and the ap-
propriateness of wrongdoers feeling bad. However, the correct kind of "feeling bad" is guilt for 
one's wrongdoing and sympathy for one's victim (if there is one), not the self-oriented distress 
that is induced by a punishment.
As a matter of empirical fact, feelings of guilt and sympathy tend to motivate human be-
ings to make amends, which is why it's appropriate for parents to encourage their children to 
have those feelings (or at least not interfere with them). I argue that punishing children is not an 
effective way to induce feelings of guilt and sympathy (indeed, punishment tends to interfere 
with them). Parents should use non-punitive discipline that encourages children to recognize 
their own wrongdoing as such, to feel sympathy for anyone they may have harmed, and they 
should help children to make amends. Parents ought not to punish their children.
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To my children, Ben and Julia.
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INTRODUCTION
I take it as uncontroversial that a default rule of human behaviour is: avoid intentionally causing 
other people distress, where distress can be anything from extreme emotional or physical suffer-
ing to mild unhappiness or physical discomfort. As I will use the term "distress", it refers to dif-
ferent types of emotion such as fear, frustration, sorrow, irritation, embarrassment, disgust, lone-
liness, unhappiness, etc. as well as including physical pain — anything from excruciating to 
minor. Of course, we do sometimes think it's justified to intentionally cause others even extreme 
distress (or pain), such as when the only way to protect oneself from an attacker involves inten-
tionally hurting them. The higher the level of distress, or the longer its duration, the "stronger" 
the justification for imposing it needs to be. Intentionally causing a very low level of distress 
would require much "weaker" justification. Making my husband jump (i.e. intentionally causing 
him minor momentary fright) can be justified because it would make us both laugh afterwards. 
That's sufficient justification. But if I knew that he hated being made to jump and only I found it 
funny, it wouldn't be justified to do it — even though his distress is still relatively minor. The 
crucial thing is that intentionally causing distress does require justification of some kind; the 
greater the distress, the stronger the justification required. Without such justification, intentional-
ly causing distress is morally unacceptable — with greater levels or duration of distress being 
morally worse than lower levels or shorter duration of distress. But even a small departure from 
the default rule "do not intentionally cause other people distress" does require justification. If you
are in doubt about the need for justification for intentionally inflicting small amounts of distress, 
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I could perhaps massage your intuitions by coming to your house and smushing all the flowers in
your garden, or purposefully stepping on your toe.
As well as being commonsensical, something along the same lines as this default rule of 
behaviour is acceptable to different kinds of ethical theory. (As we should expect. Any moral the-
ory that rejected such a fundamental tenet of ordinary moral behaviour would have a tough row 
to hoe in showing why their theory should be preferred over this rule of thumb.) A deontological 
theory will have rules about how to treat other people, and they will undoubtably include some-
thing along these lines, or else their rules will imply it. The same goes for a rule consequentialist.
Depending on the exact theory of value, they might have a more general rule that replaces "dis-
tress" with something slightly different, such as "harm". In which case, "Avoid intentionally 
causing other people distress" is just a more specific instance of that more general rule (given 
that distress is a kind of harm). 
The act consequentialist of course doesn't accept any "official" general rules of behaviour
(only practical guides, perhaps). For the act consequentialist, each act is supposed to be evaluat-
ed individually — they ask: what positive and negative consequences will this act have? Howev-
er, the act consequentialist accepts that agents ought to act such that they maximize positive con-
sequences and minimize negative consequences. Consequentialists' exact theories of value will 
vary, of course, but "distress" (or something similar, such as "negative emotion" or "unhappi-
ness") will be one of the negative values that a consequentialist believes should be avoided, in 
favour of positive values.1 They will accept that sometimes it's right to cause distress — when it 
1Consequentialists might think that along with "Avoid causing other people distress" there's an 
equally weighty default rule to "Cause other people happiness" (or something like that). More 
than one rule can be default, and departing from any of them would require justification (and for 
the consequentialist, that justification will always be in terms of consequences, of course). 
Personally, I don't believe that "Cause other people happiness" is a default rule of human 
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is a consequence of the best available option, i.e. all the alternatives have worse overall conse-
quences. But they do think it's right to avoid causing distress — unless there's justification for 
doing so, and for them, that justification will be in terms of the positive benefits achieved by 
taking the route that causes distress. (A classical consequentialist will think that an action is 
right — i.e. has the best outcome of all the options — regardless of the agent's intentions. How-
ever, if they accept something like "Avoid causing distress", they will also accept "Avoid inten-
tionally causing distress" since intentionally causing distress is a subset of causing distress.)
There is a difference, for our purposes, between intentionally causing distress and inten-
tionally causing something distressing. When I spank a child, or wash their mouth out with soap, 
I intend to cause them distress (physical or emotional or both). Their distress is not a mere 
byproduct or side effect of what I do; it forms (at least part of) my reason for doing it. On the 
other hand, when I take them to the dentist, even though I know they don't like it, their distress is
a mere byproduct or side effect of what I do; it does not form (even part of) my reason for doing 
it. Taking them to the dentist is intentionally causing something distressing to happen to them, 
but it is not intentionally causing distress. (I'm not supposing that this distinction is always made 
in everyday language, at least not strictly. But it is a distinction that is important for present 
purposes.)
I don't mean to imply that causing distress can be morally wrong only if it's caused inten-
tionally — rather than accidentally, or incidentally. It can be wrong to cause distress accidentally 
(say, if someone was culpably negligent and an accident happened) and it can be wrong to cause 
distress incidentally (say, if the unintended side effects of something were known to be much 
greater than the expected benefits). It's just that this particular default rule of behaviour — don't 
behaviour; but it's something that the consequentialist might argue should become one.
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intentionally cause other people distress — is what is relevant in the case of punishing children. 
Other actions that parents perform may cause their children distress incidentally (such as taking 
them to the dentist, or having them tag along to a loud concert) or accidentally (such as doing up 
their zipper and accidentally nipping their skin, or by letting them travel in a car without a seat-
belt on). And such actions may be morally justified or not, but the reasons they are justified or 
not has nothing to do with the distress being intended (because it wasn't).
One might think that instead of "Avoid intentionally causing other people distress", the 
following is the correct default rule of behaviour: "Avoid causing other people distress" (i.e. 
without the intentional part). My view is that these are variations on a theme, and both are rules, 
not competing principles only one of which is correct. This is similar to the following two rules 
of thumb: "Avoid killing people" and "Avoid intentionally killing people". These are variations 
on the same theme, not competing principles. We should, generally speaking, avoid killing peo-
ple — whether intentionally, incidentally, or accidentally. A more specific instance of that rule is 
"Avoid intentionally killing people". Any time these rules are transgressed, it requires justifica-
tion. Depending on the version that is transgressed, a different kind of justification is required. If 
some people are accidentally killed, the justification for the action that resulted in people being 
killed would have to focus on the degree of care taken and whether it amounted to culpable ne-
glect or not. If people are intentionally killed, a different kind of justification would be re-
quired — one that focused on the reasons for the killings, including the evidence for the likely 
effects of the killings, and whether those reasons and evidence are good enough to justify the 
killing.
So, while it's true that we ought to avoid causing distress (generally), it's also true that we
ought to avoid intentionally causing distress. And it's the latter, more specific, rule that is more 
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relevant in the case of punishment. Punishment is not only an instance of causing distress. In ad-
dition to that, it's also an instance of intentionally causing distress and, as we shall explore in 
some detail, that requires additional justification (for everyone except the classical consequen-
tialist who doesn't care what intentions an agent has).
Punishment of children is the intentional infliction of some kind of distress in response to
a disapproved of behaviour, with a goal such as "teaching a lesson", fairness, instilling responsi-
bility and so on.2 I have chosen a weak formulation of punishment, in terms of "distress", rather 
than suffering, pain, or harm,3 any of which might be objected to on the grounds that they sound 
stronger than the proponent of punishment might be willing to accept. Because "pain" or "harm" 
or "suffering" sound more extreme than "distress", I will use the latter. I don't want to give the 
impression of stacking the deck against proponents of punishment.4 Because punishing children 
involves intentionally causing them distress, physically or emotionally or both, e.g. by spanking 
them, restricting their freedom in a time-out, removing their property, etc — it requires justifica-
tion. Punishment is not merely intentionally causing something distressing to happen; it is inten-
tionally causing distress. That is, a child's distress (physical pain, emotional upset, suffering etc) 
2A fraternity ceremony that inflicts pain after an initiate has committed some agreed upon
action — such as shoplifting or breaking a window — is not punishment, even though it is the
intentional infliction of distress in response to a certain bad behaviour. It is not a punishment
because the fraternity members are not inflicting pain because they disapprove of the bad
behaviour. See Boonin (2008), p. 23.
3I think it's more standard to speak in terms of pain, harm, or suffering as in Sayre-McCord 
(2001), p. 504: "Punishment has at its core the intentional infliction of pain or harm." But I'm 
using the weakest formulation I can think of.
4Thanks to Geoff Sayre-McCord for raising this potential problem with using words like 
"suffering" to describe punishment.
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is not a mere byproduct or side effect of a punishment, it forms at least part of a parent's reason 
for punishing.
It might be thought that what really makes an action a punishment is not intentional in-
fliction of distress (or harm, pain, suffering, etc), but rather intentional interference with bodily 
integrity or autonomy. While such interference is indeed a significant source of distress and 
many punishments make use of it, there are punishments that cause distress that do not interfere 
with bodily integrity or autonomy (unless "autonomy" is understood so broadly as to mean 
"something someone doesn't want or like", which doesn't seem correct). For example, a shaming 
punishment in which someone's identity is concealed (so they don't face any consequences due to
diminished reputation) can cause distress even though it doesn't interfere with autonomy (other 
than to be something the offender doesn't want to do). Suppose an offender's sentence is to walk 
up and down a busy sidewalk wearing an identity-concealing mask and a large sign around their 
neck that says, "I am a thief". Such a punishment would cause distress to the offender, but it does
not interfere with autonomy or bodily integrity. It's the intentional infliction of distress that 
makes it a punishment.
On the other hand, someone who cannot experience any distress cannot be punished, 
even if their bodily integrity is interfered with. Suppose an offender was in a car accident imme-
diately after their crime and fell into a permanent coma. It would not be possible to punish them 
because they would not be aware of anything that happens to them. Even if their bodily integrity 
is violated during unconsciousness, they have not been punished, because the action can cause 
them no distress. They will never even know that it happened and cannot "learn their lesson" or 
anything like that. (Of course, that doesn't preclude its being morally wrong to do.) 
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When a child is punished by not being allowed to have dessert, that doesn't do anything 
so significant as interfere with the child's bodily integrity or autonomy (again, unless "autonomy"
is understood so broadly as to mean "something someone doesn't want or like"). But it does 
cause them distress — i.e. it upsets them — which is exactly what the parent intended it to do.
There's one more feature of punishment that is worth drawing attention to. The distress 
that the recipient experiences is typically5 (but not necessarily) self-oriented — children are 
made to feel physical pain, or emotional upset at being isolated by themselves in a room, or in-
tense disappointment at not being able to watch their favourite TV show, and so on. When adult 
offenders are punished in different parts of the world, they are made to feel physical pain, or the 
emotional pain of loneliness due to separation from family and friends while imprisoned, or frus-
tration at having their freedom curtailed, or hardship at having to pay a fine, and so on. Self-ori-
ented distress contrasts with other-oriented distress, for example: the discomfort of empathic 
concern; the pain of witnessing a loved one suffer; intense feelings of guilt and responsibility for 
having harmed someone else; and so on.6
By inflicting some kind of distress or suffering on a child or an offender, it is hoped  that 
punishment, will help them "see the error of their ways". Distress, pain, or suffering is supposed 
to be a means to the end of getting a child or an offender to appreciate what they did wrong, to 
5It is possible to punish someone by intentionally causing them to feel other-oriented distress. An
offender could be punished by forcing them to watch their own child being made to suffer. The 
offender's distress is other-oriented (sympathy for their child), but it is a punishment (i.e. 
intentionally inflicted distress, which aims at goals such as retribution, justice, recognition of 
wrongdoing, feelings of guilt, etc.). Note, however, that such other-oriented distress is not 
focused on the offender's victim. Which is where we might think that it would be right for an 
offender's distress to be focused. We will return to this issue.
6For more on the distinction between other-oriented empathic concern and self-oriented personal 
distress in response to another's distress, see Lamm et al (2007), Cheetham et al (2009), Decety 
& Lamm (2015). We will come back to this in more detail in Chapter 8.
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sympathize with any victims of the wrongdoing, and so on. (For the retributivist, the goal might 
be something more abstract, such as justice or fairness. But, still, the point is to intentionally in-
flict distress on the wrongdoer in order to achieve something else: justice, censure, repentance, 
and so on.) Of course, appreciating the wrongness of one's action, feeling guilty, sympathizing 
with a victim and regretting the harm one caused them can all be distressing experiences. But 
they themselves are not punishments — they are examples of the goal of punishment. So if a par-
ent or a representative of the justice system acts with the intention to cause a child or an offender 
the distress inherent in appreciating the wrongness of one's action (guilt) or the distress of realiz-
ing someone else's suffering (sympathy), that action is not necessarily a punishment.
Goals of both punitive and non-punitive discipline are things like recognition of 
wrongdoing, moral education, taking responsibility, the experience of guilt, sympathy
for victims, improved future behaviour, justice, fairness, and so on. How such goals 
are approached can be punitive or non-punitive. If they are approached via some oth-
er (typically self-oriented) distress that is intentionally inflicted, the method is puni-
tive. If they are not approached via some other distress that is intentionally inflicted, 
the method is not punitive.
This is important. Non-punitive responses to crime and non-punitive discipline of chil-
dren are not just punishment by another name, even if they cause distress, even if they intention-
ally cause distress. This is because non-punitive responses, while they share some goals with 
punitive responses and those goals involve some distress (recognizing your own wrongdoing can
be intensely distressing!), the methods of reaching those goals are necessarily different. A puni-
tive method intentionally inflicts distress (typically self-oriented), but a non-punitive method 
does not intentionally inflict distress. And the question I am considering in this dissertation is 
whether it's morally acceptable for parents to choose a punitive method of disciplining their 
children.
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Whilst there is a vast philosophical literature on the controversial issue of criminal pun-
ishment by the state, there is relatively little on the punishment of children by their parents. It 
does not seem to be an area of much philosophical controversy. Indeed, parental punishment of 
children (PPC) is sometimes considered a paradigm case of permissible punishment:
Parents are natural educators morally charged with the task of turning their young de-
pendents into civilized adults, and they need, common sense insists, the possibility of 
punishing to succeed.7
We mustn't let the common sense nature of PPC obscure what actually happens when a 
parent punishes their child. Even though they have (we can assume) their child's interests at 
heart, when a parent punishes their child, on that occasion, they intend to cause the child dis-
tress — such as physical pain or emotional upset — to some degree or other.
In a typical discipline scenario, a child exhibits bad table manners, is too noisy, too 
messy, ignores a parental instruction, hits a sibling, speaks unkindly or rudely, doesn't eat their 
vegetables, or doesn't do their homework (perhaps repeatedly). A typical punishment might be a 
spanking, a time-out, extra chores, or a removal of privileges. On such occasions,  is punishment 
justified? If justification is lacking, parents ought not to punish their children; they ought to re-
frain from intentionally causing distress. 
In this dissertation, I will argue that no justification of parental punishment of children is 
forthcoming. This means that parents should maintain the default position — and refrain from in-
tentionally causing their misbehaving children distress. Parents ought not to punish their 
children.
7Quinn (1985)
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Does this mean that it is never justified to punish a child?8 Well, we can always cook up a
scenario in which the only choices are punishing a child and something morally worse — letting 
evil aliens blow up the planet springs to mind — and in such a scenario, it would be morally per-
missible (indeed no doubt it would be required) to punish a child. If evil aliens threaten to blow 
up the planet unless I punish my child, then it's presumably morally permissible for me to give 
my a child a time-out or a spanking. (We will return to our evil aliens later.)
But what about more realistic scenarios? In realistic scenarios, is it never justified to pun-
ish a child? To answer this question, I think it's necessary to clarify how empirical evidence bears
on everyday life. Suppose, as I think is actually true, that there is overwhelming evidence in 
favour of childhood vaccinations — the initial pain is minimal, the risks are low, the costs are 
low, the benefits are high (both to the vaccinated child, and to those around them). So unless 
there is good reason to think my child is an exception in a relevant respect, then I ought to get my
child vaccinated. If my child is deathly allergic to one of the ingredients in the vaccine, or if their
immune system is so weak that they could not safely handle being vaccinated, then I have coun-
tervailing evidence against the general claim that one ought to get one's child vaccinated. In the 
absence of such countervailing evidence, I ought to get my child vaccinated. (Unrealistic scenar-
8I happen to believe that no typical general moral claim about the permissibility or 
impermissibility of a type of action is guaranteed to be literally exceptionless, although it's not 
necessary for the reader to agree with this claim in order to accept my argument against 
punishment. (By a typical general moral claim, I mean familiar statements like "It's morally 
wrong to break a promise" or "Torture is morally wrong".) We are creative creatures and we can 
always imagine a scenario in which an agent has excellent reason to believe that something 
morally much worse would happen if they don't perform a particular type of action, however 
awful that type of action is. For any genuine type of action, no matter how awful — murder, 
rape, torture, etc — we can (if we force ourselves) imagine scenarios in which performing one of
those actions is permissible (or at least not impermissible), because the only alternatives are 
morally even worse. (Different theorists will of course give different reasons for why one action 
is morally worse than another eg, it has worse consequences, or it breaks a more serious rule, it 
transgresses a more fundamental right etc.)
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ios, such as aliens threatening to blow up the planet, are imaginative ways to provide clear coun-
tervailing evidence against a general claim. The point of such cases is to make it clear that the 
evidence that would be relevant, or even decisive, in any ordinary situation is superseded in the 
specific case.) 
In the case of punishment, if there is countervailing evidence that a particular child is an 
exception in a relevant respect — for example, the child has been diagnosed with oppositional 
defiance disorder and there is good evidence that children with ODD respond well to punishment
and not to non-punitive discipline — then there might be sufficient reason to think that the gener-
al evidence is superseded in that particular case. For the purposes of this dissertation, I will be 
considering the ethics of punishing typical children, not those diagnosed with any behavioural 
disorders.9 In the absence of countervailing evidence that one's child is an exception in a relevant
respect, then one ought to refrain from punishing one's child. And, no, I don't think there are any 
exceptions to that general claim, just as I don't think that there are any exceptions to the analo-
gous claim about vaccines:
In the absence of countervailing evidence that a particular child is relevantly atypical 
(or that a particular situation is relevantly atypical), such that the general evidence 
does not apply to them (or it), or the general evidence is superseded, it's true that a 
parent ought to vaccinate their child.
In the absence of countervailing evidence that a particular child is relevantly atypical 
(or that a particular situation is relevantly atypical), such that the general evidence 
does not apply to them (or it), or the general evidence is superseded, it's true that a 
parent ought not to punish their child.
9I have not looked in any detail at the evidence regarding punishment in these populations and 
so, officially, I withhold judgement about the ethics of punishment in such cases.
11
In the vaccination case, intuitions might vary on whether or not we judge the 'ought' to be
moral or pragmatic (or both) — since it involves refraining from doing something beneficial 
(rather than doing something harmful). In the punishment case, however, since punishment in-
volves intentionally inflicting distress on another person, we tend to see the 'ought' as being 
moral (instead of, or in addition to, being pragmatic). Personally, I don't think there's a hard and 
fast fact of the matter when an 'ought' is moral and when it's pragmatic, but it would take me too 
far afield to discuss that here. Suffice it to say that, judging by the venerable history of the topic 
of punishment in moral philosophy, I take myself to be making a moral claim, not a merely prag-
matic one. Simplifying somewhat by removing the caveat about countervailing evidence regard-
ing atypicality, the moral claim I am defending in this dissertation is:
Parents ought not to punish their children. 
In order to argue for the conclusion that PPC is not justified and that parents ought not to 
punish their kids, I should need only to show that there is not sufficient reason to depart from the 
default position of refraining from intentionally causing other people distress.
If position A is the default position, and position B is the alternative, we need reasons to 
think that B is preferable in order to depart from A. In the absence of such reasons, we stick with 
A (that's what it means to be the default position). In order to have reasons to think that B is 
preferable to A, we might compare A and B, but inconclusive reasons should lead us to stick with
A. It's not the case that we start off neutral between A and B, and so need reasons that favour A if
we are to go with A; we stick with A unless we find reasons to think that B is preferable. In the 
present case, this means that in order to argue that parents ought not to punish their children, I 
should not need to show that there is an alternative, such as a particular type of non-punitive dis-
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cipline, that is preferable — I just need to show that there's no good reason to depart from the de-
fault (do not intentionally cause distress).
It might be argued that a good reason to depart from the default is that there is no alterna-
tive way to reach the goals parents need to reach (e.g. there is no non-punitive discipline method 
that has been shown to be effective at, say, getting children to eat their vegetables). This would 
be a good reason to depart from the default if punishment was effective at reaching its goals. But 
if it's not effective, then the lack of a well-supported alternative is not a reason to depart from the
default. It could be the case that "nothing works", in which case we should stick with the default.
Or it could be that there's not (yet) evidence for what non-punitive discipline methods work, in 
which case we should still stick with the default.
However, I realize that most readers will require more than seeing that there is not suffi-
cient reason to depart from the default position in order to be persuaded of the conclusion that 
parents ought not to punish their children. Given the depth to which PPC is culturally embedded, 
many people will share the feeling that Bill Lycan expressed to me: that the conclusion that par-
ents ought not to punish their children is, in his words, "mind blowing". And so I will also talk 
about the empirical evidence regarding the risk of long term harms due to punishing children, 
which provides additional reasons not to punish them. 
Of course, for the consequentialist, the long term risks and harms are not additional rea-
sons to reject PPC, but rather they are central to rejecting PPC. What matters to the consequen-
tialist is whether an action has better or worse overall consequences than the alternatives — 
taking all consequences into consideration, including the long term ones. We might loosely refer 
to "consequentialist theories of punishment" that try to justify punishment by reference to partic-
ular kinds of consequence, such as moral education or behavioural training. But to avoid confu-
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sion, I prefer to call these latter kinds of theories "instrumentalist". Such theories maintain that 
punishment is justified by its instrumental value, that is, by specific kinds of outcomes punish-
ment can achieve such as moral education or behavioural training, not by all the outcomes, as the
consequentialist maintains. So an instrumentalist theory of punishment will look at one particular
type of outcome to determine whether it's justified to depart from the default position of refrain-
ing from intentionally causing distress. In contrast, a consequentialist theory of punishment will 
look at all outcomes to determine whether it's justified to depart from the default position of re-
fraining from intentionally causing distress. We will discuss consequentialism in more detail in 
Chapter 7. 
For everyone other than the consequentialist, the long term harms and risks will be addi-
tional reasons to reject PPC. Unless someone is a consequentialist, they will give certain  types 
of outcome greater weight when considering whether or not PPC is justified. For example, a 
moral education theorist might think that PPC is justified on the grounds that it morally educates 
children. For them, the educational outcomes determine whether or not PPC is justified, not all 
consequences, as for the consequentialist. If PPC is not as a matter of fact educational, that 
should be sufficient reason to show that PPC is not justified, according to the standards of the 
moral education theory. Further harms and risks provide additional reasons for such a theorist to 
reject PPC. But even if the evidence showed that PPC was morally educational, it should also be 
relevant at what cost this educational benefit is achieved. If, for example, severely beating a child
could be shown to be morally educational, that wouldn't automatically justify beating as a pun-
ishment — even for the moral education theorist. That's because the moral education comes at 
too great a cost in terms of harm to the child. Yes, a child might learn that it's morally wrong for 
them to steal from the cookie jar, but if it comes at the cost of a black eye and a broken arm, the 
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punishment is presumably not justified by the standards of the moral education theorist, even 
though it results in moral education.
In this dissertation, I put a lot of emphasis on empirical evidence. I will discuss the evi-
dence regarding whether PPC is an effective way to gain children's obedience or to morally edu-
cate them, what the evidence is regarding the long term risks, and so on. This emphasis on evi-
dence should not be taken to imply that I am assuming consequentialism is true. As I've 
mentioned, it's not only consequentialists for whom the (evidence regarding) outcomes of PPC 
should be relevant — it also matters (or should matter) to any instrumentalist theory, such as the 
moral education theory. (And, in reality, I expect that most parents tacitly hold rough instrumen-
talist justifications for PPC.) If a moral education theorist is correct that moral education would 
justify PPC, it matters whether or not PPC actually does result in moral education. Only if PPC 
actually does result in moral education would PPC be justified, according to the moral education 
theorist — and to evaluate that we need to look at empirical evidence. Although retributivists 
tend to claim that empirical evidence is irrelevant to their position — deserved punishment is 
"appropriate", no matter what the evidence regarding its consequences — I think it's at least ar-
guable that it should matter to them. Even if we grant that punishment is an appropriate response 
to wrongdoing regardless of consequences, the empirical evidence could still indicate which type
of punishment best meets certain goals that the contemporary retributivist might have. For exam-
ple, in a given society, does imprisonment or flogging best communicate to the population cen-
sure of a criminal act? Even though it's not the purpose of a punishment to elicit a genuine apolo-
gy from an offender, if the retributivist thinks it's a desirable side effect if it does, which type of 
punishment is most likely to do so? We will look at retributivism in detail in Chapter 8.
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Of course, whether or not moral education could justify PPC is a philosophical or theoret-
ical question, not an empirical question. Suppose that the empirical evidence showed that PPC 
did in fact result in moral education, would that be sufficient to justify PPC? Why or why not? 
What else would be required? Could moral education justify PPC, even if there were more effec-
tive, and/or less harmful, alternatives? For each type of instrumentalist theory, such theoretical 
questions are important, along with the evidential issues, and I will address both kinds of ques-
tion in this dissertation. PPC can fail to be justified by an instrumentalist theory, either because 
the evidence indicates that the purported benefit does not in fact result from punishment, or be-
cause (even if it did result) that benefit would not succeed in justifying PPC, or both.
Despite it being common sense that parents ought to punish their children, I believe that 
they actually ought not to do so, and this dissertation provides an empirically-supported argu-
ment for this view. This prohibition includes not only corporal punishment such as spanking, but 
also non-physical punishments, such as currently fashionable time-outs. 
I acknowledge that, of course, children need discipline; they need to learn how to behave 
appropriately, they need to learn rules or principles of behaviour and morality. But discipline is 
not the same as punishment; punishment is just one way to discipline. Arguing that parents ought
to refrain from punishing their kids is not to argue that they ought to refrain from disciplining 
their kids — because discipline can be non-punitive. (Even the most punitive parent uses non-
punitive discipline some of the time — when they explain why a child is not allowed to do some-
thing, when they distract a toddler, when they ask a child to imagine how they themselves would 
like to be treated, and so on.)
I also acknowledge that disciplining children — with or without punishment — can be 
difficult. But I hope that over time, with the proliferation of information and advice on non-puni-
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tive discipline, parents can learn to become less punitive. Attitudes can change, and they are 
changing regarding physical punishment.10 I hope that parents can learn how to pursue better the 
worthy goals that they have for their kids — with the relief of understanding that they need not 
and should not punish their children in order to have the best shot at achieving those goals.
As already mentioned, in order to conclude that PPC is not justified and that parents 
ought not to punish their kids, I need only to show that there is not sufficient reason to depart 
from the default position of refraining from intentionally causing other people distress. However,
since this conclusion is easier to accept if we have some idea of the alternatives to PPC, in the fi-
nal chapter, Chapter 9, I will also touch briefly on possible non-punitive disciplinary alternatives 
to punishment and the currently available evidence in favour of them.
10See, for example, Durrant et al (2014) and Osterman et al (2014).
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CHAPTER ONE: PRELIMINARIES
Why, and how much, parents punish
Decent parents love their children and care deeply for their wellbeing. They don't want to hurt or 
upset them. But most parents think that they sometimes need to do so — on those unpleasant oc-
casions when they have to punish their children. Decent parents do not enjoy punishing their 
children, but they likely believe that sometimes, they must do so — perhaps against their own 
gentler feelings and certainly against their children's feelings. They think that punishments are 
justified because the distress they inflict (physical pain, emotional upset etc) means that certain 
benefits will accrue — kids will obey, they will gradually learn how to behave better, they will 
become more morally educated, and so on.
I suspect that parents typically are not retributivists when it comes to their children's pun-
ishments. They might well have retributivist intuitions — especially in the heat of the moment —
but I'm assuming that, typically, they think that PPC is justified by its benefits, and the bulk of 
this dissertation is focused on instrumentalist theories of punishment (such as the moral educa-
tion theory). Even if parents have an intuition that a child deserves a punishment (in a retribu-
tivist sense), I doubt they would typically think this feeling was sufficient to justify punishing 
them in the absence of benefits to the child. Parents typically think that if they give in to their 
own gentler feelings and fail to punish their children, they will ultimately be doing a disservice 
to their children, despite the fact that punishments at the time upset or hurt their children. They 
are instrumentalists who think that the benefits of punishment are ultimately worth the short term
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costs (in terms of their children's distress). However, there are elements of contemporary retribu-
tivism (which focuses less on desert and more on the function, meaning, or communicative value
of punishment) that are perhaps more intuitively appealing as a defense of PPC than traditional 
retributivism. So, as well as considering various instrumentalist justifications of PPC, we will 
also discuss the possibility of a retributivist justification of PPC.
If the conclusion of my argument were widely accepted and acted upon, it would radical-
ly change most parents' behaviour towards their children. For example, in 2000, 26% of Ameri-
can parents of children between the ages of 19 and 35 months report spanking their children 
"sometimes" or "often"; 65% report removing a toy as a punishment "sometimes" or "often"; 
70% report giving a time-out "sometimes" or "often".11 Of a group of 923 American children 
who were three years old in the early 2000s, 44% "were spanked 2 times or more in the past 
month".12 Also in the early 2000s, 65% of 3 year olds in an American urban population were 
spanked by one or both parents in the previous month.13 Another study found that in the US in 
2001-2003, "57% of mothers and 40% of fathers engaged in spanking when children were age 3, 
and 52% of mothers and 33% of fathers engaged in spanking at age 5... The use of spanking is 
highest for preschoolers and school-age children, but even in the first year of life recent evidence
finds 11% to 15% of children spanked and as many as 34% of 1-year-old children in impover-
ished families [are spanked]."14 One study of nearly 3,000 mothers in North Carolina showed that
11Regalado et al (2004)
12Lee et al (2013)
13Taylor et al (2010) 
14Mackenzie et al (2013) 
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70% of mothers reported that they had spanked their 2-year-old children.15 Alarmingly, there's 
also some preliminary evidence that self-reports of spanking underestimate the real frequency.16
Approval of spanking is high. "In a 2005 US poll, 72% of adults reported that it was "OK
to spank a child.""17 In 2012, 77% of American men and 65% of American women in a represen-
tative sample agreed with the claim that sometimes a child needs a "good, hard spanking".18 
In Canada in 2004, 59% of mothers reported using physical punishment (mostly spanking
and slapping) with their 3 year old children within a two week period.19 In 2012-2013, 25.4% of 
Canadian parents of children aged 2-12 reported that they had spanked their child in the previous
month, with younger children being more likely to be spanked than older children.20
UNICEF published a survey of child punishment in 33 low and middle income countries 
in 2010. 76% of children aged 2-14 had experience some form of (physically or psychologically)
violent discipline in the past month.21 Half of the children experienced physical punishment with-
in the previous month.22 As of 2016, UNICEF states that "6 in 10 children between the ages of 2 
and 14 worldwide (almost a billion) are subjected to physical punishment by their caregivers on 
a regular basis".23
15Zolotor et al (2011)
16Holden et al (2014)
17Taylor et al (2010)
18See the report on attitudes towards spanking produced by the non-profit, non-partisan, research 
centre, Child Trends: http://www.childtrends.org/?indicators=attitudes-toward-spanking
19Ateah et al (2005)
20Perron et al (2014) p. 41 
21P. 21, http://www.childinfo.org/files/report_Disipl_FIN.pdf
22P. 23
23UNICEF global databases, 2016, based on Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), Multiple 
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The role of empirical evidence, and the role of values
In this dissertation, I aim to show that all the purported justifications for PPC fail. Instrumentalist
theories, which are based on the idea that punishment is useful for achieving certain goals (obedi-
ence, better behaviour, moral education) — they all fail. Consent theory fails. Retributivism fails.
Although my argument is empirically supported, my rejection of PPC isn't based entirely 
on empirical evidence. For example, if the empirical evidence showed that spanking was effec-
tive at gaining child obedience, say, that wouldn't be sufficient to conclude that spanking children
is morally justified, in my view. After all, severely beating children might be effective at getting 
child obedience, but that wouldn't be sufficient to conclude that beating children is morally justi-
fied. It also matters how much distress or harm is being inflicted (both intentionally and uninten-
tionally) and how significant the resulting benefit is. It's hard to imagine any resulting benefit be-
ing 'worth' the harm — intended and unintended, short and long term — that is inflicted by a 
severe beating. There would also have to be no equally effective and/or less harmful way of 
achieving the same goal. The same goes for spanking. 
Any instrumentalist theory, in order to justify departing from the default rule of behaviour
"Do not intentionally cause others distress", and to justify punishment, has to meet three 
requirements:
(1) The distress inflicted (both intended and not intended) is not excessive, com-
pared to the amount and/or type of benefit gained.
(2) The distress inflicted will likely lead to the intended goal.
(3) There is no comparably effective alternative that causes less distress.
Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and other nationally representative surveys, 2005-2015. https:/
/data.unicef.org/topic/child-protection/violence/violent-discipline/#
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If any of those three requirements are not true, then the instrumentalist theory in question fails to 
justify PPC. So if, for example, punishment fails to contribute to moral education, then because 
(2) is false, the moral education theory fails to justify punishment. If, punishment does contribute
to, say, deterring children from misbehaviour over time, but it does so only a tiny amount and/or 
by imposing an excessive amount of harm on a child, then because (1) is false, the deterrence 
theory fails to justify punishment. And if non-punitive discipline is just about equivalent in effec-
tiveness at gaining compliance as punishment, then because (3) is false, the common sense view 
that PPC is justified by its effectiveness in gaining compliance is false.
For a retributivist theory to succeed in justifying departure from the default rule of behav-
iour "Do not intentionally cause others distress", and to justify parental punishment of children, it
has to meet these three requirements:
(1) The distress inflicted (both intended and not intended) is neither too much nor too 
little, compared to the wrong the child has done.
(2) The distress inflicted will likely lead to, or instantiate, the intended retributivist 
goal.
(3) There is no comparably effective alternative that causes less distress.
So if the retributivist goal is to for a parent to express condemnation of a child's action (drawing 
on the wall, say), then even if a severe beating achieves this, it would fail by the retributivist's 
standards because such a punishment is disproportionately distressing, compared to the child's 
wrongdoing, thus failing requirement (1). Retributivists seem inclined to think that their theory is
not vulnerable to empirical evidence (unlike instrumentalist theories that are based on the useful-
ness of punishment). But so long as they maintain that punishment has a  goal or a purpose, then 
it seems to me that empirical evidence is relevant. And if punishment is ineffective, or less effec-
22
tive than a less distressing alternative, it seems that retributivism fails to justify punishment. 
Rather than go into too much detail here, I will reserve further discussion until Chapter 8.
My view is that no theory of punishment succeeds in justifying PPC. Even if someone ac-
cepts a retributivist theory of criminal punishment, they could agree with me that retributivism 
fails to justify PPC. Even if someone accepts a deterrence theory of criminal punishment, they 
could agree with me that deterrence theory fails to justify PPC. A consequentialist could agree 
with me that consequentialism fails to justify PPC. And so on. I hope to be able to persuade peo-
ple with many different views to agree that PPC is not morally justified.
My own view of PPC depends heavily on empirical evidence, but it also depends on val-
ues or principles (e.g. a child's bodily integrity is very important). Since I value non-violence and
bodily integrity very highly, for me personally it would also be hard to accept spanking as a justi-
fied punishment even if it "worked". The benefits of spanking would have be very significant in 
order for me to accept it as justified. For example, if all and only children who were spanked be-
came kind and happy adults, and all and only children who were not spanked became unkind and
unhappy adults, and there was no alternative method that was comparably successful but didn't 
involve physical violence, then I would be reluctantly compelled to accept spanking as justified.
Even though an imaginary person who ranks obedience, say, far higher than any other 
value might accept that it's permissible to inflict extreme amounts of pain in order to gain even a 
tiny amount of additional obedience, we would not agree. We value a child's physical safety and 
psychological wellbeing too highly, and obedience too little, to countenance the idea that a tiny 
amount of extra obedience would be 'worth' inflicting an extreme amount of pain on a child. 
Of course, it would be a difficult task to come up with a principled way to rank values 
such as obedience, happiness, moral education, freedom from physical pain, and so on. However,
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as it turns out, we don't need to decide how to rank values (obedience compared to happiness, 
bodily integrity compared to future kindness etc) in order to weigh parents' goals against the dis-
tress or harm they inflict when punishing. We don't need to do this because, even if PPC would 
be justified if the benefits were great enough, it turns out that it is not, as a matter of empirical 
fact, very effective at promoting the benefits parents are hoping for (obedience, non-aggression, 
etc).
So despite the fact that there is a hypothetical point at which I would (reluctantly) accept 
that the likely benefits of PPC are 'worth' the inflicted distress, I still nevertheless believe that 
PPC — in the actual world — is not morally permissible. Here's an analogy. Even though we 
generally believe that, say, punching people in the face is wrong, almost all of us would never-
theless hold the view that it would be acceptable to punch an innocent person in the face if this 
was the only way to prevent evil aliens from blowing up the planet. That outlandish counterfac-
tual situation doesn't change the fact that, ordinarily, punching people in the face is wrong. Simi-
larly, even if spanking a child (or even severely beating them) would be permissible (or even 
morally required) in order to prevent evil aliens from blowing up the planet, that doesn't change 
the fact that, ordinarily, spanking children (not to mention severely beating them) is wrong. An 
extreme counterfactual situation is required in order for our judgement to change on the permis-
sibility of murder or the serious assault of a child. Less extreme situations are required for our 
judgement to change on the permissibility of less extreme actions. While we might require sav-
ing the planet in order to justify killing an innocent person, we require less benefit to justify 
breaking someone's arm, even less to justify a slap, and even less to justify giving a child a time-
out.
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Note that it's not only consequentialists who accept this kind of view; non-consequential-
ists can too. Rights can be "outweighed" by competing rights and duties. Rules can conflict and 
the solution is determined by the weighting of various values, and so on.
So, when it comes to considering the counterfactual situation in which "spanking works" 
or "time-out works", even if I would be willing to concede that, in those situations, spanking or 
time-outs would be permissible, that does nothing to change the fact that, ordinarily (in the actual
world, rather than a counterfactual one), spanking, time-outs, and other punishments are not per-
missible. This view is consistent with both consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral theo-
ries. It does not make my moral position on PPC dependent only on the empirical evidence. It 
also matters how much different things are valued, such as obedience, future happiness, bodily 
integrity, parent-child relationship, autonomy, and so on.
Not all negative consequences are punishments
If a thief is required by the state to return stolen money, despite the fact that this may cause the 
thief distress, it is nevertheless not a punishment. The goal is for the victim to get their money 
back (and thus to partially make amends to the victim). The thief feeling distress — such as 
intense disappointment and resentment at having to return the money she was hoping to buy a 
yacht with — is irrelevant to that goal. The distress that is caused is incidental; the distress is not 
intended as a means to some end, as it is with punishment. If the thief does not feel any distress 
at returning the property, then this is not a failed sentence — unlike a punishment that fails to 
cause distress. (The point of a punishment is to reach some goal — such as moral education — 
via distress.) The goal is to have the stolen property returned to its rightful owner, and this is 
successfully accomplished whether or not the thief is distressed about returning it. And so 
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returning the money is not a punishment.
Similarly, negative consequences for misbehaviour that a parent imposes — which might 
cause distress and might happen to act as disincentives — aren't always punishments. For 
example, suppose my daughter gets a new Nerf gun and I'm concerned for the safety of our cat. I 
give my daughter instructions not to shoot at the cat because it might get hurt or scared, and tell 
her that if she does shoot at the cat (or finds herself too tempted to do so), I will need to protect 
the cat by taking away the Nerf gun and she will be allowed to use it only under close 
supervision. Of course, she is likely to be upset if this happens, but my goal is not to upset her 
(not even in part, not even as a means to an end). My goals are to protect the cat, and to help my 
daughter understand why the cat needs protection, perhaps also with a view to improving her 
future behaviour. If my daughter is not upset when I take away the Nerf gun, that's good. It was 
not part of my intention to upset her. If my daughter suggests an equally effective, less upsetting, 
alternative way to protect the cat such as keeping the cat in one part of the house while she uses 
the Nerf gun in another part of the house, I should prefer that — since I do not intend to upset 
her. If she lacks the self control or the understanding necessary to keep the cat safe, I need to take
steps to address those issues. If she lacks self control, I can try to change the environment to help
her and keep the cat safe — removing the Nerf gun or physically separating her and the cat. If 
she lacks understanding, I can explain to her that the cat will be hurt and scared if a Nerf dart hits
it. Although she might be upset by my actions, I do not intentionally upset her. In this scenario, 
my action of removing the Nerf gun is not a punishment.24
24Even if I didn't intend to upset her, inflicting such distress would still need to be justified. I 
don't escape needing justification for causing distress, just because I didn't intend her distress. In 
the non-punitive removal of the Nerf gun, my justification is protection of the cat — which is 
sufficient to justify my daughter's upset, if we cannot come up with an alternative way to protect 
the cat that does not upset her. Similarly, an air force commander's order to drop the bomb needs 
to have a good enough reason in order to justify both its intended effects and its unintended (and 
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On the other hand, if I intend to punish my daughter and say something like, "If you 
shoot at the cat, I'll take away the Nerf gun for a week, and then you'll be sorry!" I intend such a 
consequence to upset her. I intend to upset her in order to teach her a lesson not to shoot at the 
cat. (I also intend the threat of punishment to motivate her to behave properly.) I intend her 
negative emotion to be a means to the end of protecting the cat, and also "teaching her a lesson," 
perhaps to follow the house rules, or to do what she's told, or something along those lines. If I 
intend to punish her but she doesn't mind me taking the Nerf gun away — perhaps she was bored
with it anyway — then my intentions will have been thwarted. The point of taking it away is to 
"teach her a lesson" by suffering a negative emotion, but if she isn't upset then my tactic has 
failed. In this scenario, my action of removing the Nerf gun is a punishment, because I intend to 
upset her as a means to an end (such as "learning a lesson").
How is my intention relevant? Does it make a difference to my daughter if I intend to 
upset her, if she loses the Nerf gun either way? Why might it make a difference to her if I remove
the Nerf gun with the intention of upsetting her, or if I remove the Nerf gun without the intention
of upsetting her, if she loses the Nerf gun in either case? Does it make a difference to her current 
distress or any future effects on her? Is my intention relevant in any way other than the effects it 
may have?
These are important questions but, first, it's crucial to note that my rejection of 
punishment is not simply on the grounds that it is the intentional infliction of distress. I do not 
maintain that intentional infliction of distress is always morally wrong. Indeed, sometimes I 
think it is morally justified (as in the obvious case of self-defense). I also don't mean to imply 
merely foreseen) effects. Law professor, Adam J. Kolber, has an interesting paper on the 
justification of the unintended harms of imprisonment: http://ilvoices.com/uploads/
2/8/6/6/2866695/unintentional_punishment_-_kolber.pdf.
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that intentionally causing distress is always worse (either morally worse, or having worse effects)
than incidentally or accidentally causing distress. 
Of course, if a parent intends to cause distress they are highly likely to do so. It's not 
difficult to upset a child or cause them pain. So when comparing a hypothetical action in which a
parent intends to cause distress to one in which they don't, holding everything else as similar as 
possible, there's a good chance that the former will cause more distress than the latter (and so in 
that respect, intending to cause distress is likely to be worse than not intending to do so). 
In addition to sometimes intentionally causing distress, parents' actions also sometimes 
cause distress incidentally — the distress is foreseen but not intended — as when a child is 
vaccinated or is taken to the dentist. And actions can be wrong when they incidentally cause 
distress, just as when they intentionally cause distress. For example, suppose a parent knows that 
their child will likely be upset by being made to kiss Uncle Frank, but the parent insists that they 
kiss Uncle Frank nonetheless. The parent does not intend (we can suppose) that the child become
distressed, but they foresee that result and nevertheless insist that the child kisses Uncle Frank. 
The parent ranks (so-called) politeness towards Uncle Frank over the child's feelings (not to 
mention their bodily autonomy).25 
Finally, a parent's action that accidentally causes distress can be morally wrong too. 
Suppose a child sustains serious injuries in a car accident partly as a result of their parent's 
allowing them to ride without a seatbelt. The harm caused to the child is accidental, but the 
parent's action that causally contributed to it is morally wrong.
So, although I don't maintain that only when distress is caused intentionally is it morally 
25Of course, it doesn't matter if you don't think that the parent is wrong in this particular example.
It nevertheless illustrates the point that a parent's action can be morally wrong when the distress 
they cause is unintended, but foreseen.  
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wrong, it is important to my position that punishment is an instance of intentionally causing 
distress. This is important because it makes a difference to the justification that is required for 
performing an action that causes that distress. If distress is intended to be a means to an end, then
to be justified in causing that distress it has to be the case that the distress will indeed causally 
contribute to bringing about that end (or at least that it is likely to do so),26 and also that the end 
is 'worth' the distress (and that there are no equally effective alternative means to that end that are
less distressing etc). To justify causing distress as a mere side effect, it's not necessary that the 
distress is causally efficacious in bringing about the end (it is a side-effect, after all). It would 
merely need to be the case that the end is 'worth' the distress. 
A parent could enforce a time-out on a child with the intention of causing the child 
distress (as a means to the end of "teaching them a lesson"). Or, alternatively, they could enforce 
a time-out with the intention of protecting a sibling (and the child's distress is an unintended but 
foreseen side effect of the time-out). In the former case, the time-out is a punishment; in the 
latter, it's not. They may or may not result in the same amount of distress, especially because a 
child might become more upset at the thought that their parent intends them to be upset. Even if 
they result in the same amount of distress though, one may be justified and the other not (because
the distress of the punishment is supposed to be causally efficacious but distress of the non-
punishment is not). In sum, using distress as a means to an end requires a different kind of 
justification than if the distress is merely a side-effect.
To my knowledge, nobody has empirically compared the effects of the same kind of 
26It's not rationally justified to intentionally bring about x as a means to y, if you have no reason 
to think that x will indeed cause y. Furthermore, if x is someone else's distress, harm, 
unhappiness, or pain etc, it's also not ethically justified.
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action, performed with and without an intention to inflict distress.27 It is a reasonable hypothesis 
that children are sufficiently sensitive to parents' intentions that they can tell whether or not a 
parent intends to cause them distress28 and it is actually worse for the child — more upsetting in 
the present moment — if they believe a parent intends to upset or hurt them than if they undergo 
the same type of experience, while not believing a parent intended to upset or hurt them. If I 
express my genuine regret that my daughter is upset at my taking away her Nerf gun, if she 
knows that I have tried to find ways not to upset her, or to minimize her distress, she will still be 
upset about the Nerf gun, but it's easier for her to feel that I'm on her side than if I am intending 
to upset her. She doesn't feel the additional distress of knowing that I intend her to be upset. 
Imagine in your own case the difference between how you would feel if someone stepped on 
your foot accidentally and how you would feel if they stepped on your foot to intentionally cause
you pain. Even if the physical pain were the same in both cases, you would feel additional 
distress if you believed that they intended you to experience pain.
For all we know, some (or all) of the long term harms of PPC (such as damage to 
children's mental wellbeing) may depend on children's beliefs about their parents' attitudes and 
27Future empirical evidence might distinguish between the same type of action — removing a 
toy, say — when used as a punishment and when used non-punitively. It's not a punishment when
the parent does not intend any distress to the child. Currently, empirical research does not make 
this distinction and simply investigates broad types of action, regardless of the intentions behind 
them. It doesn't distinguish between grounding intended to upset a teenager and grounding 
intended solely for safety, say. So this could be a confounding factor in some empirical results. 
For example, Chapman & Zahn-Waxler (1982) did not distinguish between physical coercion 
meant only to protect a child, and physical coercion meant to hurt a child — they merely lumped
together all physical coercion.
28Even within the first year of life, children are already sensitive to that fact that humans have 
intentions and inanimate objects don't. See, for example, Meltzoff (1995). Within the first year 
and a half of life, infants can also understand that different people can have different intentions, 
and they can track intentions over time within the same person. See, for example, Buresh and 
Woodward (2007) and Woodward (2009). 
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intentions towards them. If this is right, it might help explain the common moral intuition that 
there is (at least sometimes) something morally worse about intending to harm someone, rather 
than knowingly but not intentionally harming them.29 
So although there is no empirical evidence (to my knowledge) that compares the same 
kind of action performed with and without an intention to inflict distress, there is evidence that 
children do perceive parents' intentions differently when they discipline using reasoning and 
when they discipline using physical punishment. Children between the ages of 6 and 9 years old 
have a harder time attributing positive intentions (such as an intention to help their child) to 
mothers in pre-recorded vignettes who used physical punishment than to mothers who used 
reasoning as discipline.30
Of course, it might turn out that parental actions other than punishments can have 
criticisms leveled against them similar to those that apply to punishments, but those actions are 
not our focus here. For present purposes, our focus is restricted only to punishments — which are
actions that parents do intend to cause distress, whether by physically hurting children or by 
upsetting them in some way. Ideally, we would want empirical evidence that distinguishes 
between punishments (which are intended to cause distress) and similar actions (which are not 
intended to cause distress). Since the currently available evidence does not make this distinction, 
our understanding of its conclusions has to take that into consideration. However, in many cases, 
it's obvious that the empirical evidence is describing actions that intentionally inflict distress. No 
parent spanks a child without intending the child to experience distress (in the form of physical 
29Thanks to Geoff Sayre-McCord for the point that the different beliefs about agents' intentions 
might help explain the intuition of double effect. On the doctrine of double effect, see Quinn 
(1989) and also Foot (1967).
30 See Sorbring et al (2006).
31
pain)! But time-outs, for example, can be used punitively (with the intention of causing the child 
some distress) or non-punitively (simply with the intention of helping the child to calm down), 
and this distinction is rarely made clear in the empirical literature. If non-punitive use of time-out
was separated from punitive use of time-out, it's quite possible we would see that using it as a 
punishment is just as harmful as spanking! (It's also possible, of course, that time-outs are 
harmful to the extent that they are, whether they are used punitively or not.) So, to some degree, 
the empirical evidence is equivocal. As we proceed, I will note the limitations of the empirical 
evidence.
Incidentally, refraining from doing something can also be a punishment, just as much as 
doing something can. Not taking my kids to the fairground can be a punishment, just as much as 
putting them in a time-out can be a punishment. Whether something is an act or omission is, in 
itself, irrelevant to its status as a punishment.
The argument
Let me explicitly state my argument against PPC:
1. It's a default rule of behaviour to avoid intentionally causing distress.
2. Punishing children is an instance of intentionally causing distress (departing from 
the default rule of behaviour).
3. Intentionally causing distress (departing from the default rule of behaviour) re-
quires justification.
4. Therefore, punishing children requires justification.
5. If punishing children is not justified, parents ought not to do so.
6. Punishing children is not justified.
7. Therefore, parents ought not to punish children.
Because punishment involves the intentional infliction of distress, it requires justification. Our 
default behaviour is to avoid intentionally causing others distress. This dissertation argues that 
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there is not sufficient reason for parents to depart from this default and punish their children; 
parental punishment of children is not justified. (In addition to the fact that there is no good rea-
son to depart from the default, there is in fact also good reason to refrain from punishment, be-
cause of the long term harm it causes.)
And most of my time will be spent supporting premise 6, and showing how different the-
ories of punishment fail to justify PPC. Punishing children is not justified by any instrumentalist 
theory because in order to justify departing from the default rule of behaviour "Do not intention-
ally cause distress", three requirements mentioned earlier must be true:
(1) The distress inflicted (both intended and not intended) is not excessive, compared 
to the amount and/or type of benefit gained.
(2) The distress inflicted will likely lead to the intended goal.
(3) There is no comparably effective alternative that causes less distress.
For instrumentalist theories such as the moral education theory, for example, these three 
requirements would look like this:
(1) The distress (such as pain or emotional upset) inflicted (both intended and not in-
tended) is not excessive, compared to the moral education gained.
(2) The distress inflicted will likely lead to moral education.
(3) There is no comparably effective alternative method of moral education that caus-
es less distress.
The empirical evidence that I summarize in this dissertation tends to show that (2) is not true for 
the various reasonable goals that parents might have for PPC — obedience, moral education, im-
proved behaviour and so on, and for the various types of punishments that have been empirically 
studied. Since a number of different types of punishment have been studied (both physical and 
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non-physical), then we have no reason to think that (2) is true for an unstudied type of punish-
ment. Although we have no reason to think that an unstudied type of punishment will lead to 
moral education, our confidence is stronger that spanking won't lead to moral education, because 
it has been thoroughly studied. In the absence of empirical evidence in favour of a punishment, 
parents should refrain from doing so and stick with the default rule of behaviour: Avoid intentio-
nally causing others distress.
And here's a reminder of the three requirements for a retributivist:
(1) The distress inflicted (both intended and not intended) is neither too much nor too 
little, compared to the wrong the child has done.
(2) The distress inflicted will likely lead to, or instantiate, the intended retributivist 
goal.
(3) There is no comparably effective alternative that causes less distress.
My conclusion applies to all forms of punishment — spanking, time-out, public shaming,
washing a child's mouth out with soap, putting hot sauce on a child's tongue — because none of 
these forms of punishment have sufficient positive reason in favour of them to justify departing 
from the default rule of behaviour. They remain unjustified. Some of them, such as spanking, 
have been extensively empirically studied. Others, such as putting soap or hot sauce in a child's 
mouth or banning a teen from Instagram, have not been studied at all, as far as I know. (Parents 
can get pretty creative with their punishments and not all of them are widely practiced.) In both 
cases, justification is lacking, and parents ought to stick to the default position of "refrain from 
intentionally causing others distress." However, since spanking has been extensively studied, its 
lack of positive effects and its unintended harms are well documented, unlike with soap or hot 
sauce or Instagram bans. So it's possible that these latter, unstudied, punishments have all sorts of
unknown positive effects that would be able to justify using them on children. So our confidence 
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in the conclusion that such punishments are unjustified is stronger for spanking than it is for hot 
sauce etc. However, it is still the case that for an unstudied form of punishment, parents ought 
not to use it — because there is no reason for them to depart from the default rule, "refrain from 
intentionally causing others distress".
Since I've acknowledged that the empirical evidence doesn't distinguish between a 
parental behaviour that is performed with an intention to cause distress and the same behaviour 
performed without that intention, one might wonder how the empirical evidence can be telling 
about punishment at all. Won't the evidence be relevant only against, say, time-out — and not 
against using time-out as a punishment?31 
I've acknowledged that time-out, for example, can be used punitively (i.e. with an inten-
tion to cause distress) and non-punitively (i.e. without an intention to cause distress); and I've ac-
knowledged that the empirical evidence doesn't clearly distinguish between these two different 
uses of time-out. And, unlike in the case of spanking, we can't safely assume it's used with an in-
tention to cause distress. If recommendations in the popular media are anything to judge by, it's 
likely that time-outs are usually used punitively, but are sometimes used non-punitively, so it's 
likely that at least some of the studied instances of time-out are punitive, and some are non-puni-
tive. This means that there are these limitations on the empirical research on time-out (and other 
parental behaviours that can be either punitive or non-punitive):
~ We don't know if it's used punitively, so we don't know if any of its bad effects 
count against using it punitively.
~ We don't know if its lack of positive effects count against using it punitively.
~ We don't know if any of its positive effects count in favour of using it punitively.
31Many thanks to Geoff Sayre-McCord for raising this objection.
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In which case, parents ought to stick with the default rule (Avoid intentionally causing others dis-
tress), in the absence of justification to depart from it. The empirical evidence fails to provide a 
reason to use time-out punitively. For time-out (and many other non-spanking punishments) we 
can accept (B), even if we can't accept (A):
(A) The evidence provides good reason to think that time-out is an ineffective or 
harmful punishment.
(B) The evidence fails to provide good reason to think that time-out is an effective 
and harmless punishment.
So, even if we are skeptical that the evidence against time-out is sufficiently conclusive to show 
that it is ineffective and harmful when used punitively (as opposed to when it is used either puni-
tively or non-punitively), we can nevertheless conclude that it is not justified to use time-outs 
punitively because there is not sufficient evidence to justify departure from the default rule of be-
haviour: do not intentionally cause distress. 
Distress
Some instances of the way that I will be using the word distress may be counterintuitive, so I will
clarify what I mean. First, distress isn't necessarily a big deal, and it's also not necessarily minor. 
It can be physical or emotional. It need not be severe and long lasting, or minor and short lived. 
If a mother intentionally upsets her daughter by calling her a slobby pig, because her room is so 
messy, that's unlikely to result in a huge degree of distress — unlike a severe beating with a cane 
would cause — but the child's hurt feelings, or embarrassment etc, is some small amount of dis-
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tress.32 Causing intentional distress is sometimes a very small thing. Indeed, the very occasional 
intentional infliction of distress on children, through punishment, is likely not to be a big deal. 
However, this is not to deny that typically children do experience distress when they are spanked,
insulted or forced to have a time-out, even if the distress is relatively small on each occasion. 
(And, remember, even a small departure from the default rule "do not intentionally cause other 
people distress" does require justification. You would no doubt appreciate this if I purposefully 
made a 1cm scratch your car, or rang your doorbell at 3 o'clock in the morning. These would not 
be instances of major wrongdoing, but even these minor cases of causing distress would be 
wrong, in the absence of justification for them.)
Distress is a kind of harm. But harm doesn't have to involve distress. Some might think 
that it's the intentional infliction of harm, rather than infliction of distress that characterizes pun-
ishment. I am inclined to think that distress (to some degree) is necessary for an action to suc-
ceed in being a punishment — simply because parents typically intend to "teach that kid a les-
son" when they punish, and this would make no sense if punishments could be inflicted without a
child's knowledge or negative emotional response. Suppose, intending to punish her, a father 
throws away his child's most educational book, but she doesn't know that he has done this (or she
does know, but she doesn't care). Then the father has, let us suppose, harmed his child by hinder-
ing her education, but it seems to me that he has failed in his effort to punish her — because she 
is not upset and so can't possibly be motivated to "learn her lesson", which is the father's goal. I 
32Insults are perhaps not usually thought of as punishments, but if they're used to intentionally 
upset a child, in response to disapproved of behaviour, with the goal of "teaching her a lesson", 
then they are a being used as punishment. If you disagree, and think that insults are not 
punishments for some reason, even when they involve intentional infliction of distress, that 
simply means there are other ways in which parents unjustifiably intentionally inflict distress on 
their children, in addition to PPC. These putative non-punishments would require justification 
too.
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am inclined to think that he has failed to punish his daughter because he has failed to cause dis-
tress, even though he has (we can suppose) succeeded in causing harm. As Tadros (2011) puts it 
with respect to criminal punishment:
If offenders do not suffer, or are not harmed in some other way, they have not been 
punished, or at least they have not been punished very successfully.33 
However, we don't need to come to an agreement on cases in which a parent inflicts harm
without distress. Intentionally inflicting harm will generally involve intentionally inflicting dis-
tress so, in real life, the distinction won't make much difference. And since my argument con-
cludes that parents ought not to punish their children, that has the practical (if not logical) impli-
cation that parents ought not to try to punish their children. Whether or not the parent in the 
above example succeeds in punishing or not is irrelevant for present purposes — he ought not to 
have tried to punish in the first place.34
Dialectic strategy
Before moving on to purported justifications for PPC, I would like to make a note on the dialec-
tic strategy in this dissertation: My argument starts from a default moral principle: "Do not inten-
33Tadros (2011), p. 1
34On the other hand, consider this example: If a mother intentionally upsets her child, without 
otherwise harming him she has, I think, still punished him. In response to her son's misbehaviour,
suppose she says, "Now I won't take you to the circus!", when there wasn't a circus to go to 
anyway, so she had no prior intention of taking him. She has upset him (because he falsely 
believes he's been deprived of some future pleasure) but she hasn't harmed him — in addition to 
just upsetting him, that is — because she hasn't in fact deprived him of anything. We might think 
that she has succeeded in punishing him because she has successfully caused emotional distress, 
even though she did not cause any harm other than the emotional distress.
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tionally cause others distress" and, unless there is good reason to depart from that default moral 
principle, punishment of children is unjustified. That is, in the absence of good reason to depart 
from the default, we stick with the default — which implies that parents shouldn't punish their 
children. 
But it might be suggested that this dialectic strategy is misguided and that we ought to 
start from common sense, which dictates that children ought to be punished when they do wrong.
And then the burden would be on me to show that we have good reason to depart from common 
sense and refrain from punishing children. 
This disagreement makes a difference in the real world. With respect to physical punish-
ment in particular, Elizabeth Gershoff, whose research demonstrates multiple potential harms of 
physical punishment maintains that "unless and until researchers, clinicians, and parents can def-
initely demonstrate the presence of positive effects of corporal punishment (including effective-
ness in halting future misbehavior), not just the absence of negative effects, we as psychologists 
cannot responsibly recommend its use".35 On the other hand, some researchers who defend the 
use of corporal punishment (on the grounds that it's no worse than any other form of punishment)
tend to support the commonsensical status quo and think parents should be free to use whichever 
(non-abusive) discipline method they see fit.36 Such researchers think that until and unless there 
is conclusive evidence that spanking is more harmful that alternative forms of punishment (such 
as time-out or removing privileges), then there should be no "blanket recommendations against 
its use".37 
35Gershoff (2002 b)
36See, for example, Larzelere et al (1997).
37Larzelere et al (1997), p. 7.
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Gershoff thinks the default position should be to refrain from hitting children, until and 
unless it is shown to be beneficial to do so. Larzelere thinks the default position should be the 
common sense "parental liberty" to punish children by spanking, until and unless it's shown to be
worse than alternative forms of punishment. While the US, Canada, and the UK, for example, 
have not joined many other countries in banning corporal punishment of children, organizations 
supporting and representing pediatricians in those countries are opposed to the practice. The 
American Academy of Pediatrics recommends that parents don't use spanking or other corporal 
punishment.38 The Canadian Paediatric Society is a signatory to the "Joint Statement on Physical
Punishment of Children and Youth" which maintains that parents should be encouraged to avoid 
physical punishment.39 And the position statement of Britain's Royal College of Paediatrics and 
Child Health says that corporal punishment should not be used and it supports a legal ban on its 
use.40 So theoretical discussions about the burden of proof can have real life implications.
It might be argued that it's reasonable to start with common sense as our default moral 
position because it has developed over many, many generations and billions of parent-child rela-
tionships. This surely gives us some reasonable — although of course defeasible — evidence that
punishing children is effective, and thus morally justifiable. And the onus should be on those 
who would challenge the morality of the common sense position to provide the reasons to depart 
from it.
38https://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/aap-press-room-media-center/pages/
discipline.aspx
39http://www.cheo.on.ca/en/physicalpunishment
40http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/sites/default/files/asset_library/Policy%20and%20Standards/
Policy%20Documents/Corporal%20Punishment%20Policy%20Nov09.pdf
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I think this position is mistaken. While I think that common sense dictates our practical 
starting place, it needn't dictate our dialectical starting place. Given that we have to do some-
thing (with inaction counting as doing something), the natural and sensible thing to do might be 
to do what we've always done, what common sense tells us to do — which in this case is for par-
ents to punish their children when they judge it's appropriate. However, the fact that — practical-
ly speaking — we need to start from the common sense position, doesn't mean that dialectically 
we must start there.
Suppose we were considering the ethics of marriage. Given that we have to do some-
thing, our behaviour would be (and reasonably should be) to stick with common sense, which 
has developed over many generations, and carry on doing what we're doing (unless and until we 
have reason to depart from the common sense position). But granting this practical starting place,
doesn't mean that common sense needs to be our dialectical starting place. We might start from 
"A liberal state has no legitimate role in the private and consensual affairs of its citizens" or 
"Consenting adults may do as they please so long as it harms nobody else" or "The definition of 
'marriage' is a union between a man and a woman", and so on. 
What determines the correct dialectical starting position? I don't think there's any one 
correct starting place. There are various possibilities and it makes sense to start from premises 
that one judges that as many people as possible will accept, and try to keep as many people on 
board as possible throughout one's argument, until one reaches one's conclusion. If common 
sense was supposed to be a dialectical starting point, and not only a practical one, it would form 
a premise in an argument (not necessarily a deductive argument). How might such an argument 
go?
(1) The common sense view is that PPC is permissible.
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(2) Only if there is good reason to think that departing from the common sense view 
is morally preferable, ought we to depart from the common sense view.
Then, the supporters of common sense would be inclined to accept the following:
(3) There is no good reason to think that departing from common sense is morally 
preferable.
(4) Therefore, we ought not to depart from the common sense view.
(5) Therefore, we ought to believe that PPC is permissible.
Whereas of course I would defend the following:
(3') There is good reason to think that departing from common sense is morally 
preferable.
(4') Therefore, we ought to depart from the common sense view.
(5') Therefore, we ought not to believe that PPC is permissible.
The weight of common sense and premise (2) puts the burden on those (like myself) who would 
seek to reject the common sense view, and requires us to defend premise (3'), which is what I do 
in this dissertation. The reason that departing from common sense is morally preferable to stick-
ing with it, is that we accept this moral principle: Avoid intentionally causing distress to others. 
And, unless we have reason to depart from that, parents ought not to punish their kids. (We will 
see shortly that common sense cannot provide a reason to depart from this default moral 
principle.)
However, perhaps the argument that starts from common sense is not supposed to be a 
moral argument (at least not directly, anyway). It could be less about the permissibility of punish-
ment and more about the effectiveness of punishment. (It might lend support to a moral argument
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on the grounds that effectiveness of PPC implies its moral permissibility.) How might this argu-
ment go? This is the reconstruction that I think is most problematic for me:
(1) The common sense view is that PPC is effective.
(2) Only if there is good reason to think that there is a more effective alternative to the
common sense view, ought we to depart from the common sense view.
(3) There is no good reason to think that there is a more effective alternative to the 
common sense view.
(4) Therefore, we ought not to depart from the common sense view.
(5) Therefore, we ought to believe that PPC is effective.
Unfortunately, I think that the currently available empirical evidence regarding non-punitive 
methods of discipline is not (yet) tremendously impressive. While there is some favourable evi-
dence (which we will touch on in Chapter 9), there is not yet a consensus. So, for the time being, 
we cannot be confident in rejecting premise (3). This is why this is the most problematic argu-
ment for me. Luckily, however, I think we can reject premise (2). In order to legitimately reject 
the common sense view it is not necessary to show that there is a more effective alternative (al-
though of course that would be preferable). We can reject the common sense view on the grounds
that PPC is ineffective (and I will be marshalling the evidence that this is the case) even if we 
don't have conclusive evidence in favour of an alternative. 
This is analogous to common sense telling us that a particular health or medical behav-
iour is effective, but scientific evidence demonstrating that it's not. (Examples would be things 
like: Avoid cramps by not eating before swimming; Eat carrots for better vision; Don't stay out in
cold, wet weather in order to avoid catching colds; Take Tylenol to get rid of a  headache.) It 
would be good if we had evidence in favour of an alternative treatment or course of action, but 
it's not necessary in order to argue successfully against the common sense view. We can rule out 
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not eating before swimming as a way to prevent cramps, without knowing what would prevent 
them. 
So I think that the argument should go like this:
(1) The common sense view is that PPC is effective.
(2') If and only if there is good evidence that PPC is not effective, ought we to depart 
from the common sense view.
(3') There is good evidence that PPC is not effective (despite common sense beliefs).
(4') Therefore, we ought to depart from the common sense view.
(5') Therefore, we ought not to believe that PPC is effective.
Premise (2') correctly puts the onus on those (like myself) who would reject common sense, but 
instead of premise (3), this dissertation supports premise (3'): there is evidence that various forms
of parental punishment are not effective, especially spanking but also time-out and other 
punishments. 
Bear in mind that this is not the argument I am relying on in order to conclude that par-
ents ought not to punish their children. I summarized my argument earlier in this chapter. The 
gist is that it is a default moral rule of behaviour that we ought to refrain from intentionally caus-
ing others distress. And unless there is good reason to depart from that default (as in the case of 
self-defense), we ought to stick with that default — and thus not punish our children.
Even though it's not necessary for me to start my argument from the defeasible assump-
tion that common sense is correct about PPC, I will nevertheless consider if common sense is 
able to provide a justification for departing from the default rule of behaviour and punishing 
children.
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CHAPTER TWO: Common sense justifications
PPC has certainly struck some philosophers as common sense, and the vast majority of people in 
Western society would agree that PPC is common sense. There are a number of different ways in 
which a common sense justification of PPC might go. Let us quickly dispense with the less sen-
sible versions, before moving onto more sophisticated ones. One is simply based on assumptions 
about what behaviour is widespread, and I assume that nobody would take such a position seri-
ously. It wasn't that long ago that it was considered common sense for a husband to beat a dis-
obedient wife (and in some societies, it is still common sense); everyone else did it too, including
their own fathers with their own mothers. I shall assume without argument that intentionally 
causing distress is not justified by the fact that everyone, or a great number of people, do some-
thing that intentionally causes distress, or that one's parents did something that intentionally 
causes distress.
A second variation on the common sense theme is to point to one's own case and claim 
that the fact that "I was punished and I turned out OK" justifies PPC. However, the existence of 
adults who experienced abuse as children and "turned out OK" does not justify abusing children;
similarly, the existence of adults who experienced punishment as children and "turned out OK" 
does not justify punishing children. That's just not a sufficient justification for intentionally in-
flicting distress. That someone "turned out OK" isn't by itself sufficient to justify any aspect of 
their past treatment. Anyway, we could surely find people who weren't punished as children and 
who could truthfully claim, "I wasn't punished and I turned out OK". Someone turning out OK 
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does not, by itself, provide support for their parents' child rearing techniques. Furthermore, even 
if someone who was punished as a child "turned out OK", there's no reason to think that they 
wouldn't have turned out better (psychologically healthier, with stronger relationships, more ethi-
cal behaviour, and so on) had they not been punished. The fact that some people may be spared 
long term ill effects is hardly a resounding endorsement of a practice of inflicting intentional dis-
tress on someone else.
Even if a particular person didn't suffer any long term ill effects of punishment (indeed, 
even if that person benefited from it), that wouldn't justify intentionally inflicting suffering on 
someone else, because the lack of ill effects for one person is consistent with punishments carry-
ing significant risks for various long term harms. A particular smoker could truthfully claim that 
they suffered no long term health problems but that doesn't mean that it's a good idea for some-
one else to smoke. Smoking increases the risk of long term health problems, and punishing kids 
increases the risk of various long term harms, as we shall see later. 
Presumably, people who use this defense typically intend to imply that they wouldn't 
have turned out OK without being punished during childhood. But that is an empirical claim 
about the risks and benefits of PPC versus non-punitive discipline and there is no evidence to 
support the claim that it's better to punish kids than to raise them with non-punitive discipline. 
(They may be assuming that the only alternative to PPC is no discipline at all. In which case, 
they might be correct that some PPC is better than no discipline at all. But of course they're 
wrong that these are the only two options.)
It's natural
Now let's move on to more sophisticated common sense defenses of PPC. One might note that 
human beings have been punishing children for millennia, across all cultures — it would be mind
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blowing to discover that it was not a good idea to punish children for their misbehaviour. It 
would be similar in magnitude to discovering that the common sense view "breastfeeding is 
healthy for babies" is false. Breastfeeding is natural, and human beings have been doing it for 
millennia, across all cultures. Surely when something is so universal and natural, we have reason 
to think it's beneficial for our species. And if it's beneficial for our species, that gives us reason to
think that it's morally acceptable.
There are a number of ways to respond to this objection. (I will start with weaker ver-
sions of the objection, and progress to better versions.) First, we need to be wary of claims of 
universality. Is it in fact universal across all cultures throughout history and all over the globe, 
that parents standardly punish their children? The fact that we (in rich, Western societies) are sur-
rounded by punitive parenting — both in our daily lives and in our media — doesn't mean that 
punitive parenting is the norm in other cultures, past or present. 
In fact, there are many societies around the world that are non-punitive towards their chil-
dren. For example, the Utku of the Canadian Arctic,41 the Ammassalik of Greenland,42 the Fore 
of Papua New Guinea,43 the Bachiga of East Africa,44 the !Kung of the Kalahari Desert,45 the 
41See Briggs (1971) and Briggs (1994).
42Mirsky (1937) and Robert-Lamblin (1986) 
43Sorenson (1976)
44Mandelbaum Edel (1937)
45Draper (1978)
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Buid of the Philippines,46 and the Semai of the Malaya peninsula47 are generally non-punitive to-
wards their children. There may well be others. 
I do not mean to imply any endorsement of the typical parenting practices of these cul-
tures more generally. For example, the Utku Inuit don't punish their children, but after infancy 
parents express very little affection towards their children. Adults are not affectionate towards 
one another either. The overriding values seem to be emotional neutrality and self-control. By 
mentioning these cultures, I am not attempting to provide evidence of the benefits of non-puni-
tive childrearing. I am merely providing evidence against the "common sense" claim that it's uni-
versal that human societies punish their children.48
It's not always clear what "natural" means when talking about human behaviour. But it 
often seems to be taken to imply inevitability, and thus moral permissibility. (Conversely, when a
human behaviour or tendency is described as "unnatural", it's taken to imply moral impermissi-
bility.) However, I take it that even when a human behaviour or practice really is universal, that 
doesn't necessarily mean it's "natural" in any sense that implies inevitability.49 Even if we disre-
gard the evidence from other cultures regarding non-punitive parenting and suppose it's true that 
it is indeed (so far) universal that parents are punitive towards their children, we should not infer 
that it is therefore natural or inevitable, (and thus morally acceptable) that they are. Since much 
46Gibson (1989)
47Knox Dentan (1968) and (1978)
48Thank you to Gerald Postema for pushing me to clarify my point here.
49As John Stuart Mill observed in The Subjection of Women, "Whatever any portion of the human
species now are, or seem to be, such, it is supposed, they have a natural tendency to be." Mill 
(1869)
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human behaviour is learnt from previous generations, there is no in principle reason to think that 
even completely universal behaviours couldn't be changed over time.
Another sense of natural is that humans are "designed" by evolution to behave a certain 
way. And this is sometimes taken to imply that this is how humans should behave. This is the 
sense in which breastfeeding is natural. But, even if a practice is (so far) universal, and in this 
sense natural, there may nevertheless be better alternatives that we can strive towards. Natural 
and (so far) universal does not mean inevitable. For example, confirmation bias has likely affect-
ed all human cultures, at all times in history — perhaps it's useful in certain contexts that were 
common in our evolutionary past but it's a liability now; perhaps it's a harmful side effect of 
something else that is useful (either to individuals or to the survival of the species). The fact that 
a practice or habit is natural and (so far) universal doesn't mean that we can't now try to change it
and do things differently, and better. Currently, breastfeeding is best for human babies; that 
doesn't mean that it always will be. We might come up with a better way of feeding them. Grant-
ed, we should be highly skeptical of claims that there is a better alternative to something we have
evidence is beneficial and that has survived through millennia of human evolution (as we should 
be highly skeptical of current baby formula manufacturers' claims) but when we know that a 
practice causes harms (as punishment does, as confirmation bias does) we need not be quite so 
skeptical of purported alternatives. We know that harmful habits, practices or even physical traits
can persist throughout millennia of evolution. Evolution, even over millennia, doesn't guarantee 
the best possible design, or even a good design — merely a design good enough to propagate the 
species in its ecological niche.
Furthermore, even if a natural practice has enabled our species to survive and thrive, that 
doesn't imply that it's morally acceptable. If a mother chooses to breastfeed her child, it harms 
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nobody — that is why it is morally permissible for her to do so. The benefit to the species' sur-
vival isn't what makes breastfeeding permissible. Benefit to the species (in contrast to benefit to 
the individual members of a species) cannot by itself justify actions that are otherwise harmful. 
Killing other animals for food might have been essential to our species' survival, but that doesn't 
mean that it's now a morally acceptable practice — perhaps it is, perhaps it isn't. Even if we sup-
pose that rape has been beneficial for our species' survival — perhaps by propagating the genes 
of physically strong, aggressive males — that wouldn't mean that rape is a morally acceptable 
practice. So even if PPC had (somehow) enabled our species to survive and thrive, that wouldn't 
imply that it is morally acceptable.
Common sense defenses that depend on claims of the universality of PPC, or its natural-
ness, do not succeed in providing a reason to depart from the default rule to avoid intentionally 
causing distress, and so do not succeed in justifying PPC. However, we will now proceed to 
stronger versions of the common sense defense of PPC, that will be more difficult to counter.
Immediate compliance
Another version of a common sense justification might be that parents can observe that punish-
ment works on their own children, and by working they mean that it tends to get them compli-
ance. After all, parents spend a lot of time with their children, especially when they are young, 
and so they are able to make many observations of the effects of punishment, over an extended 
period of time. There is perhaps some plausibility to the idea that parents can observe — over 
numerous instances — that punishment tends to get them immediate compliance. Parents spank 
Bobby, or give him a time-out, and afterwards he does what he was told. (And, on the next occa-
sion, a mere threat of the same punishment gets compliance from Bobby.) It's less plausible that 
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they can observe how their punishment would compare to alternatives. It's not plausible that they
can observe the long term effects of their punishments. And, even if they are correct and do get 
immediate compliance, would it be enough to justify PPC?
This idea that punishment is useful for immediate compliance does have some empirical 
support — but the evidence is not as compelling as it might at first seem. A classic experiment 
described in Forehand et al (1976) compared three different discipline techniques (negative at-
tention, isolation, and ignoring, plus a combination) with respect to their effect on child noncom-
pliance — both during the three sessions in which the techniques were used (treatment phase) 
and also in the four subsequent sessions in which they weren't used (recovery phase). Here is 
how the authors describe the different discipline techniques:
For the isolation condition the mother stated, "You did not do what I said, so I am go-
ing to leave the room for a while." Subsequently, the mother left the room for one 
minute. For the ignoring condition, the mother stated, "You did not do what I said, so 
I'm not going to watch you for a while." Then the mother read a magazine for one 
minute and did not respond to the child. For the negative attention condition the 
mother stood up and stated, "You did not do what I said; I do not like it when you dis-
obey me." Subsequently, she crossed her arms and glared at the child for one 
minute.50
All discipline techniques reduced noncompliance during the sessions in which they were being 
used. Once the techniques were no longer being used, noncompliance crept up again, but moth-
ers' expressed negative attitude towards noncompliance (reprimand combined with glaring at the 
child) resulted in the lowest levels of noncompliance both during treatment and recovery — low-
er than ignoring, isolation, and a combination of methods. 
50Forehand et al (1976), p. 116.
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The paper doesn't describe how the children appeared to feel about the various treat-
ments, so it's not clear if the children were upset by them. We cannot know if the intention was to
cause the children distress by ignoring, isolating, or reprimanding them. However, the paper does
make explicit that the reprimand is communicative and the mother's tone of voice is merely 
"firm" (rather than angry or threatening):
The reprimand is designed to communicate two messages to the child: an explicit 
statement of the violated parental expectancy and of the parent's disapproval regard-
ing the violation.51
All the discipline methods did indeed have the immediate effect of reducing noncompliance, but 
unfortunately we can't really know how punitive the methods were in practice. That is, we can't 
know whether the methods employed by the mothers in the experiment were intended to upset 
their children, or rather to communicate disapproval to them (without the intention of upsetting 
them). So, while this classic study may support52 the idea that parental discipline tends to result 
in immediate compliance — it's not clear whether punitive discipline produced that result. A ver-
bal reprimand and glare may or may not be punitive. That is, the action may or may not be in-
tended to upset the child (i.e. to cause the child distress). It could have been merely expressive of
the parent's displeasure.53 And given the authors' explicit statement that the reprimand is commu-
nicative and in a firm tone of voice, rather than being angry or threatening, there is some reason 
51Forehand et al (1976), p. 110.
52At best, it would support this conclusion only weakly though — because there were only 32 
mother-child pairs in one experiment and 28 mother-child pairs in another.
53Well, in this case, feigned displeasure, since it was an experimental situation in which mothers 
were instructed to say certain things to their children.
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to think that it wasn't supposed to be punitive. On the other hand, there is also some reason to 
think it was supposed to be punitive, because the authors also say, "The aversive quality of the 
stimuli emitted by the authority person while administering the procedure is also maximized. 
These stimuli include posture, gestures, and tone-of-voice."54 Which makes it sound as though 
the mothers' actions were supposed to be as unpleasant as possible to the children, perhaps in-
tending to cause them distress. So, given that we can't be sure if the reprimand was non-punitive,
we can't use this study as evidence in favour of non-punitive discipline. Similarly, however, we 
can't use this study as evidence in favour of punitive discipline. It does provide some (weak) evi-
dence in favour of using discipline of some kind to deal with noncompliance — all the discipline
methods used were more effective than simply repeating commands. 
Another article that is often referenced as evidence in support of parental punishment be-
ing useful for immediate compliance is Chapman & Zahn-Waxler (1982). This small study55 
lends some support to the idea that "love withdrawal" (which includes time-outs, as well as with-
drawing affection or attention) is helpful for gaining child compliance. Compared with the other 
discipline methods the researchers considered — reasoning, verbal prohibition, physical coercion
(including both physical restraint and physical punishment) — love withdrawal appeared to be 
the most effective in gaining child compliance. However, as with Forehand et al (1976), it's not 
clear which of their discipline methods are punitive. In particular, it's not clear that what they call
"love withdrawal" is always punitive. Leaving a child alone for a few minutes to calm down may
54Forehand et al (1976), p. 110.
55It involved only 24 mothers and their toddlers. Over a 9 month period, the data collected was 
on 514 reported disciplinary incidents. This means that, for example, the combination of 
reasoning + physical coercion (which was used in 3.8% of the 447 incidents that ended with 
unambiguous compliance or noncompliance) was used in only about 17 incidents. That is a very 
small number of discipline incidents to base any comparative conclusion on.
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not be punitive; locking him in his room because a parent intends to upset the child is punitive. 
Similarly for physical coercion, which may or may not be punitive. We simply don't know how 
much of the "physical coercion" was spanking (punitive), or if it's holding a child's arm to pre-
vent them from hurting themselves or someone else (not necessarily punitive). We also don't 
know often the "verbal prohibitions" were things like calmly saying, "Honey, it is dangerous for 
you to play with that. So I need to put it away safely" which is likely not punitive; and how often
they were saying things like, "You stupid kid! Don't play with that!" which likely is punitive (as-
suming the parent intends to upset the child into compliance). 
If we suppose that "love withdrawal" is punitive (and it certainly sounds like something 
that is intended to upset a child) and we also suppose that reasoning and verbal prohibition are 
non-punitive, then this study would provide some weak evidence that the punitive method was 
superior to the non-punitive methods for gaining immediate compliance from children. The evi-
dence is weak because there were only 24 mother-child pairs in the study. The children were also
very young, only 10-20 months old at the beginning of the nine month study period. With chil-
dren this young, it is unlikely that reasoning or verbal prohibitions alone would be consistently 
effective at gaining compliance. It's much more realistic to not expect much compliance to 
parental commands in the first place, so to keep them to a minimum. In the Forehand et al (1976)
paper discussed above, the commands were things like "Play with the blocks now", "Play with 
the toy cars now". These are unreasonable demands to make on a child, and were in an experi-
mental condition. In Chapman and Zahn-Waxler (1982), the demands were realistic (as this was 
a naturalistic study, not experimental), and they report that "children were significantly more 
likely to comply with parental wishes than not".56 So the first thing that parents can do to reduce 
56Chapman and Zahn-Waxler (1982), p. 86.
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the rate of noncompliance is to make sure their requests or instructions are reasonable! The sec-
ond thing they can do is to reduce the possibility of noncompliance in the first place by, for 
example, putting locks on cupboard doors, putting things out of children's reach, and so on. In-
stead of expecting a toddler to comply with a parental demand not to open the fridge, or not to 
say "Dammit", which the child had heard their mother say (a couple of the examples mentioned 
in Chapman and Zahn-Waxler (1982)) it's much more realistic to distract a toddler, to keep the 
fridge locked, help the child get something from the fridge, put forbidden items out of reach, and 
so on.57 Love withdrawal may well be more effective at reducing noncompliance than, for exam-
ple, verbal prohibitions or reasoning with toddlers — but there are many other non-punitive 
methods that parents could be using or improving upon, not just these.
However, even if we grant that love withdrawal is an effective method at gaining toddler 
compliance compared to non-punitive methods, as the researchers say, "The short-term efficacy 
of love withdrawal does not constitute a prescription for its use."58 We will return to this point, 
after completing the summary of the empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of punishment for
promoting child compliance.
Larzelere and Kuhn's meta-analysis59 looked at data from 26 different studies, which had 
investigated a number of different discipline methods, both punitive and non-punitive.60 They did
57I remember my own two year old going through a phase of being fascinated with the kitchen 
garbage can. Once I dropped my frustrated desire to get him to do as he was told, it was easy to 
come up with a solution. The garbage can was moved behind a door to the basement, which had 
a handle he couldn't reach. Not only did he forget about the garbage can most of the time because
he couldn't see it, he also couldn't open the basement door to get to it. No need for parental 
instructions to leave the garbage can alone; so no opportunity for toddler noncompliance.
58Chapman and Zahn-Waxler (1982), p. 93
59Larzelere and Kuhn (2005) 
60These included: privilege removal, reasoning alone, threaten/power assertion, love withdrawal,
physical coercion, grounding, scolding, time-out/isolation, conditional spanking, customary
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indeed find that certain punitive discipline methods (such as spanking and time-outs) were asso-
ciated with child compliance. So, this data supports the common sense position that punishment 
is, to some extent, effective at gaining child compliance. 
However, they also found that "customary spanking" (i.e. spanking as parents typically 
do it), for example, actually has a weaker association with child compliance than reasoning and 
ignoring (which may or may not be punitive).61 "Conditional spanking" — which is spanking that
meets certain conditions, not necessarily ones that parents achieve — was one of the most effec-
tive discipline methods and it has stronger associations with compliance than customary spank-
ing. However, verbal prohibition "did not differ significantly from conditional spanking in its as-
sociations with child outcomes"!62 In other words, in terms of association with child compliance, 
there is no reason to think that conditional spanking differs significantly from verbal prohibi-
tions. (Just as it's reasonable to assume that spanking is punitive, I think it's reasonable to assume
that verbal prohibitions are not punitive. That is, they are not typically issued after wrongdoing 
with the intention of causing distress.)
So even if a parent can observe over time that their favourite punishment method (spank-
ing, say) is often followed by compliance, they cannot see how it compares to a non-punitive dis-
cipline method they don't use, or that they rarely use. And this meta-analysis provides no reason 
to think that any of numerous methods of punishment is any better at gaining immediate compli-
ance than verbal prohibitions. So even if common sense is correct and punishment is at least 
spanking, overly severe spanking, ignoring, diverting, verbal prohibition.
61See Table V on p. 22 of Larzelere and Kuhn (2005) for the data on customary spanking 
compared to other discipline methods. See also Table IV on p. 20 of Larzelere and Kuhn (2005).
62Larzelere and Kuhn (2005), p. 26.
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somewhat effective for gaining compliance — and this meta-analysis supports that position — 
that does not mean that PPC is justified, even if all parents cared about was compliance (which 
of course, they don't). Verbal prohibitions (which I'm assuming are non-punitive) were just as 
strongly associated with child compliance as one of the most effective punitive methods for gain-
ing child compliance, conditional spanking.63
Although Larzelere (2000) lists it as supportive of spanking, Ritchie (1999) doesn't ap-
pear to support spanking for child compliance. It looked at many different outcomes of discipline
on 3 year old children, including compliance, passive non-compliance, whining, negotiating, de-
fiance, physical non-compliance, and so on. Although this study was not actually looking at the 
question of which discipline methods had better effects,64 it is apparent that non-compliance is 
more likely than compliance for almost all the maternal disciplinary responses considered — 
both punitive and non-punitive. (These are three year olds after all!) The "unsuccessful" discip-
line methods were were: spanking, removing privileges, time-out, reasoning, verbal power asser-
tion, threatening, and "giving in" i.e. consenting to the child's suggested alternative. 
The only disciplinary responses that were more likely to result in compliance than non-
compliance in this sample were: offering an alternative, physical power assertion (e.g. removing 
a forbidden thing from the child), and "no response" (e.g. ignoring a child's complaints about 
63"Combining data for all outcomes, the weighted mean effect sizes for specific tactics favored 
only 2 of 13 alternative tactics over conditional spanking, albeit non-significantly so." Larzelere 
and Kuhn (2005), p. 26. Since the difference between conditional spanking and two other 
discipline methods was "non-significant", that's effectively a tie. The two other tactics were 
nonphysical punishment + reasoning, and verbal prohibition. These three methods were tied for 
the most strongly associated with child compliance.
64It was looking at whether there are differences in outcome for single discipline encounters 
versus extended discipline encounters.  
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tidying up their toys).65 It's not clear that these disciplinary responses are punitive, so this article 
lends no support to the compliance justification for PPC. That is, contrary to common sense 
judgement, punishment (at least as used by these parents) isn't very good for gaining toddler 
compliance. (It may, however, support the idea that expecting 3 year olds to comply frequently 
with parental instructions is unrealistic!)66
Owen et al (2012) is a review article that looked at reported effects on child compliance 
of praise, positive nonverbal responses (e.g. high fives and hugs), reprimands, and negative non-
verbal responses. Importantly, reprimands and also some negative nonverbal responses (such as 
stern looks, crossed arms, shaking head) are communicative — that is, they are meant to commu-
nicate the parent's disapproval of a child's behaviour or remind children of the rules. The authors 
contrast reprimands and these communicative nonverbal responses with what they call "backup 
response costs", and what most people would call punishments, such as "loss of privileges, loss 
of points, or time-outs."67
This distinction is important for our purposes. A parent's frown or shake of the head can 
communicate to a child that the child is being too noisy or that the child is not allowed to jump 
on the couch. The frown or head shake is not intended to cause distress, it is intended to commu-
nicate the parent's disapproval of the child's behaviour, or remind the child of the household 
65No reward option (e.g offering to read to the child once they've tidied their toys), and no 
cooperation option (e.g. offering to help the child tidy their toys) were included, so we don't 
know how they would have compared to the other methods.
66It also seems that the sample size is small, although it's not very clear. "Ninety mothers of 
three-year-old children participated in the study... Thirty-one percent of the mothers could be 
reached and agreed to participate." Ritchie (1999), p. 581. 31% of 90 is about 28.
67Owen et al (2012). They have a behaviourist inclination and call anything that successfully 
extinguishes a behaviour a 'punisher'.
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rules.68 Punishments, such as loss of privileges, are intended to cause distress (and no doubt they 
communicate parents' disapproval too).
Despite this important distinction, the authors' conclusion does not distinguish between 
the effects of the communicative and the punitive negative nonverbal responses. They claim that 
reprimands and negative nonverbal responses — as an entire class — are effective in gaining 
child compliance. When we look at the details of the individual studies, in some of them it's not 
clear if the negative nonverbal response was punitive, such as Forehand et al (1976), which 
we've already looked at.69 The other articles that report positive results of nonverbal negative re-
sponses are all based on the use of time-out with clinical samples.70 That leaves the positive 
results of reprimand, which is unlikely to be punitive.71 So this review paper, which considered 
results from 41 articles that met the authors' inclusion criteria, supports the view that verbal rep-
rimand is useful for compliance in the nonclinical population that we are concerned with in this 
dissertation. It does not support the use of punishment for compliance in that population.
68If a child is not upset by the frown or head shake, then the parent's action has not failed. Of 
course, in such a situation, a parent would hope that the child's understanding of such 
information will result in compliance with the explicit or implied instruction not to jump on the 
couch. If it doesn't, then then have failed to elicit the desired behaviour, but they did not fail to 
achieve the desired psychological effect of the nonverbal behaviour — which was 
communicative, not emotional. A punishment would aim at the same end behaviour (compliance)
as the communication, but via causing distress.
69And many of the studies were looking at the results of parent training programs which involve 
implementing a variety of techniques simultaneously, and do not attempt to tease apart the effects
of the different techniques.
70Roberts et al (1978) was with "clinically deviant" children; Bean and Roberts (1981) used a 
"clinic referred" sample, as did Roberts (1982). The sample of 13 children in Roberts and 
Hatzenbuehler (1981) were referred by "local professionals for the treatment of conduct 
problems" and displayed a "clinically deviant" level of noncompliance (p. 108). The three 
subjects in Jones et al (1992) were rated as "deviant" on a standardized scale of aggression.
71These are Minton et al (1971), Reid et al (1994). Kuczynski et al (1987) and Kuczynski and 
Kochanski (1990) looked at frequency of reprimand, not effectiveness.
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Specifically regarding physical punishment and child compliance, a major meta-analysis, 
Gershoff (2002), which looked at "88 studies conducted over the last 62 years",72  concluded that,
"There is general consensus that corporal punishment is effective in getting children to comply 
immediately."73 However, she also points out that:
Three remaining issues qualify the overall positive relation of parental corporal pun-
ishment to children’s immediate compliance. First, the studies constituting the mean 
effect size for immediate compliance were not consistent; two of the five individual 
studies found corporal punishment to be linked with decreased compliance. This in-
consistency argues for caution in accepting that corporal punishment and immediate 
compliance are favorably associated... Second, three of the five studies in the meta-
analysis of immediate compliance only included target children who had been re-
ferred for conduct disorder... Third, although immediate compliance is often a valid 
short-term goal for parents, their long-term goals are that children continue to comply
in the future and in their absence... Immediate compliance can be imperative when 
children are in danger, yet successful socialization requires that children internalize 
moral norms and social rules... Consistent with previous research that power assertion
impedes children’s moral internalization.., the studies examined here found corporal 
punishment to be associated overall with decreases in children’s moral internaliza-
tion, operationalized as their long-term compliance, their feelings of guilt following 
misbehavior, and their tendencies to make reparations upon harming others.74 [Italics 
added]
thirteen of fifteen studies (eighty-seven percent) found that parents' use of corporal 
punishment was significantly correlated with less long-term compliance and less 
moral and pro-social behavior75
So even when research suggests that a particular type of punishment (in this case, physical pun-
ishment) is effective for child compliance, it's important to bear in mind that it might be for only 
72Gershoff (2002), p. 549
73Gershoff (2002), p. 549
74Gershoff (2002), p. 549-550
75Gershoff  (2010), p. 37
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a specific sub group (such as children with oppositional defiance disorder), and that there might 
be long term negative effects, even on the very behaviour that is supposed to be promoted (in this
case, child compliance).
To wrap up this section: The common sense judgement that PPC is effective for child compliance
is supported to a certain extent by some empirical evidence, but it is challenged by other empiri-
cal evidence. However, even if it's granted that PPC is effective in gaining child compliance, that
is not sufficient for justification. Recall the three requirements that have to be met for an instru-
mentalist justification of PPC to be successful:
(1) The distress inflicted (both intended and not intended) is not excessive, compared 
to the amount and/or type of benefit gained.
(2) The distress inflicted will likely lead to the intended goal.
(3) There is no comparably effective alternative that causes less distress.
So, even if we grant that PPC has a good chance of meeting (2), that still leaves (1) and (3) to be 
met. Even in the studies that seem to support the common sense view that PPC is effective for 
compliance, punishment is not shown to be any better than non-punitive alternatives. Non-puni-
tive alternatives such as verbal prohibitions and reprimands are not intended to cause distress and
so are highly likely to cause less distress than a parental action that is intended to do so. And of 
course there are non-punitive alternatives that weren't even considered that may well do better 
than the punitive (and other non-punitive) methods that were studied. So it can't be assumed that 
requirement (3) is met either. 
Furthermore, it matters how the value and 'amount' of compliance weighs against the dis-
tress inflicted (as well as the long term harms that might be unintentionally caused). Burning a 
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child with a cigarette butt might 'work' to gain compliance, but it would not be acceptable be-
cause it inflicts too much harm. Does spanking inflict too much distress? Time-out? Privilege 
removal? Of course, it's going to depend to a certain extent on the particular child how distress-
ing they find various punishments but, in general, there is no reason to believe that obedience 
gained is 'worth' the distress parents inflict, both intentionally and unintentionally. Also, the val-
ue of compliance surely depends, in part, on what behaviour is being enforced. ("Don't play with 
the stove knobs" versus "Pick up your toys" or "Kiss your Uncle Bert".) Parents' requests and in-
structions are not always reasonable. And even when they are, it's not clear that inflicting a pun-
ishment is overall the best route for parents to take.
Even if common sense is correct that PPC is an effective way to get compliance, it also 
matters what side effects it has, both short term and long term. If 'love withdrawal' is used puni-
tively — i.e. with an intention to cause distress — it seems likely that it could be a particularly 
pernicious form of discipline. Young children are completely dependent on their parents for safe-
ty and security (physical and emotional) and to give the impression that parental love is being 
withdrawn could have quite significant side effects that parents do not intend. We don't know that
this is the case (the researchers didn't follow the subjects long term) but in the absence of evi-
dence that this form of punishment is harmless, compliance to parental demands (which them-
selves may or may not be reasonable) does not seem sufficient benefit to justify the risk of poten-
tial harms. 
So it seems that requirement (1) is also unlikely to be met. We will look in detail at the 
long term harms and risks of PPC in Chapter 6, but for the time being, suffice it to say that it 
seems unlikely that the benefits of compliance are sufficient to justify the use of PPC, rather than
parents sticking to avoiding intentionally inflicting distress on their children by using non-puni-
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tive methods of achieving child compliance. This includes parental behaviours such as distrac-
tion, but also using methods that reduce the possibility for noncompliance in the first place, such 
as locking cupboard doors and putting gates at the stairs, and so on. With the proliferation of 
such products in recent years, this has become much easier for parents to achieve.76
Punishment plus reasoning for child compliance
At this point, common sense might remind us that parents aren't purists. Typically, parents don't 
only punish their children, just as they don't only reason with their children. They combine puni-
tive discipline with non-punitive discipline. They use punishment to emphasize the importance 
of the reasoning, or they punish sometimes and use non-punitive discipline at other times. 
The most favourable evidence regarding the benefit of punishment for compliance sup-
ports using punishment as a "back-up" for reasoning. Using punishment as a back-up means that 
children are more frequently reasoned with in the absence of punishment, but from time to time, 
punishment is used to reinforce the importance of parents' rules and reasoning. However, al-
though it is the best available evidence in favour of punishment, it is still very weak evidence. 
The classic paper, Parke (1969), concluded that punishment + reasoning was more effec-
tive than punishment alone, but as we shall see it does not provide good evidence in favour of 
parents combining punishment with reasoning. The experiment was based on kids  in the lab be-
ing allowed to play with certain toys, but not with others. After a child learns which toys are al-
lowed and which are forbidden, the experimenter leaves the room, and each child is surrepti-
tiously watched to see if they obey the rules about which toys they're allowed to touch. The 
76For an idea of how many such products there are, just take a quick look at 
www.mypreciouskid.com.
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reason children were given for not being allowed to play with some of the toys was that they 
might get broken or worn out if the kids were allowed to play with them. (Unfortunately, there's 
no information on what the toys actually were, so it's not possible to know how plausible this 
reason is. Perhaps the children were quite reasonably skeptical and that's why some of them ig-
nored the prohibition on certain toys.) In any case, the conclusion that punishment + reasoning 
was more effective than punishment alone doesn't help support punishment as a discipline 
method (even together with reasoning) because (1) there was no comparison with a completely 
non-punitive alternative and (2) the 'punishment' that was used wasn't really a punishment any-
way — it was just a buzzer sound which, presumably, wouldn't cause a child distress.77 In effect, 
although Parke referred to the buzzer as a punishment, it was really just a form of basic commu-
nication about which toys were "off limits" for the kids in the experiment.78 And the conclusion 
of Parke's experiment should be that the buzzer + reasoning is apparently better than the buzzer 
alone at getting children to avoid playing with certain toys. This does provide evidence that it's 
helpful to give children reasons for the rules we want them to obey. But it doesn't provide evi-
dence in favour of combining reasons with punishments.
In the 1990s, Robert Larzelere and his colleagues published two papers79 that explicitly 
compare a "reasoning alone" condition with a "reasoning + punishment" condition and a "pun-
77The buzzer didn't make a sound loud enough to cause pain, which would have made it 
punitive — but it also would have made an unethical experiment! It was 69 decibels in one 
condition and 86 in another. (The dial tone of a phone is 80 decibels, a piano's fortissimo is 
92-95 decibels.)
78Parke's definition of a punishment is is whatever successfully extinguishes an undesired 
behaviour. So a 'punishment' could even be something pleasant if it succeeds in conveying the 
necessary information about the relevant rules, such that they are are subsequently obeyed.
79Larzelere et al (1996) and Larzelere et al (1998)
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ishment alone" condition. (They define "reasoning" as a "description of consequences, explana-
tion, and seeking information".80) The sample was small and very young: 40 children, aged 2 and
3 years old. They looked at the effects of combining reasoning and punishment over time and 
concluded that reasoning alone is more effective at delaying toddler misbehaviour recurrences if 
there has been a more recent punishment back-up. If the punishment back-up was longer ago, 
reasoning alone is less effective than if the punishment back-up was more recent. The authors 
also claim that the effectiveness of reasoning alone depends on how often parents combine pun-
ishment and reasoning. The punishments were "time-out, withdrawal of privileges, hand slap-
ping, and spanking".81 These were compared to responses in the "other" disciplinary category, 
which included: command to stop, reward, threaten, planned ignoring, diverting child, other cor-
poral punishment — so a mixed bag of punitive and non-punitive responses.
Let's look first at the purported positive effects. The effects are very small. For example, 
"The median delay [until the next misbehaviour incident], given an immediately preceding back-
up, was 2.3 hours, whereas the median delay was only 1.6 hours when it had been 55 incidents 
since the latest back-up."82 This is a difference of 0.7 hours (42 minutes) in the median delay of 
misbehaviour. So even if we accepted the results at face value, the best possible scenario is that 
punishment makes a tiny positive contribution to reasoning's effectiveness with 2 and 3 year 
olds. Intentionally inflicting distress on a child, including hitting them, gained an extra 42 min-
utes of good behaviour.
80Larzelere et al (1998), p. 392
81Larzelere et al (1998), p. 392
82Larzelere et al (1998), p. 396
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Why might punishment be useful in increasing the effectiveness of reasoning, even if 
only a little bit?83 I suggest that if a parent is sometimes punitive, very young children do learn to 
take parental reasoning more seriously if it's accompanied by punishment (even if they don't real-
ly understand that reasoning). If a parent typically punishes for serious infractions, but they 
didn't punish on some particular occasion, it's reasonable for the child to infer that this particular 
infraction was not very serious. 
We might be tempted to think that parents who don't use punishment could, therefore, 
enhance the effectiveness of their discipline — even if only a little — by adding punishment 
"back-ups". While this might be true, this study has provided no reason to think it is. Even if it's 
true that, for parents who use both punitive and non-punitive discipline, punishment enhances the
effectiveness of reasoning, it could nevertheless be the case that occasional punishment makes 
non-punitive discipline less effective than it otherwise would have been. For all this study shows,
it could be that non-punitive discipline is taken less seriously by kids who are sometimes pun-
ished than it would be by kids who are never punished. A child who receives only non-punitive 
discipline doesn't have the contrast with punitive discipline and so can't infer on that basis that 
non-punitive discipline needn't be taken seriously. While we can't conclude that punishment 
wouldn't enhance the discipline methods of completely non-punitive parents, this study provides 
no reason to believe that it would do so. And so in the absence of a  positive reason to intention-
ally inflict distress on their children, parents ought to stick with the default and refrain from do-
ing so.
Even if we grant that this study provides evidence that, for parents who use both punitive 
and non-punitive discipline, punishment makes reasoning slightly more effective, this minimally 
83Thanks to Geoff Sayre-McCord for raising this question.
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effective disincentive doesn't seem sufficient to justify using punishment as a back-up for rea-
soning. This is because the gains were minimal, the comparison between punishment and rea-
soning is developmentally arguable for such young children, alternative non-punitive methods 
would need to be considered before drawing such a conclusion, and the harms of punishment 
would also need to be taken into consideration. (It's obvious we need to take harms into consider-
ation — as soon as we remember that abusive punishments, such as burning children with ciga-
rette butts, may well act as disincentives too.) So, reasoning + punishment fails to meet require-
ments (1) and (3), even if we grant that it (barely) meets (2).
It would be useful to compare the effects of reasoning alone — with older children, for 
whom it's more appropriate — when used by completely non-punitive parents with that of rea-
soning alone by sometimes-punitive parents. My suggestion is that sometimes-punitive parents' 
use of punishment would make reasoning less effective than when reasoning is used by com-
pletely non-punitive parents. However, there is no empirical evidence that makes this compari-
son, so we currently don't know whether or not the effectiveness of reasoning is undermined by 
the occasional use of punishment — but neither do we have reason to think that punishment 
enhances reasoning.
There are additional reasons why we shouldn't put too much stock in the conclusions of 
these studies anyway. First, the sample is small; only 40 children were enrolled to begin with and
only 33 mothers completed the follow up questionnaire. Second, at best the results would apply 
only to very young children — for whom one wouldn't expect "reasoning alone" to be particular-
ly effective at preventing or delaying misbehaviour anyway. Third, the authors didn't put all the 
punishments that parents used into their "punishment" category. They excluded all corporal pun-
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ishment other than hand slapping or spanking.84 This means, for example, that slapping a child's 
face would have been excluded. We can have no idea how the results would have turned out if 
such punishments had been included in the data analysis. Finally, and most importantly, the au-
thors didn't look at non-punitive discipline methods other than reasoning — and there are likely 
to be much more effective non-punitive discipline methods than reasoning with such young chil-
dren (e.g. distraction).
In addition, there could be ways to make reasoning more effective, without the use of 
punishment as a disincentive. Perhaps it would help if parents were trained in the use of NVC 
(non-violent communication). Perhaps it would help if parents knew more about child develop-
ment and appropriate expectations for their children. These studies did not explore any of these 
alternatives. So even if reasoning + punishment is better than reasoning alone, that's only one 
possible non-punitive discipline method. How does reasoning + punishment compare with dis-
traction? Or with reasoning + reward? Or how would distraction + non-violent communication 
work? All sorts of possibilities regarding non-punitive alternatives were not compared to the 
punishment options, and so it's unwarranted for Larzelere and his colleagues to draw the conclu-
sion that "reasoning can be effective with 2- and 3-year-olds but only when it is combined with 
punishment"85 and it would certainly be unwarranted to infer that punishment + reasoning is 
more effective than any other non-punitive discipline method.
84Larzelere et al (1998), p. 392. They excluded corporal punishment other than hand slapping or 
spanking ostensibly because it was more likely to be abusive. But this is not a good enough 
reason to exclude it from the analyses. Spanking is more likely to be abusive than time-outs, so 
why not exclude spanking too?
85Larzelere et al (1996), p. 54.
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In summary, there is some (weak) evidence supporting the view that the combination of 
reasoning and punishment is more effective than "reasoning alone" and "punishment alone" for 2
and 3 year olds. However, even if we ignore the small sample sizes and so on, and take the con-
clusions at face value, the effect is minimal. Given that punishment inflicts immediate distress or 
pain on children, and there's evidence, as we shall see, that it increases the risk of long term 
harms too, such as anxiety and increased dishonesty, there is no reason to think that it's overall 
beneficial to use punishment, either alone or in combination with reasoning, in order to gain 
child compliance. Even if adding punishment to reasoning delays misbehaviour by some small 
period of time, compared to reasoning alone, that is not sufficient to justify PPC — not least be-
cause "reasoning alone" is not the only non-punitive discipline method that should be compared 
with punitive discipline (especially with toddlers). Even if we grant that punishment enhances 
reasoning's effectiveness with toddlers (for whom one wouldn't expect reasoning to be particular-
ly effective anyway), for all we know, rewards could enhance reasoning's effectiveness more. Or 
perhaps distraction + reasoning works best of all. In the absence of reasons to prefer intentionally
inflicting distress (in the form of punishment + reasoning) to non-punitive discipline, parents 
ought to stick with the default rule of behaviour of avoiding intentionally inflicting distress.
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CHAPTER THREE: Behavioural training and the deterrence theory of punishment
Many parents think that punishment is justified not by immediate compliance (or not only by 
that), but by its usefulness for training kids to behave properly in the long term. That is, they 
think it can be useful, in the longer term, for training kids to be honest, non-aggressive, responsi-
ble, and so on.
It's very commonsensical to think that since human beings respond to disincentives, then 
of course parental punishment of children is beneficial and thus justified. Without disincentives, 
children wouldn't learn over time to do what they should or avoid doing what they shouldn't. On 
this view, the reason to punish children is to provide a disincentive to misbehaviour, so that over 
time they can be trained to behave properly. This commonsense justification is clearly related to 
the philosophical deterrence theory of punishment. The common factor is that both views are in-
strumentalist theories, which focus on using punishment as a means to improve behaviour over 
time. In the case of criminal deterrence theory, punishment is supposed to improve the future be-
haviour of those who have already offended, and punishment of one offender is also supposed to 
deter other potential offenders from actually offending. (The threat of punishment is credible 
only if offenders are often enough actually punished.) In the case of PPC, I assume that the focus
is on improving the punished child's behaviour in future, rather than on deterring other children, 
such as siblings, who might witness the punishment (although of course it might have that wel-
come side effect).
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In this chapter, we will first look at the evidence regarding criminal punishment and de-
terrence. Then we will turn to what we might call "natural incentives and disincentives" things 
like empathy and guilt, and see how they might serve to "train" young children to gradually be-
have better over time. Finally, we will consider the empirical evidence regarding punishment of 
children and its effectiveness at training children to behave properly and deterring them from un-
desirable behaviour. 
Criminal deterrence
It may seem intuitively obvious that punishments deter potential offenders and also deter offend-
ers from re-offending — but, despite its common sense appeal, the deterrence theory of criminal 
punishment is not actually strongly supported by the empirical literature.
To take the deterrence of potential offenders first. There are many factors involved when 
someone refrains from committing a crime (that they otherwise might be tempted to do), the pos-
sibility of punishment being only one of many: the likelihood of detection; the likelihood of be-
ing charged; the chances of failing to successfully commit the crime; anticipating feelings of 
shame and guilt at having done something wrong; anticipating feelings of shame, embarrassment
etc at being apprehended or charged; anticipating the social costs (e.g diminished reputation) of 
being apprehended or charged; the physical risk of committing the crime; the opportunity costs 
of committing a crime instead of, say, going to work or going on a cruise; and so on. On the oth-
er hand there are also possible benefits of committing the crime, which the potential offender is 
judging (explicitly or not) are not worth the risks: the likely financial benefits of committing the 
crime; the likely social benefits (e.g. increased "coolness" or "respect") of committing the crime; 
the other likely personal benefits (e.g. convenience, excitement, pleasure). Deterrence theory, 
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with its focus only on punishment, is too narrow. There are clearly many factors that may or may
not deter potential offenders, and many factors that they fail to be sufficiently attracted by. The 
broader Rational Choice Theory86 is actually a better fit as an explanation for criminal behaviour,
but it would take us too far afield to explore that literature here. It's quite possible, consistent 
with the empirical evidence, that it would be more effective (i.e. there would be a greater deter-
rence effect) to eliminate punishment, but to decrease the attractiveness of crime relative to al-
ternatives (e.g. by improving educational and employment opportunities) or to increase the 
chances of apprehension (e.g. by increased policing or other observation). So even if punishment
is a criminal deterrent to some degree, it's not clear that it is a very effective deterrent or that it is 
more of a deterrent than other, non-punitive, alternatives. (Of course, the costs of various ele-
ments would need to be taken into consideration too, in order to decide exactly which combina-
tion would be the best in a particular society, all things considered.)
To turn briefly to the idea of using punishment in order to deter offenders from re-offend-
ing. There is seems to be a consensus that imprisonment, at least, is not very effective at prevent-
ing offenders from re-offending after release:
Despite being used on a massive scale and consuming huge amounts of the public 
treasury, prisons have largely failed to reduce offender recidivism.87
[T]here is growing evidence that compared to noncustodial sanctions, imprisonment 
either has no effect, or a slight criminogenic effect, on recidivism.88
86Loughran et al (2016)
87Cullen et al (2012), p. 77
88Cullen et al (2012), p. 79
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It is reasonable to believe that increasing the number of police officers on the street 
does deter some amount of crime, and increasing the risk of incarceration does as 
well... the evidence does not suggest that either imprisonment itself or the length of 
imprisonment is effective in deterring crime for those who experience it.89
In England and Wales, for example, recidivism is high for both young (75 per cent) 
and adult (50 per cent) ex-prisoners, and even here these data only measure those ex-
prisoners who both offend and are caught... Indeed, prisons not only fail to deter 
'crime' but also have criminogenic effects...90
Studies show that almost 60 percent of adult offenders are returned to prison within 
three years of their release for either a technical violation or a new crime.91
The answer is not to make prison sentences harsher. Harsh prison experiences tend to 
make the problem even worse. For example, solitary confinement — compared to 
regular imprisonment — actually increases recidivism rates:92
The more painful prisons are, the more likely they are to increase recidivism.93
Research on recidivism for both juveniles and adults has shown that rehabilitative and
transition programming, as well as less punitive and restrictive conditions, can help 
reduce recidivism.94
Studies of prisons that have used solitary confinement less frequently show that this 
action actually increased public safety.95
89Paternoster (2010), p. 818
90Scott (2013), p. 12
91MacKenzie (2008), p. 5
92Gordon (2014), p. 498
93Cullen et al (2012), p. 80
94Gordon (2014), p. 519
95Gordon (2014), p. 526-8
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None of the programs focusing on punishment, deterrence or control, such as boot 
camps, electronic monitoring or intensive supervision were effective in reducing 
recidivism.96 
So, as we can see, the evidence from criminal punishment does not clearly favour the idea that 
punishment is an effective deterrent. We should bear this in mind when we consider parental 
punishment of children — what seems obvious and commonsensical may not actually be true.
Natural incentives and disincentives
Before delving into the evidence relevant to behavioural training of children with the use of pun-
ishment, we should note that there are what we might call "natural" incentives and disincentives 
that can help children learn to do what is right and refrain from doing what is wrong (and thus 
learn appropriate or sensible habits of behaviour). For example, the natural incentives of being 
kind to other people, feeling good about your own behaviour, avoiding others' distress, making 
others feel good, as well as the natural disincentives of upsetting people, feeling bad about your 
own behaviour, others' distress, and so on. Because young children lack the understanding, self-
control, and communicative abilities that adults have, perhaps many parents underestimate how 
much children do care about others' feelings and wellbeing. But the evidence supports the view 
that children begin to develop care and concern for others very early in life:
18- to 25-month olds were significantly more likely to offer assistance to an adult 
whom they had previously witnessed being harmed by another person, compared to 
an adult who had not been harmed.97
96MacKenzie (2008), p. 14
97Thompson (2014) 
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Children attempt to alleviate the distress of others, and they show concern about other
people being frightened or worried, well before they are able to articulate their under-
standing verbally.98
Observations of children within their families… make clear not only that children are 
concerned about the welfare of others who are distressed, and show the beginnings of 
empathic responsiveness to another's distress, but that they understand people can 
cause pain to others… It is not, in the second and third year, a wide or differentiated 
understanding of the notion of harm to others, but although limited, it is an essential 
foundation for sensitivity to moral issues that are related to the idea of harm to others,
and others' welfare.99
Modest levels of other-oriented empathy were already evident at 8- and 10-months 
[of age].100
Empathic concern [for others]... exists during the 1st year of life.101
And this care and concern for others can translate into prosocial behaviour (i.e. "overt
actions intended to benefit others" not merely an absence of antisocial behaviour, 
such as aggression)102:
[P]rosocial behavior of many different sorts appears in the second year of life, possi-
bly earlier for some forms. In a growing number of studies, infants between 12 and 24
months of age have been shown to help, comfort, share, and cooperate with others.103
98Dunn (2006)
99Dunn (2006), p. 333
100http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0163638311000506
101http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cdep.12028/abstract
102Carlo (2014) p. 209 
103Brownell (2013) 
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[I]nfants as young as 14 months of age help others achieve their instrumental goals by
removing obstacles and fetching out-of-reach objects for them.104
[Children at 18 months old and at 25 months old] showed more concerned looks to-
ward the victim while the victim was being harmed than while she was not being 
harmed. They also showed more subsequent prosocial behavior toward the victim af-
ter they had seen her being harmed than after they had seen her not being harmed. 
Moreover, the level of children’s concern in response to viewing the harm was posi-
tively related to the degree of their subsequent prosocial behavior toward the recipi-
ent.... Thus, by 18 months of age, children sympathize not only with a victim display-
ing overt distress cues but also with a victim who is displaying no emotional cues at 
all—where harm has to be inferred from overt actions. They also act prosocially to-
ward victims, and importantly, their concern for the victims correlates with and per-
haps motivates their prosocial behavior. The feeling of sympathy for others thus un-
derlies prosocial behavior from early in development.105
Furthermore, there is evidence that even very young children can experience the distinct emotion
of guilt. (Guilt is, roughly, an uncomfortable emotion that combines taking responsibility for 
one's own actions and feelings of sympathy or concern for those affected by one's actions.) Two 
year olds are able to feel sympathy for another person who is harmed by a mishap, but they are 
no more likely to help that person if they themselves caused the mishap than if somebody else 
caused it. Three year olds, on the other hand, feel sympathy for the other person, and are more 
likely to make reparations when they themselves were the cause of the mishap:
By at least 3 years of age, children make amends for their transgressions by attempt-
ing to repair and verbally expressing guilt.106 
104Hepach et al (2013)
105Hepach et al (2013)
106Vaish et al (2016) 
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It might be tempting to suggest that perhaps children are able to experience things likes 
guilt or sympathy this early simply because they've been taught to feel it through punishment at a
young age. But there is no evidence that this is the case. On the contrary, there is evidence that
Many inclinations [that comprise social concern] appear very early in life, before 
there has been much opportunity for social learning. Very young children, for exam-
ple, are inclined to form strong attachments to caregivers and to help others in dis-
tress. Many inclinations are exhibited by nonhuman primates, where social learning 
plays a much smaller role. For example, nonhuman primates often show concern for 
the pain of others; try to avoid causing harm to others, especially close others; and 
display some commitment to reciprocity... The inclinations are somewhat independent
of social learning. For example, the tendency for young children to help others is 
maintained regardless of whether it is rewarded or ignored... And the inclinations 
have some genetic basis and are linked to aspects of brain structure and 
functioning.107
So it appears that very young children are biologically endowed with the capacity to be-
have prosocially with those around them, before there has been much chance for social 
learning — in particular, the tendency is present independent of reward and punishment. Howev-
er, parents' behaviour can tap into these natural tendencies and there are parenting practices that 
can help kids become more empathic and engage in more prosocial behaviour. (And thus reduce 
the perceived need for punishment.) This is analogous to how children learn to speak. They are 
naturally endowed with the capacity to learn language from those around them; but parents don't 
(typically) teach children how to speak — certainly not with rewards and punishments as they 
might teach them table manners or how to pour milk from a carton without spilling it. However, 
there are behaviours that parents can engage in that help kids learn language, such as having con-
versations with them, reading to them, and so on.
107Agnew (2014)
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Brownell et al (2013) found that the way parents talk with their toddlers about others' 
emotions makes a difference to the quality of those toddlers' prosocial behaviour. In their experi-
ments, mothers were recorded reading picture books to their 18-30 month old children. And then 
the children were given opportunities to engage in sharing and helping tasks. (For example, the 
experimenter would say she was cold and ask if the child could get her a blanket, or the exper-
imenter would express sadness at not having a toy when the child had toys to play with, and so 
on.) The results were that how the parents engaged with their children when reading picture 
books with them made a difference in children's subsequent prosocial behaviour:
While reading picture books with their toddlers, parents who more often asked chil-
dren to reflect on and talk about the emotions depicted in the books had children who 
helped and shared with a needy adult more quickly and more often. Moreover, par-
ents’ encouragement of their children’s active participation in discussing others’ emo-
tions explained helping and sharing above and beyond the child’s age and how much 
parents themselves labeled and explained the depicted emotions. Thus, it was not how
much parents talked about emotions with their toddlers that mattered, but how they 
talked about them, and in particular, how much they encouraged the children them-
selves to think about, label, and explain others’ emotions.108
Parenting that encourages children to take the perspective of others is associated with 
greater development of cognitive empathy skills109 (i.e. the ability to infer the mental 
states of others), which leads to more prosocial behaviour in three to six year olds.110 
[H]igher levels of maternal (dispositional) cognitive empathy were associated with an
increased likelihood of engaging in parenting that encourages the child to take the 
perspective of others, which was in turn associated with greater development of child 
cognitive empathy skills...111 Children with greater cognitive empathy skills displayed
108Brownell et al (2013)
109Cognitive empathy contrasts with emotional empathy, which involves the "vicarious 
experience of emotion" and typically develops earlier. Farrant et al (2012).
110Farrant et al (2012) 
111There were no significant direct associations between mothers' cognitive or emotional empathy
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more prosocial behaviour. These findings suggest that the development of explicit 
[perspective taking] skills may facilitate children's prosocial behaviour.
This study is part of a growing body of research demonstrating the importance of children's cog-
nitive empathy skills and their relationship to prosocial behaviour. If parents think of discipline 
more broadly to include any parenting behaviour that helps children gradually learn to behave 
better (instead of focusing solely on responses to misbehaviour), then it's clear that it's important 
for parents to encourage (or perhaps, at least not hinder) the development of their children's cog-
nitive empathy skills.
Parents might learn to improve their ability to tap into children's natural empathy in order
to provide natural incentives and disincentives, and so avoid using the artificial disincentive of 
punishment. For example, instead of punishing their child when they grab a playmate's toy, a par-
ent could help them to see that their playmate is upset because their toy was taken. The discom-
fort a child feels when they appreciate someone else's upset is a natural disincentive to future 
misbehaviour — a disincentive that has the potential to make artificial disincentives in the form 
of punishments unnecessary.112 
If a parent encourages their child to notice a playmate's upset, even if the parent intends it
to cause their own child some degree of distress, then — even though the parent is intentionally 
causing their child distress — this is not a punishment. Remember that recognizing one's wrong-
doing and/or sympathizing with one's victim is a goal of discipline (both punitive and non-puni-
tive), and that experience (which may be felt as guilt) can of course be distressing. However, that
and children's prosocial behaviour.
112Note that punishment is typically based on self-interest. Empathy provides disincentives based 
on the interests of others.
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goal can be pursued punitively (through the intentional infliction of distress, such as physical 
pain) or non-punitively (without the intentional infliction of distress). A parent might try to help a
child to feel sympathy by pointing out that the victim of their wrongdoing is crying, or they 
might simply explain to their child that they did something wrong. Those actions are not punish-
ments. If my child didn't notice that grabbing the toy upset another child, and I point this out, my
child may or may not become distressed and might simply return the toy to the other child — be-
cause they have recognized that their actions caused someone else to become upset, and they 
simply wish to rectify it. I do not fail in my task if my child experiences no distress! (If I had in-
tended to punish my child, on the other hand, I would fail if they didn't experience any distress.) 
Indeed, intense personal distress — including feelings of shame — can actually be detri-
mental to prosocial behaviour. It can make a child want to avoid a situation, instead of rectifying 
it. Empirical research distinguishes between empathic concern and feelings of guilt for wrongdo-
ing on the one hand, and personal distress and shame on the other (which might be caused by the 
same stimulus, such as someone else's suffering), and has shown that the former, but not the lat-
ter contributes to prosocial behaviour: 
While empathic concern refers to the individual's other oriented feelings of sympathy 
and concern for someone in distress, personal distress refers to experiencing unpleas-
ant feelings oneself, in response to witnessing another in distress.113
[W]e conducted a study with hospice nurses caring for terminally-ill patients. What 
we found was that possessing empathic concern was positively related to the nurses' 
performance, but personal distress was negatively related. We surmised that if hospice
nurses felt their patients' pain (and family members' distress as well), it made them 
less able to do their job of providing comfort to the patient and family because they 
113Williams et al (2014)
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had their own emotions that they had to deal with.114 
[W]e found that personal distress (positively), empathic concern (negatively), self-
judgment, isolation and over-identification (positively), were associated with burnout 
[in nurses].115 
[E]mpathic concern for sadness does lead to prosocial resource allocation in young 
children both by promoting sharing and decreasing envy.116
Guilt appears to motivate reparative action, foster other-oriented empathy, and pro-
mote constructive strategies for coping with anger.117
[E]mpirical results converge, indicating that guilt but not shame is most effective in 
motivating people to choose the moral paths in life. The capacity for guilt is more apt 
to foster a lifelong pattern of moral behavior, motivating individuals to accept respon-
sibility and take reparative action in the wake of the occasional failure or 
transgression.118 
If parents knew better how to tap into their children's capacity for empathic concern   for others 
and feelings of guilt for their own wrongdoing, perhaps parents would feel less need to resort to 
PPC. Empathic concern for others and feelings of guilt "naturally" help deter children from mis-
behaviour. And, for young children, much "good behaviour" is indeed based on the feelings of 
others. Don't hit, because it hurts; don't take other kids' toys, because it upsets them; use inside 
voices, because Mommy doesn't like shouting; be careful with Grandpa's nicknacks, because he'd
be sad if they were broken; and so on. Once children get older, of course their empathic abilities 
114Riggio (2011)
115Duarte et al (2016)
116Williams et al (2014)
117Tangney et al (2007)
118Tangney et al (2007)
81
are greater, as is their capacity for appreciating more complex reasons for moral and prudential 
behaviour: Eat your vegetables before you have dessert, because vegetables help you to be 
healthy and if you eat dessert first you might be too full to eat your vegetables. Do your home-
work, so you can practice your math skills, which will help you in school and in your future life 
beyond school. 
Since some punishments are intended not to deter moral transgressions, but for training 
prudential behaviour, and/or to providing disincentives to self-destructive behaviour (e.g. not 
brushing teeth, riding a bike without a helmet, not doing homework, etc), empathic concern and 
related emotions are unlikely to be helpful in all discipline scenarios.
So let's grant the reasonable view that at least sometimes, children are not sufficiently 
motivated by natural incentives and disincentives to behave appropriately, or such disincentives 
are inapplicable. This is how common sense judges that punishments such as spanking should 
work:
How might spanking promote children's social competence? Spanking is a form of 
punishment that associates a negative stimulus (e.g., physical pain) with an undesir-
able behavior in order to reduce its recurrence... If parents accompany the spanking 
with a message about what socially competent behavior they would like to see instead
(e.g., taking turns with a sibling's toy), spanking may make the child's positive behav-
ior more likely. Given that most parents have the goal of increasing their children's 
social competence through parental discipline, whether spanking predicts social com-
petence is an important question for research.119
However, even if there was some evidence that common sense is correct and at least 
some punishments are useful for training children, that would not be sufficient to imply that in-
119Altschul et al (2016)
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flicting those punishments is morally justified. Whether or not punishments are justified for 
training purposes depends on more than just whether or not they are effective disincentives. Re-
call the three requirements for an instrumentalist justification of punishment to succeed:
(1) The distress inflicted (both intended and not intended) is not excessive, compared 
to the amount and/or type of benefit gained.
(2) The distress inflicted will likely lead to the intended goal.
(3) There is no comparably effective alternative that causes less distress.
 
So, first of all, it would depend on how the distress inflicted weighs against the benefits 
gained. We wouldn't think that burning a child with cigarette butts was justified simply because it
was effective for training purposes. Similarly, we shouldn't think that spanking or time-outs are 
justified simply if they are effective for behavioural training purposes. It matters how much bene-
fit is gained for how much harm or distress. This goes for intentionally inflicted distress and dis-
tress that is not intentionally inflicted. It wouldn't be morally preferable for a parent to try to im-
prove a child's behaviour by engaging in non-punitive amateur brain surgery or treating a child 
with large, repeated doses of sedatives, without consulting a doctor — because the harm inflicted
is so great compared to the likely resulting benefit. An action that doesn't intentionally cause dis-
tress isn't automatically preferable, no matter what else, to an action that does intentionally cause
distress. Second, it also depends on what alternatives to the particular punishment are available. 
If there is a less harmful, equally effective, one available then that would be preferable. Third, to 
justify intentionally inflicting distress it has to be the case that there is good reason to think that 
the distress is required in order to produce the desired result. If it's not, then there's no reason to 
intentionally inflict it.
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Common sense is simply not in a position to judge the overall balance of harms and bene-
fits. That's why carefully gathered empirical evidence is so important. (Even though our common
sense judgement may be that Tylenol is effective for headaches — because we've personally had 
multiple experiences of taking Tylenol and having our headaches improve — of course, there's 
room for empirical evidence to show us that, as a matter of fact, Tylenol is not very effective.120 
It could also demonstrate long term side effects that common sense is unaware of, and so doesn't 
take into consideration.121) Punishments cause immediate distress (that's the point of them), but 
they also increase the risk of various long term harms, as we shall see later. Parents are simply 
not in an epistemic position to assume that using punishment in order to provide a deterrence 
against unwanted behaviour — such as hitting a sibling or refusing to eat vegetables —  is justi-
fied. This is because they are not in an epistemic position to evaluate either the long term effec-
tiveness of the training method or the long term or "hidden" harms of punishment.
So even if punishment was effective for training purposes, that wouldn't be sufficient to 
justify it (as can easily be seen by the cigarette butt example). Other factors would have to be 
taken into consideration too — such as the overall balance of harms and benefits, as well as the 
available alternatives. But, in any case, there is empirical evidence that punishment is not, in fact,
as effective as we might imagine for behavioural training purposes. 
Before we turn to that evidence, we should note that often it's a threat of punishment that 
is supposed to deter a child from instigating or continuing a specific instance of misbehaviour. 
(For example, "If you don't pick up your toys, I'll throw them in the garbage", "Do as I say or 
you'll get a spanking", and one I remember from my own childhood, "Stop crying, or I'll give 
120Cochrane Review (2016) 
121Zolot (2017), Lin et al (2017)
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you something to cry for.") So a successful punitive deterrent is one that isn't actually used on a 
particular occasion; instead the threat prevents the behaviour in question.122 But if a punishment 
is issued, it's supposed to contribute to future deterrence. Punishments, over time, help make fu-
ture threats of punishment credible, and punishments are also supposed to provide a disincentive 
to future misbehaviour (with or without an explicit threat). So we need to look at the effects of 
using punishments over time. This is in contrast with punishment used for immediate compli-
ance. If a punishment is successful for gaining compliance, we need to look at individual punish-
ments and their tendency to be immediately followed by compliance. But for behavioural train-
ing or deterrence, we need to look at levels of punishment and levels of misbehaviour over an 
extended period of time.
Empirical evidence regarding punishment for behavioural training
We should note that even pro-punishment researchers have concluded that punishment of multi-
ple different kinds "does not enhance positive development,"123 such as empathy or concern for 
other people. But, as mentioned earlier, empathy and concern for others produce relevant disin-
centives against bad behaviour in both the short term and the long term, and young children's 
"anticipation of the emotional consequences for another of one's behavior can be an important 
curb on antisocial conduct, or incentive to helping behavior."124 But the question is, even if pun-
ishment doesn't contribute to the development of things like empathy and concern for others, is it
122We might think of a threat of a punishment as a punishment itself, if it is in response to 
misbehaviour. It is a intended to cause distress — to scare or worry a child — in order to correct 
the child's behaviour.
123Larzelere and Kuhn (2005), p. 28
124Thompson (2014), p. 80
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useful for improving children's behaviour over time? Is it a successful deterrent against misbe-
haviour over time?
If punishment is effective for behavioural training, there should be some level of punitive 
parenting at which the behaviour of those children gradually improves over time (even if the 
children of more punitive parents start off with a higher level of misbehaviour than the children 
of less punitive parents).125
Let's look at the evidence regarding physical punishment first. It's not only that spanking 
is associated with aggression and antisocial behaviour at any given time (which is what we 
would expect either if spanking causes aggression or if children's bad behaviour makes parents 
more likely to spank them and more likely to spank them more frequently). Rather, there is evi-
dence that spanking contributes to increases in child aggression and antisocial behaviour over 
time:
The child outcomes most often linked with spanking are aggression and antisocial be-
havior, and several large, longitudinal studies have now linked early spanking with in-
creases in children's aggression or antisocial behavior over time, including from age 1
to age 2 in the Early Head Start Research and Evaluation Project...; from age 1 to 
ages 3, 5, and 9 in several studies using the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing 
Study...; from kindergarten to third grade in the Early Childhood Longitudinal 
Study...; and from kindergarten to middle school in the Child Development Project 
and the Pitt Mother–Child Project...126
125Children's behaviour gradually improves as a matter of normal development. See, for example,
Snyder et al (2005) and Di Bartolo and Braun (2017), p. 152. So if a child does not have any 
diagnosable disorder, the expectation would be that their behaviour would improve over time.
126Altschul et al (2016). See also Grogan-Kaylor (2005).
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Altschul (2016), for example, found that maternal warmth predicts an increase in social compe-
tence between the ages of 3 and 5, and it is not associated with changes in aggressive behaviour 
over time. In contrast:
[M]aternal spanking at age 3 remains a significant predictor of increase in child ag-
gression from ages 3 to 5, but it was not a significant predictor of change in child so-
cial competence across the same time period.
Spanking not only failed to increase children's social competence between the ages of 3 and 5, it 
was associated with increases in child aggression. (These associations are small, but given that 
spanking is of course supposed to improve kids' behaviour, it's cold comfort that it apparently 
contributes only slightly to making children's behaviour worse over this two year period. Child 
aggression at age 3 was a much bigger predictor of child aggression at age 5; and maternal 
spanking at age 3 was also a major predictor of maternal spanking at age 5.)
A small 2014 pilot study used audio recorders in the homes of 33 families with children 
aged 2 to 5 years old, and recorded how parents responded to conflict with children. It was found
that, after being subjected to corporal punishment, children "were misbehaving again within 10 
minutes after 73% of the incidents."127 Now, of course, this is consistent with the most badly be-
haved children getting spanked more frequently than the less badly behaved children. However, 
it does indicate that, by any reasonable measure — for these children at least — spanking is not 
effective at controlling misbehaviour.
Gunnoe (2013) is a survey based study of 158 American 13-18 year olds. They were 
asked (among other things) about their parents' discipline methods and their own current ex-
127Holden et al (2014)
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ternalizing or delinquency behaviour. For example, they were asked how often during the past 
year they had done things like "Lied to get money", "Cheated on your schoolwork" or "Physical-
ly attacked someone". They were also asked about their depressive symptoms during the last 
thirty days. On a scale of 1 to 5, they were asked how often they had experienced things like "I 
felt I could not keep from being sad", "I enjoyed life", "I thought my life had been a failure". The
externalizing scores and the depressive scores were combined (somewhat arbitrarily, as far as I 
can see) into a single "maladjustment" score. The subjects were classified into groups that expe-
rienced no spanking, spanking after age 12, and "age-delimited" spanking (i.e. they were 
spanked, but it stopped before age 12). The results for maladjustment was that the subjects in the 
12+ group were the most maladjusted. There was no difference between the other two groups 
with respect to their maladjustment score. Spanking did not overall appear to have harmed the 
kids whose spanking stopped before age 12, but nor did it appear to have helped them, compared
to kids who were not spanked. 
The author's intention appears to be to support spanking. I don't think it the study suc-
ceeds in doing so.128 First, it doesn't show any benefit of spanking, even if we grant that it shows 
lack of harm in the age delimited group (compared to kids who were not spanked). Second, it 
doesn't distinguish frequency of spanking. So, for all we know, almost all of the age-delimited 
128It is based on subjects' recall, which we might be inclined to doubt is accurate about whether 
children were spanked when they were very young. However, it's likely that the subjects did 
accurately remember whether they were spanked at all and when that spanking ceased. 
"Adolescents’ ability to accurately recall parents’ use vs non-use of different types of aggression 
during childhood has been demonstrated in a prospective study. Greenhoot, McCloskey, and 
Glisky (2005) surveyed children aged 6–12 years about abuse and less severe aggression (push, 
grab, shove, slap or spank, hit with an object). Six years later (when participants were the same 
ages as the youth in this study) participants’ recall was assessed with specific yes/no questions 
(“Did ___ ever … hit you that year?”). Of the 22 teens included in the analyses, only one 
misreported (forgot) the experience of less severe aggression." Gunnoe (2013), p. 953.
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group could have been spanked only once or twice in their entire childhood, which could be why 
they show no worse effects than the non-spanked group. And, third, for all we know, the non-
spanked kids received high rates of non-physical punishment, perhaps higher than the age-delim-
ited group.129 In which case, it might show that occasional age-delimited spanking is no worse 
than some amount of non-physical punishment — but it doesn't show that spanking isn't worse 
than non-punitive discipline. Finally, the measure of "maladjustment" seems a little awkward and
I wonder if it was a post hoc decision to put externalizing scores and depressive scores together 
into one "maladjustment" score. ("Five aspects of youth adjustment were assessed: externalizing,
depressive symptoms, academic rank, volunteer work, and optimism."130 The first two of these 
were combined into a "maladjustment" score, and the other three into a "competence" score. But 
why was this particular combination chosen? The five scores could have been combined into, 
say, a "behavioural" score combining externalizing, academic rank, and volunteer work; and a 
"psychological" score combining depressive symptoms and optimism; or they could have been 
left as five separate scores. The article is silent on the choice to combine the scores in one way 
rather than another.) Because of these doubts about the study, I wouldn't use it to support non-
punitive discipline. But I also think that it does not support punitive parenting.
Mackenzie et al (2015) used data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study 
which is based on interviews with parents, starting in the hospital shortly after their child was 
born, between 1998 and 2000, in twenty medium to large cities in the United States. Interviews 
129It did ask the group who reported being spanked about whether they experienced other 
punishments more or less than spanking. Those who reported more spanking than nonphysical 
punishment were excluded from the "age-delimited" group on the grounds that "excluding them 
was thought to increase the likelihood that youth in the age-delimited group had experienced 
only non-abusive, confrontive rather than coercive spanking". Gunnoe (2013), p. 952.
130Gunnoe (2013), p. 953-4
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were repeated when the child was 1 year old, and again at 3, 5, and 9 years of age. The sample is 
large — 1874 families — and diverse. They found reciprocal effects between spanking and child 
externalizing behaviour:
Our results indicate that maternal spanking predicts increases in later child’s external-
izing behavior at each wave, taking into account earlier child’s behavior. And, chil-
dren’s externalizing predicts increases in maternal spanking, taking into account earli-
er spanking.... Analyzing children through age 5, [it was] found that spanking at age 3
had an effect on child’s behavior at age 5. We find similar results to age 5 but add to 
this the finding that spanking at age 5 continues to affect child’s behavior at age 9. In 
addition, we find that early spanking in the first year carries effects extending through
age 9, and that early externalizing also elicits later increased spanking.131
So, this study finds that child externalizing behaviour has effects on parental spanking, and 
spanking has effects on child externalizing behaviour. It is the case that the biggest predictor of 
whether or not a parent spanks at age 5 say, is whether that parent spanked at age 3. As with Al-
tschul (2016), earlier parental behaviour is more predictive of later parental behaviour than say 
earlier or concurrent child behaviour. Similarly, earlier child behaviour is more predictive of later
child behaviour than either earlier or concurrent parental behaviour. But even taking these influ-
ences into consideration, it was still the case that spanking contributed to future externalizing be-
haviour. Instead of spanking being shown to be helpful for improving children's behaviour, it was
shown to contribute to future externalizing behaviour.
Physical punishment is standardly thought of as the most aversive from of PPC. And if 
it's not a successful deterrent against misbehaviour, common sense might lead us to expect less 
aversive forms of punishment to be even less successful. Alternatively, however, it could be the 
case that nonphysical punishment is sufficiently aversive to provide a deterrent to bad behaviour,
131Mackenzie et al (2015), p. 666
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but without the side effect of increasing aggression and antisocial behaviour as physical punish-
ment does. We will consider that possibility after first looking at a claim that has been made a 
few researchers: That spanking has beneficial behavioural effects on certain subgroups of 
children.
Is spanking beneficial for any specific sub-group of children?
A few studies purport to provide evidence of the behavioural benefits of spanking for a specific 
subgroup of children. For example, Gunnoe & Mariner (1997) claims to provide evidence to sup-
port the view that "spanking may deter aggression among black children".132 However, even if 
we grant that children from a particular subgroup (e.g. black children under age 7), if they are 
spanked, have less aggression 5 year later, say, than children from that subgroup who are not 
spanked, then that does not provide evidence for positive effects of spanking compared to non-
punitive discipline.
Depending on the details of the particular study, the group of non-spanked children that is
contrasted with the spanked children can include those who are hit with an implement (such as a 
paddle or a hairbrush), yelled at, insulted, receive punitive time-outs, have hot sauce put on their 
tongues, have privileges removed, and so on. So even if we grant that, within a certain subgroup 
of children, those who are spanked turn out to perform better on some measure (such as frequen-
cy of fighting) than those who are not spanked, that does not support the idea that punishment is 
beneficial — because the category of children who are not spanked is likely to include children 
who receive other punishments instead (unless the study explicitly re-categorizes children who 
receive different kinds of punishment). The previously mentioned Gunnoe & Mariner (1997), for
132Gunnoe & Mariner 1997, p. 774
91
example, relies on survey data133 that asks about spanking and yelling, but not about any other 
possible punishments that parents might use. So even if, within a particular subgroup of children,
being spanked appears to have beneficial effects on behaviour compared to not being spanked, 
that doesn't mean that spanking is beneficial compared to non-punitive discipline (it could just be
better — or less bad — than the hot sauce or time-out methods of punishment, say).
So it is not warranted to infer that "spanking may deter aggression among black children"
means that black children should be spanked. We'd need to know to what extent aggression was 
deterred; we'd need to know how much harm (intended and unintended) was caused by spanking;
we'd need to know what the comparison class is. If spanking deters aggression better than, say, 
burning a child with cigarette butts or hitting them with a wooden paddle, then we can clearly see
that's not a recommendation for spanking! We would need to know how spanking compares to 
less distressing discipline methods. And Gunnoe & Mariner (1997) cannot tell us this, since the 
original data it relies upon comes from a survey that asks only about spanking and yelling.
Let's look at a different one of these kinds of examples in some detail. Ellison et al (2011)
uses the same survey data as Gunnoe & Mariner (1997) and it claims that American children 
from conservative Protestant backgrounds, but not from other backgrounds, might actually bene-
fit behaviourally from spanking. Specifically, the article claims that, in contrast to children from 
other backgrounds, conservative Protestant children who were spanked only during toddlerhood 
(and not later) have better behaviour later (between the ages of 7 and 10) than children who were
not spanked at all. A background hypothesis is that being a member of a community in which 
spanking is the norm protects children from its otherwise harmful effects, perhaps because it is 
133The National Survey of Families and Households: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/nsfh/
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seen by the children themselves as part of loving parenting.134 Alternatively, it could be because 
parenting advice received by parents in such a community instructs parents how to "correctly" 
use corporal punishment, in the context of an otherwise loving, warm relationship. 
T1 is when children were between the ages of 2 and 4; T2 is when children were between
the ages of 7 and 10. The survey does not ask the same behavioural questions at these two times, 
because of course not all the same behaviour is applicable. For example, at T2 it makes sense to 
ask how often a child is disobedient at school, or how often do they cheat or tell lies. Those ques-
tions are much less sensible at T1. So the study does not attempt to measure changes in behav-
iour over time. Instead it compares, at T2, the behaviour of conservative Protestant kids who 
were spanked at T1 and conservative Protestant kids who were not spanked at T1. It turns out 
that among conservative Protestant kids, unlike kids from other backgrounds, those who were 
spanked at T1 end up with better behaviour at T2 than those who weren't spanked — which, at 
first glance, seems to support the idea that spanking helps to train at least this subgroup of chil-
dren to behave better, lending support to the behavioural training justification of PPC. I will ar-
gue, however, that this article fails to provide any reason to think that punishment is useful for 
training conservative Protestant kids to behave better.
So: among the conservative Protestant sub group of children, the group that was spanked 
at T1 has better behaviour at T2 than those who were not spanked at T1. This certainly appears to
134Note that a later article (Petts and Kysar-Moon 2012) that investigated the possibility of a 
protective effect of conservative Protestantism over time stated: "We also explored whether the 
relationship between corporal punishment and problem behavior over time differed for 
conservative Protestants, using the study by Ellison et al (2011) as a guide... [Spanking] was 
associated with increased externalizing and internalizing problem behavior; being spanked at W4
or at both waves was associated with increased externalizing behavior, and being spanked at any 
wave was associated with increased internalizing behavior. However, these models provided no 
evidence that conservative Protestantism moderated the relationship between corporal 
punishment and problem behavior." Italics added.
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support the hypothesis that spanking conservative Protestant kids has beneficial effects on their 
behaviour. What could explain the better behaviour of the group of spanked kids, other than the 
spanking? The study considered other factors, such as mother's age, race, whether or not the 
mother had depression, and so on. But none of these other factors match the pattern. For exam-
ple, it's not the case that the non-spanked kids have younger mothers and so that feature cannot 
explain why the non-spanked group has worse behaviour than the spanked group.
There is a factor that the study did not consider, however, and there is good reason to sup-
pose that it has interfered with these results, such that we have no reason to suppose that spank-
ing is beneficial: They did not look at what other punishments the children received. (The origi-
nal survey did ask parents about yelling at their kids, but the study did not mention that.) For all 
we know, the non-spanked kids experienced more overall punishment than the spanked kids. For 
all we know, the non-spanked kids experienced harsher punishment than the spanked kids, either 
or both of which could be part of the explanation of the non-spanked kids' worse behaviour. 
There is no way of telling whether the non-spanked children experienced other harsh punish-
ments, because the original survey did not ask about that.
However, we do have other evidence to draw on. It's not just an unknown, open question 
whether the non-spanked kids received harsher punishment than the spanked kids (which is suffi-
cient to cast doubt on drawing any conclusions about the benefits of spanking). We actually have 
positive reason to think that they did receive harsher punishment. This is because this article con-
sidered only slapping and spanking, which is a punishment administered with an open hand, usu-
ally to a child's buttocks. Importantly, slapping and spanking does not include striking children 
with an implement, such as a paddle or a switch. It's important that studies distinguish between 
these types of punishment because it's possible that there could be harmful long term effects of 
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striking a child with a paddle, even if there aren't harmful long term effects of spanking a child 
with an open hand. If all corporal punishment is lumped together, then there isn't any way of 
teasing these effects apart. Ellison et al (2011) is specifically talking about spanking and slap-
ping. However, in the subgroup of conservative Protestants there is reason to think that the 
group of non-spanked kids does indeed include children who are hit with implements. As Ellison 
himself notes in a previous article, Ellison (1996):
Most Conservative Protestant child-rearing writers advise against using hands or oth-
er body parts to spank or slap children, contending that hands should be used only to 
convey affection... Some take the biblical references to "the rod" literally and advo-
cate the use of branches or switches..., while others endorse impersonal objects like 
wooden paddles and spoons, belts or straps, or other instruments for punishment.135
This means that even though the group of spanked conservative Protestant kids likely includes 
some kids who were hit with an implement as well as being spanked, the group of non-spanked 
conservative Protestant kids also likely includes some kids who were hit with an implement. And
we can have no idea how many kids that is likely to be, since the survey data does not include 
that information.
So the fact that the spanked group had better behaviour at T2 than the non-spanked group
does not support the hypothesis that spanking has beneficial effects on kids' behaviour, compared
to non-corporal punishment. For all we know, the spanked group having better behaviour than 
the non-spanked group might be (partly? largely? entirely?) due to the non-spanked group re-
ceiving corporal punishment that is even worse than spanking. We simply cannot tell from this 
study. Ellison et al (2011) indicates that the spanked children in the conservative Protestant sub-
135Ellison (1996), p. 10
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group end up with better behaviour than the non-spanked children. But because we have reason 
to think that the non-spanked kids received other punishments, including harsh punishments such
as being hit with an implement, this provides no reason to think that spanking has better effects 
on these kids' behaviour than either non-punitive discipline or nonphysical punishment.
Nonphysical punishment and behavioural training
Unfortunately, compared to research on spanking, there's relatively little empirical research on 
the effects over time of nonphysical punishment on children's misbehaviour. However, the little 
evidence that there is does not support the common sense view that punishment will act as a de-
terrent to undesirable behaviour and so gradually train kids to behave better over time.
However, it has been demonstrated that punishment contributes to "training" some un-
wanted behaviour — that of deception in order to hide a transgression and thus avoid 
punishment:
There is a body of evidence which suggests that punishment often may not be as ef-
fective in suppressing unacceptable behaviors as parents and other caretakers might 
hope it would be... [P]arents who claimed to employ a power-assertive disciplinary 
style to punish rule-breaking behavior in their children at home often had children 
who demonstrated higher levels of rule-breaking when away from home... These 
results suggest that the use of punishment may teach punished individuals a more 
complex lesson than the punishing agent intends. The person who is punished may 
learn to discriminate punishing versus non-punishing situations. He/she might then 
refrain from demonstrating the behavior only when punishment is likely to follow and
yet remain likely to demonstrate the behavior when punishment is not likely to 
follow.136
136Toner (1986), p. 31
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This isn't tremendously surprising — it's also pretty commonsensical that people will try to avoid
detection if they believe that detection will likely lead to unpleasant consequences for 
themselves.
Talwar & Lee (2011) compared the behaviour of children attending more or less punitive 
schools. Children were placed in a situation in which most kids reliably lie. "Children were told 
not to peek at a toy when left alone in a room. Most children could not resist the temptation and 
peeked at the toy."137 The researchers noted that although most kids in their sample of 48 three 
and four year olds peeked at the toy when left alone in the room, "the majority of punitive school
peekers lied about peeking at the toy while significantly fewer nonpunitive school children did 
so."138 This particular study had a small sample size, but the effect was replicated in the much 
bigger Talwar et al (2015) study.
In Talwar et al (2015), 372 children between 4 and 8 years old were placed in the same 
kind of situation in which most kids reliably lie. They were "instructed not to peek at a toy while 
they are left alone for a short period of time."139 This particular study did not record how many 
kids peeked at the toy, but instead measured how likely kids were to lie about having peeked at 
the toy, depending on the type of appeal they heard:
Children were told not to look at a forbidden toy while the experimenter was out of 
the room. Upon the experimenter's return, children who heard an appeal that empha-
sized the positive consequences of telling the truth were more likely to tell the truth 
about peeking at the toy. In contrast, those who expected punishment for their trans-
gression were more likely to lie.140 [Italics added]
137Talwar & Lee (2011), p. 1751
138Talwar & Lee (2011) p. 1751
139Talwar et al (2015)
140Talwar et al (2016) The kids were told a story about honesty after they had had the opportunity
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So the expectation of punishment made children more likely to lie. Perhaps a threat of punish-
ment before being told not to look at the toy in the first place would have made children less 
likely to disobey instructions and peek. But, even if that were true, it's nevertheless the case that 
the expectation of punishment had a detrimental effect on children's truth-telling behaviour. 
Using survey data with a resulting sample size of 785 families, Larzelere et al (2010) 
compared the effects of spanking to three nonphysical punishments: grounding, removing privi-
leges and sending to room, and found that
more frequent use of all three types of nonphysical punishment was associated with 
higher subsequent antisocial behavior, with effect sizes similar to spanking.141
The researchers repeated their analyses after removing from the sample the kids who didn't re-
ceive any disciplinary tactics during the referent week (on the assumption that these were the 
best behaved kids). In this case, after controlling for initial antisocial behaviour, the nonphysical 
punishments predicted subsequent antisocial behaviour, just as much as spanking did. If this 
study detects a (small) causal effect of spanking on increases in antisocial behaviour, it gives us 
reason to think that nonphysical punishments are no better than spanking in this regard.142 So 
to peek at the forbidden toy, but before they could either tell the truth or lie about having done so.
141Larzelere et al (2010), p. 11
142This is not what the researchers' conclusion was, however. They want to claim that the small 
effect size linking spanking and increased antisocial behaviour is not evidence of a causal effect. 
Their argument for this is that there are similar effect sizes linking nonphysical punishments (and
psychotherapy) with increased antisocial behaviour. And they claim that since these are likely to 
be the effect of residual confounding, then so is the relationship between spanking and increased 
antisocial behaviour. But if we don't assume the harmlessness of nonphysical punishments then 
we have no reason to doubt that the apparent effects are real effects. And it's not surprising to see
worsening over time of the behaviour of children who are diagnosed with a behavioural disorder 
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common sense appears to be wrong about punishment and its effect on antisocial behaviour over 
time. Instead of punishment being a successful deterrent over time, it makes antisocial behaviour 
worse.
Despite its common sense appeal, the behavioural training hypothesis is just a hypothesis.
There is no positive reason to believe that PPC is more effective than alternative discipline meth-
ods that do not cause intentional suffering. In addition, we have seen some evidence that punish-
ment is counterproductive when it comes to children's behaviour. We will look at more evidence 
of this in Chapter 6, on the risks and harms of PPC. 
and need to see a psychotherapist, despite seeing a psychotherapist. (The best evidence-based 
psychotherapy for youth is slow to reach actual clinical practice. See, for example, Weisz and 
Gray (2008) and Silverman and Hinshaw (2008).) If punishment worked to reduce antisocial 
behaviour, however, we would expect to see decreases in antisocial behaviour over time. But we 
don't.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Moral education
Parents want immediate compliance from their children, and they want their children to behave 
properly over time. We looked at those child outcomes in Chapters 2 and 3. But they also want 
their children to come to have correct moral beliefs and feelings. They want their children to be 
morally educated. 
What is moral education? In part, it seems to be accepting some very general values that 
are shared by members of a community. So, for example, we might think it's important that 
everyone accepts some general principles such as, say, people should not be discriminated 
against on the basis of race, or that kindness is generally good, or that violence is generally bad. 
Beyond these general principles, we don't think it's necessary that everyone have the same moral 
beliefs. For example, while we think it's important for community members to accept that, gener-
ally speaking, violence is bad — we don't think it's important for everyone to agree on the exact 
cases when violence is justified, or even what counts as violence. So moral education is unlikely 
to involve the inculcation of a list of more specific moral truths, beyond very general principles 
or statements of value. If, through punishment, an offender came to learn that, generally 
speaking, violence is bad and that attacking people in order to steal their money is not a suffi-
cient justification for violence, then that would count as a success for the moral education theo-
ry — even though many may still disagree with him about, say, whether or not killing in war is 
justified violence, whether or not abortion is justified violence, and so on.
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In addition to acceptance of broad values, instead of moral education involving the acqui-
sition of more and more moral facts, psychologists think more in terms of: First, young children 
coming to understand and care about the needs and emotions of others (as distinct from their 
own); second, an appreciation of one's responsibility for one's own actions that impact the needs 
and emotions of others; and third, a gradual increase in degrees of sophistication of moral rea-
soning (which is compatible with arriving at different moral beliefs). This means, of course, that 
people on the political left and right can both be highly morally educated, despite disagreeing on 
many moral issues.
Proponents of the moral education theory of punishment typically don't specify what they
have in mind as moral education, beyond teaching "right from wrong". In young children, this 
might mean believing some simple moral absolutes such as "Hitting is wrong" and "Be kind". 
But I think that it's plausible that both scholarly and parental proponents of moral education envi-
sion the goal of moral education not to be inculcation, by adulthood, of a longer and longer list of
simple moral truths, but instead the ability to engage various moral principles or values one has 
and to think carefully about complex moral situations, appreciating that moral principles some-
times conflict and that there might be circumstances in which it's permissible or required to lie, 
or to break the law, and so on. That's really what "knowing right from wrong" means — being 
able to use one's broad moral principles or values to engage in sophisticated moral evaluation of 
complex circumstances. Together with empathy (which is important, because otherwise people 
can know the "correct" moral principles, but not care about them) this gradual process is what 
psychologists refer to as "moral internalization". So when we consider how effective punishment 
is at moral education, rather than relying on measures of the moral beliefs that punishment man-
ages to inculcate over time, we will instead be looking at its influences on moral internalization 
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generally, or separately on empathy and, in older children and young adults, moral reasoning 
(which is often called "prosocial reasoning").
Adults' and adolescents' moral reasoning is sometimes tested with the Defining Issues 
Test (DIT), which presents respondents with stories that involve moral dilemmas and they have 
to respond with both their answer to the dilemma and rate the importance of various issues that 
are (or should be) relevant or irrelevant to the decision:
The DIT assesses the cognitive processes used during the analysis of social-moral 
problems. Participants are presented with a series of moral dilemmas and are asked to
reach a decision concerning the most appropriate solution to each situation. Partici-
pants are then asked to rate a series of factors that could have influenced their 
decision.143
The test is less about giving the "right" answer to each dilemma, but more about the sophistica-
tion in the moral reasoning needed to reach an answer. Respondents fill in bubble sheets about 
the degree of importance of various issues when deciding what they think is the correct answer to
a moral dilemma. For example, one of dilemmas is about someone stealing food from a rich per-
son in order to feed their starving family, and the issues to be rated according to their importance 
or relevance to the dilemma include, "Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody 
concerned or wouldn't it?" and "Shouldn't the community's laws be upheld?" Whereas the ques-
tion of whether the man has a recipe for bark soup should be rated as irrelevant.144
143Lopez et al (2001), p. 196. On the reliability of the DIT, see Bailey (2011) and Thoma & Dong 
(2014).
144This example is from the DIT-2 (http://www.washburn.edu/academics/general-education-files/
DIT2.pdf). I wasn't able to find a copy of the older DIT-1 online.
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The moral education theory, as proposed by Jean Hampton and Herbert Morris,145 has in-
tuitive and common sense plausibility for the justification of PPC (whether or not we think it 
provides a plausible justification for punishing adult criminals). It's intuitively appealing that 
punishment is justified if it's for a child's "own good" and that it "teaches them a lesson". The 
moral education theory is an instrumentalist theory of punishment. Punishment is the instrument,
or means, of reaching the goal of moral education. Decent parents believe and hope that punish-
ment is actually, in the long run, beneficial for their children despite the short term distress it in-
flicts.146 If punishment genuinely does result in moral education — presumably a significant ben-
efit to the child — it seems at least a promising possibility that punishing children could be 
justified. (Of course it would depend on the degree of moral education achieved, the harshness of
the punishment, and the availability of alternative methods that do as good a job, but don't cause 
as much distress, including unintended harms.) 
As an instrumentalist theory, the following three requirements have to be met for the 
moral education theory to succeed in justifying punishment:
(1) The distress (such as pain or emotional upset) inflicted (both intended and not in-
tended) is not excessive, compared to the moral education gained.
(2) The distress inflicted will likely lead to moral education.
145Hampton (1984), Morris (1981) 
146Someone might suggest that PPC is justified on the grounds that children need to experience 
suffering in order to come to understand suffering in others — that this is the specific way in 
which punishment can be morally educational. However, even if it's true that children need to 
suffer themselves in order to come to understand others' suffering, that would not justify PPC — 
because children experience suffering "naturally" without parents having to intentionally induce 
it in their children. (Furthermore, punishing a child on this grounds would also seem to justify 
intentionally causing children to suffer, even when they have done nothing wrong. I expect 
proponents of PPC would not generally be content with that consequence.) Thanks to Geoff 
Sayre-McCord for raising this issue.
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(3) There is no comparably effective alternative method of moral education that caus-
es less distress.
In this chapter, after looking at the theory in a little more detail, we will consider philo-
sophical objections to the moral education theory, seeing how they can apply in the case of chil-
dren. Then we will turn to the empirical question of whether or not PPC actually does morally 
educate. 
In the case of criminal punishment, the moral education theory of punishment maintains 
that punishment is justified because it helps improve the wrongdoer's (and also perhaps ob-
servers') moral internalization. Punishment is justified in order to morally improve the recipient; 
punishment is for the recipient's own good. Jean Hampton says:
[M]y interest in moral education theory is connected with my desire to justify punish-
ment as a good for those who experience it, and to avoid any theoretical justification 
of punishment that would regard it as a deserved evil.147
The idea is that when an offender receives a deserved (i.e. proportionate and otherwise appropri-
ate) punishment for breaking a morally just law, the punishment is justified because it enables 
(not forces) the offender to morally educate him or herself. It does this, first, by demonstrating 
that the crime is "fenced off". The punishment marks a boundary for acceptable behaviour, which
those living in the society in question ought not to transgress. Hampton acknowledges that the 
moral education theory has this much in common with a deterrence theory of punishment — 
simply appealing to the offender's (or potential offender's) self-interest and demonstrating that 
147Hampton (1984), p. 237
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transgressing society's moral boundary would be harmful to the offender. But punishment is sup-
posed to do more than simply deter — after all, an electric fence deters an animal from transgres-
sing its boundary into forbidden territory148 — it's also supposed to morally educate the offender:
[U]nlike the animal in the pasture, a human being will also be able to reflect on the 
reasons for that fence's being there, to theorize about why there is this barrier to his 
freedom.149
[O]ne distinction between the moral education view and the deterrence justification of
punishment is that on the moral education view, the state is not concerned to use pain 
coercively so as to progressively eliminate certain types of behavior; rather, it is con-
cerned to educate its citizens morally so that they choose not to engage in this 
behavior.150
Hampton explicitly wonders how "inflicting any pain upon a criminal [can] be morally 
educational?"151 And her answer is:
By giving a wrongdoer something like what she gave to others, you are trying to drive
home to her just how painful and damaging her action was for her victims, and this 
experience will, one hopes, help the wrongdoer to understand the immorality of her 
action.152 
148Hampton (1984), p. 211
149Hampton (1984), p. 211-212
150Hampton (1984), p. 214
151Hampton (1984), p. 223
152Hampton (1984), p. 227
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This is, perhaps, intuitively plausible, especially given Hampton's idiosyncratic definition of 
punishment: "disruption of the freedom to pursue the satisfaction of one's desires."153 Assuming 
an offender was pursuing their self interest when they broke the law,154 a punishment acts as a de-
terrent by being contrary to the offender's self interest, and the pain (loosely defined) that they 
experience through punishment also has the potential to help them appreciate the harm that they 
caused to their victim. But Hampton intends punishment to be more than a mere deterrent. It's 
crucial to her theory that punishment — as she understands it — is morally educational. "Given 
that punishment is understood in this way, how do coercion and the disruption of one's self-inter-
ested pursuits convey a moral message?"155 Since Hampton's understanding of punishment is a 
disruption of the pursuit of one's self-interest, it helps to deter offenders who have, after all, pur-
sued their own self-interest at the expense of their victim. And if they come to appreciate the par-
allel between what they experience through punishment and what they inflicted on their victim, 
they will understand the reason behind society's placing a moral boundary, disallowing people 
from performing that kind of action. At least that's the hope, anyway.
Although Hampton doesn't explicitly say this, we can also charitably interpret her as say-
ing that punishments are supposed to be proportionate because they best represent the harm done
to the victim. A punishment that is proportionate to the crime communicates — both to the offen-
der and to the general public — the degree of harm caused by the offender. A disproportionate 
153Hampton (1984), p. 224
154The idea of criminal activity being characterized by pursuit of self-interest is likely overly 
simplistic. This issue is currently being explored in criminology. See, for example, Agnew 
(2014).
155Hampton (1984), p. 225
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punishment (whether too harsh or too lenient) would fail in this communicative task, and thus 
fail in its educational purpose.156
One philosophical objection to the moral education theory can be dispensed with relative-
ly quickly by someone who proposes it as a justification for punishing children. 
It's clear that offenders' autonomy is very important to moral education theorists. They do
not want offenders to be coerced or forced into to becoming morally upstanding citizens. They 
want them to freely choose to "turn to the good". But, since punishment is forced on offenders by
the state — moral education theorists do not advocate offenders freely choosing whether or not 
to be punished — why is that a legitimate infringement of autonomy, while somehow forcing or 
coercing an offender into becoming morally upstanding is not legitimate? Whether or not advo-
cates of the moral education theory of criminal punishment can adequately respond to this objec-
tion, we can see how the response would go in the case of PPC. Parents have a moral duty to 
override children's autonomy when it is in their children's best interest to do so. Whether it's pre-
venting them from playing with matches, or making them get vaccinated, decent parents some-
times have to force or coerce a child into doing things the child doesn't want to do, or prevent 
them from doing something they do want to do, no matter how strongly the child disagrees — for
the child's own benefit. 
Whether or not PPC falls into the category of something parents are entitled or obligated 
to do for their children's own benefit is exactly the question at issue. But the issue doesn't depend
on whether or not it overrides children's autonomy. Because even if it does, that would not be 
sufficient to make the parental action morally wrong, as can be seen from the matches and vac-
cines examples.
156This is similar to the view expressed by von Hirsch (1990), p. 279.
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Similarly, objections based on the state being unjustifiably paternalistic when it punishes 
offenders "for their own good" can be dispensed with in the case of PPC. Of course parents are 
justifiably paternalistic towards their own children. That's part of what being a decent parent 
is — taking care of children's best interests because they are limited in their capacity for doing so
themselves.
Another philosophical objection to the moral education theory is that it seems to allow 
punishing the innocent. That is, the moral education theory seems to imply that it's permissible 
for the state to "punish" (i.e. intentionally inflict distress or suffering on) those who have broken 
no rule, on the grounds that they are nevertheless in need of moral education. Of course, strictly 
speaking, intentionally inflicting distress on someone who is (known to be) innocent is not a pun-
ishment, since a punishment is inflicted in response to (perceived) wrongdoing. Nevertheless, 
such a "punishment" (with inverted commas) or intentional infliction of distress would still need 
justification. And if a theory of punishment implies that a "punishment" or intentional infliction 
of distress may permissibly be performed on an innocent person, that theory needs to respond to 
that objection. In what follows I will refer to the problem of punishing the innocent, because 
everyone knows what that standard phrase means, and it's less awkward than constantly using in-
verted commas or the phrase "intentional infliction of distress". I will, however, distinguish be-
tween genuine punishment and "punishment" when necessary to avoid confusion.
We will focus on Boonin (2008)'s version of the punishing the innocent objection. He 
says that, if the moral education theory of state punishment was correct, someone who cheats on 
their spouse, even though this is not illegal, could be punished by the state since they are appar-
ently in need of moral education. Boonin puts the objection as follows:
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[T]here are many people who do not break the law but who nonetheless need moral 
education: vicious racists whose behavior remains within the law, verbally abusive 
spouses, people who are unfaithful to their loved ones, who lie to their friends, talk 
behind people's backs, and so forth. In all of these cases, the person in question would
benefit from moral education. And so, if it is true that punishing offenders is permissi-
ble because it benefits them by enlightening them, then it will also follow that punish-
ing these people will be morally permissible for the same reason.157
Since we don't want the state to punish people who have not broken the law, but we do (accord-
ing to Boonin) want the state to morally educate (some) people who have not broken the law, it 
would seem to follow that punishment is not moral education after all. To put the same point a 
different way, if the state is permitted to punish people on the grounds that it is morally educatio-
nal, it would seem it is permitted to punish those who have not broken the law (i.e. they would be
permitted to punish the innocent). Since the state punishing the innocent is wrong, the moral edu-
cation theory must be false.
In the case of PPC, the punishing the innocent objection perhaps has even more force. If 
it were justified to intentionally cause a child distress in order to morally educate them when they
have done something wrong, it seems it would also be justified to intentionally cause a child to 
distress in order to morally educate them when they haven't done anything wrong. If spanking a 
child, or removing their video game privileges, genuinely helped a child to become more morally
educated, the moral education theory seems to imply that parents needn't wait until they grab 
their sibling's cookie before doing those things to them. The moral education theory seems to im-
ply that kids should be punished whether or not they've done anything wrong. But even those 
who defend spanking children, would likely find the idea of spanking children who have done 
157Boonin (2008), p. 189
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nothing wrong repulsive. So how can the moral education theorist respond to the punishing the 
innocent objection?
Hampton's response to the punishing the innocent objection, regarding criminal punish-
ment, is that 
the state should refrain from punishing immoral people who have nonetheless com-
mitted no illegal act, not because they don't need moral education but because the 
state is not the appropriate institution to effect that education. Indeed, one of the rea-
sons we insist that the state operate by enacting laws is that doing so defines when it 
may coercively interfere in the lives of its citizens and when it may not; its legisla-
tion, in other words, defines the extent of its education role... So if the state were to 
interfere with its citizens' lives when they had not broken its laws, it would exceed its 
own legitimate role.158
Hampton is trying to avoid the conclusion that the state ought to morally educate citizens who 
need it but who have not broken the law, because otherwise she would seem to be committed to 
the state punishing citizens who have not broken the law. She does this by claiming that it's not 
the state's place generally to morally educate citizens, and by referring to an independent limit on
who the state may not "coercively interfere" with: anybody who has not broken the law.
Boonin maintains that the first part of Hampton's response (the state is not the appropriate
institution to morally educate those who have not broken the law) is mistaken. He says, we have 
no problem accepting that the state has a role in educating people about some things that are not 
illegal, such as smoking tobacco, so we should have no problem with the state morally educating 
people about other things that are not illegal (such as talking behind people's backs).
158Hampton (1984), p 132-4
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Hampton might respond by conceding the state's legitimate role in educating citizens 
about health issues, but insist that it's not the state's place to morally educate its citizens about 
matters that are not illegal. Hampton could support her case by pointing to examples of things 
that we might agree are immoral, but nonetheless recognize that it's not the state's business to ed-
ucate citizens regarding them: all the examples that Boonin mentions in his objection (such as ly-
ing to one's friends). She could claim that Boonin has illegitimately lumped together legal prac-
tices that it is the state's place to educate citizens about (e.g. health related things like smoking) 
and legal practices that it is not the state's place to educate citizens about (i.e. moral issues).
But, Boonin says, even if we grant that the state should stick to moral education only re-
garding illegal acts, it doesn't follow that the state needs to wait until such an act is committed 
before doing so. In which case, Hampton would still be left with the undesirable consequence 
that the state ought to punish some people who have not broken the law. For example, 
A man who publicly states that all women deserve to be raped, for example, or that it 
is morally permissible for men to rape their wives, may break no law, but the state's 
presumably legitimate interest in preventing rape would seem to give it as good a rea-
son to educate him as to educate those who commit rape.159
Whether we think Hampton or Boonin is ultimately successful in the case of criminal 
punishment and the state, we can see in the case of PPC, it is very much the role of parents to 
morally educate their offspring; indeed, it might be argued that this is one of the most important 
tasks of a parent. But this means that even if Boonin's objection can be defanged in the criminal 
case (by taking Hampton's route that it's not the state's place to morally educate citizens about 
159Boonin (2008), p. 189
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things that are not illegal) this response doesn't work in the case of PPC. Parents punish their 
kids; and parents do have the legitimate role of morally educating their children (regardless of 
the children's guilt or innocence). And so Boonin's objection still has force against the moral edu-
cation theory of PPC: If intentional infliction of distress were justified on the grounds that it is 
morally educational after a child has done something wrong, then it seems that intentional inflic-
tion of distress would also be justified on the grounds that it is morally educational when a child 
has not done anything wrong. Boonin's objection, as applied to PPC, would be that if punishment
is justified on the grounds that it is morally educational, and kids need moral education even 
when they haven't done anything wrong, then it would be justified to punish kids who haven't 
done anything wrong — i.e. to intentionally inflict distress on them. And since this strikes us as 
grossly unfair, it seems to show that the moral education theory of PPC must be false.
We recognize that not only are parents sometimes permitted to do things to their children 
that cause them distress, for the child's own good (such as confining a child to bed for their 
health),160 it's their responsibility to do so. So, Boonin might argue, since it is parents' responsi-
bility to morally educate their kids regardless of wrongdoing, it is therefore parents' responsibili-
ty to punish them, regardless of wrongdoing — and that seems to imply that the moral education 
theory is false. We don't think it's right to spank a child, or withhold their allowance, or take 
away their TV watching privileges, if they have done nothing wrong! And we certainly don't 
think it's a parent's responsibility to do so.
160Thanks to Geoff Sayre-McCord for this example. Note that it's not a punishment because the
distress of being bed-ridden is not intended. A parent would try to minimize such distress, unlike
with a punishment. 
112
Boonin also thinks that the second part of Hampton's response (the state may not "coer-
cively interfere" in its citizens' lives when they have broken no law) is unsuccessful, because it 
begs the question:
Her response depends on the claim that when the state passes a law prohibiting a giv-
en behavior, this makes it "legitimate" for the state to "coercively interfere" in the 
lives of those who nonetheless engage in that behavior. But whether or not that state's 
prohibition of a given behavior renders such a response morally permissible is pre-
cisely the question that the moral education theory is attempting to answer.161
Here, I think Boonin is being somewhat uncharitable towards Hampton. On a charitable interpre-
tation of her words, Hampton's response to the "punishing the innocent" objection depends on 
the claim that it is impermissible for the state to coercively interfere with citizens when they have
not broken the law. That is sufficient grounds for maintaining that it's not acceptable for the state 
to punish those who have not broken the law, even if they do need moral education. 
This claim does not imply that it is permissible for the state to coercively interfere when 
citizens have broken the law. That is a separate claim, and if Hampton's response to the objection
was to say that the state may coercively interfere when people have broken the law, then that 
would indeed beg the question. But she does not have to say that.
Hampton could quite reasonably make the following claims: (1) The state may not coer-
cively interfere with citizens who have broken no laws.162 (2) The state ought to morally educate 
161Boonin (2008), p.190
162We might think that, strictly speaking, saying that the state may not "coercively interfere" with 
citizens who have broken no laws is not quite accurate — after all, we accept that the state may 
"coercively interfere" in law-abiding citizens' freedom when, for example, it requires taxes to be 
paid or when it makes hate speech illegal. So, if necessary, we might again be charitable to 
Hampton and change her wording somewhat. Instead of "coercively interfere", perhaps what we 
object to is the state forcing hard treatment (such as incarceration, pain, humiliation, etc) on 
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citizens who have broken the law. (3) Moral education justifies state punishment (a form of coer-
cive interference). This means that the moral education theory of criminal punishment is not vul-
nerable to this version of the punishing the innocent objection. Claim (1) is based on the value of
autonomy, which also drives the moral education theorist's insistence that moral reformation is to
take place (when it does) voluntarily; that is, the state cannot force citizens to become morally 
educated. 
Shafer-Landau (1991) is also satisfied that the moral education theory does not beg the 
question when it avoids the problem of punishing the innocent:
Attention to the restricted scope of moral education theories enables the theorist to 
counter one of the traditional problems in the philosophy of punishment. The narrow 
compass of the moral education view explains why its proponents are not committed 
to using punishment to morally educate those who haven't broken the law. If moral 
education were an overriding aim of a political theory, there would apparently be no 
bar to "educating", via hard treatment, those perceived to be in need of such treat-
ment. But as the educationists have sketched it, the only claim made about fundamen-
tal political values has to do with the value of autonomy. They make no attempt to sit-
uate their view on punishment within a more comprehensive theory, thereby avoiding 
the "punishing the innocent" scenarios which so often plague consequentialist 
theorists.163
So, the response to the punishing the innocent objection in the case of state punishment turns on 
the idea that the state may not "coercively interfere" with law-abiding citizens. Our values of au-
tonomy and freedom from interference preclude allowing the state to coercively interfere with 
citizens, even if it's "for their own good" (e.g. moral education).
citizens who have broken no laws. Thanks to Geoff Sayre-McCord for raising the point that 
"coercively interfere" may be too broad.
163Shafer-Landau (1991), p. 192
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However, we can see that it's problematic to take this route when responding to the pun-
ishing the innocent objection in the case of parental punishment of children. Although the state 
ought not to coercively interfere with citizens' autonomy (so long as they have broken no law) 
it's not the case that parents ought not to coercively interfere with children's autonomy (so long 
as they have broken no rule). Even if a child doesn't want to get any shots — they do hurt, after 
all — not only is it permissible for parents to override their child's autonomy, they are arguably 
required to do so, given that vaccination is demonstrably in the child's long term best interests.
So even if we allow that the moral education theory does not beg the question when it 
sidesteps the problem of the state punishing innocent citizens, it nevertheless needs a response to 
the problem of punishing children who have not done anything wrong. Rejecting "coercive inter-
ference" on the grounds of children's autonomy can't do the job. This means that the moral edu-
cation theory of justification for PPC is left with the problem of punishing kids who have done 
nothing wrong. If punishing a child is justified on the grounds that it is morally educational, then 
it seems that there would be no reason to wait until a child actually does something wrong. The 
moral education theory seems to imply that kids should be punished, whether they've done any-
thing wrong or not.
Ultimately, I think the moral education theory as applied to children can survive the pun-
ishing the innocent objection. I have two separate responses to the objection. The first is to bite 
the bullet and accept that if PPC was genuinely morally educational, it would therefore be per-
missible to punish (i.e. to inflict intentional distress on) children who have done nothing wrong. 
Suppose that spanking, say, really was morally educational and let's imagine, for simplicity's 
sake, an extreme kind of case: that all and only children who are spanked exactly once become 
morally educated. If it really was true that children who did not receive their one spanking did 
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not learn right from wrong (e.g. they had no idea that hurting others for fun was wrong etc), then 
it would indeed be a parental responsibility to make sure kids got their one spanking. And it 
would be a parental responsibility to issue this one spanking regardless of whether the child had 
done wrong or not. If the distress caused by that one spanking is somehow causally efficacious in
morally educating children, and somehow necessary, then it would be a parental requirement to 
intentionally inflict that distress on their children. 
I suspect that our reluctance to punish children who haven't done anything wrong stems 
from our intuition that if they are innocent of wrongdoing they do not deserve to have distress, or
hard treatment etc, intentionally inflicted on them. But of course children do not deserve the pain
of a shot, but they should have it inflicted on them nonetheless. (We could even imagine that 
somehow the pain of the shot was causally efficacious in generating the immune response so that
someone intentionally inflicting pain is a necessary element of the vaccination process.) If PPC 
was genuinely morally educational (to a significant extent, with no significant side effects, with 
no less distressing alternative, etc) then it would fall into the same category as vaccinations — 
something that causes kids distress, and that parents might not like to inflict, but that is necessary
for their own good. It would be parents' responsibility to ensure it happens. 
Of course, we might also conclude that if spanking was like a vaccination, and needn't be 
inflicted after wrongdoing, that it would therefore cease to be a punishment. I think this is true, 
but as mentioned earlier, pointing it out does not avoid the punishing the innocent objection. We 
could just recast the original objection in terms of "intentionally inflicting distress on the inno-
cent". We might think it's justified to intentionally inflict distress on the guilty, but baulk at inten-
tionally inflicting distress on the innocent. And if a theory such as the moral education theory 
seems to have the consequence of it being permissible to intentionally inflict distress on the inno-
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cent, the theory needs a response to that problem. (In the case of criminal offenders and innocent 
citizens, Hampton did this by invoking a principle that the state is not permitted to "coercively 
interfere" in the lives of innocent citizens, and that the state oversteps its legitimate role when it 
seeks to morally educate citizens who have broken no law.) In the case of PPC, it's more plausi-
ble to bite the bullet and accept that "intentionally inflicting distress on the innocent" would be 
justified if doing so was morally educational — because we don't have the worry of "coercively 
interfering" with children's autonomy, or with overstepping the legitimate role of a parent.
My second response to the "punishing the innocent" objection takes a completely differ-
ent tack. The moral education theorist could plausibly respond that punishment is morally educa-
tional only if it is inflicted on an agent after that agent has themselves transgressed, and not at 
any other time. They might try to make the case that parental punishment acts as a proxy for a 
guilty conscience and that is why it is morally educational. If a child associates their action of a 
certain type with parental disapproval and their own feelings of distress (intentionally inflicted 
by the parent), the idea is that the child will come to learn that actions of that type are forbidden 
(and because they are forbidden by a respected authority), thus morally wrong. 
I think that both of these responses to the "punishing the innocent" objection are at least 
plausible in the case of the moral education theory's justification for PPC. However, I think that, 
ultimately, they both fail on empirical grounds. As a matter of empirical fact, punishment is not 
an effective way to morally educate children (even when they themselves have done wrong), and
(fortunately) there are less distressing ways in which parents can help their children become 
morally educated. But before turning to that evidence, let us consider a couple more objections 
the moral education theory of criminal punishment raised by Shafer-Landau (1991) and consider 
how they apply in the case of PPC. 
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Shafer-Landau asks: Why think that we ought to allocate resources to benefit criminals 
(when there are innocent people who could use our help)? After all, a murderer has amply 
demonstrated what an awful person they are, so if we as a society are going to decide which citi-
zens to help with our scarce resources, we don't have good reason to help those who commit ter-
rible crimes — when there are so many more deserving people who could be helped instead.
Even if we grant the debatable premise that offenders are awful people who do not de-
serve help from the state, it would be possible to defend moral education by appealing to the ben-
efit of doing so to society at large. If offenders who are punished and become moral educated as 
a result could become upstanding, contributing citizens who poses no danger to other people, that
would of course be a huge benefit to society.
However, in the case of children, we can see that the objection doesn't even get off the 
ground. Of course parents of children who have broken rules should invest time and energy into 
morally educating them. It is uncontroversial that parents ought to try to ensure that their kids are
morally educated — both the well behaved ones and the badly behaved ones.
Shafer-Landau points out that the moral education theory depends on the assumption that 
becoming a morally better person is objectively a good thing, even if an offender has no desire to
become a morally better person. (Let us grant that there is no important difference between be-
coming more morally educated and becoming a morally better person.) It's supposed to be in the 
offender's interests to become a morally better person, which is why it's a good for them to re-
ceive moral education in the form of punishment (and, on the other hand, bad for them not to re-
ceive it). But, Shafer-Landau suggests,
There appears to be no prima facie reason for thinking that immoral individuals are 
necessarily harmed by their immorality, that a moral education necessarily constitutes
a benefit conferred. It seems that we are justified in believing that immoral individu-
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als may live successfully, until such time as we are given a persuasive account of how
immorality necessarily impedes human flourishing.164 
Perhaps it's possible, although no doubt difficult, to come up with an argument that shows that 
moral education (when successful) necessarily confers a benefit on an offender. Criminals who 
have already committed a crime, perhaps multiple crimes, may not personally benefit from com-
ing to appreciate that their actions are immoral. They may be embedded in a criminal communi-
ty, with few contacts outside that community; they may have no skills that are relevant outside a 
criminal lifestyle; their material and social advantages may be significantly lessened if they re-
frain from crime; they may also suffer psychologically as a result of moral education showing 
them their actions have been morally reprehensible. We might think some of these kinds of ef-
fects are right and just — but they are not clearly benefits to the offender. (And this was the dri-
ving force behind Hampton's theory — she wanted to justify punishment as a benefit to the per-
son it is inflicted on.) Alternatively, of course, we could make the reasonable claim that the state 
has a duty to society at large to morally educate offenders, but then this removes one of the 
moral education theorists' key claims — that punishment is for the offender's own good. 
However, for children it does seem plausible to suppose that becoming morally educated 
and growing up to become a morally upstanding adult is more likely to result in being a happier, 
better adjusted adult — and therefore it is in the child's own interest to morally educate them. 
And, while it's not clear that the state has a moral duty to morally educate offenders, when there's
a good chance that it won't make them better off (indeed, might make them worse off), it's never-
164Shafer-Landau (1991), p. 210-211
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theless uncontroversial that parents have a moral duty to morally educate their children — both 
for the sake of society at large, and also for the children's own benefit.
So it seems that even if we think that Shafer-Landau's objections are successful against 
the moral education theory as a justification for criminal punishment, they do not succeed against
the moral education theory as a justification for PPC. Moral education remains a plausible candi-
date to justify the punishment of children.
However, even if we grant the intuitive plausibility of the moral education theory, and 
suppose that there are adequate responses to all the philosophical objections, that is not suffi-
cient. Any instrumental theory needs to satisfy these three requirements:
(1) The distress inflicted (both intended and not intended) is not excessive, compared 
to the amount and/or type of benefit gained.
(2) The distress inflicted will likely lead to the intended goal.
(3) There is no comparably effective alternative that causes less distress.
My view is that we have no good reason to think that punishment is an effective method of moral
education. Hampton supposes that a punishment will enable an offender to reflect on the harm 
they have caused and thus persuade them to repent. In the absence of actual evidence, this is 
ungrounded optimism. Shafer-Landau puts the objection like this:
Suppose... we had a system of incarceration free from the present problems that beset 
our own prisons. It remains unlikely that being put behind bars in a respectable envi-
ronment will bring about moral change. Incarceration, even under the best conditions,
seems at most to provide only the setting in which the real moral education can take 
place. Incarceration simpliciter will not do the job, or, more realistically, it will do the
job in only a handful of cases. What's required is some form of education that's to 
take place during incarceration. But this education is not punishment; the education is
not any kind of hard treatment (unless it uses conditioning techniques that involve 
aversive stimuli of the kind already ruled out by the [moral education theorist's] con-
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cern with autonomy). The punishment itself — incarceration — is simply insufficient 
to attain the educationist's goal.165
 What we really need is empirical evidence regarding the likelihood of (different types of)
punishment being effective in morally educating an offender.166 But although Hampton gives a 
passing nod at empirical evidence — "I would argue that it speaks in favor of this theory that it 
rejects many forms of incarceration used today as legitimate punishments, insofar as they tend to 
make the criminal morally worse rather than better."167 — she doesn't go any further than that. 
Similarly in the case of PPC. We need good reason to think that punishment — intentionally in-
flicting distress in response to wrongdoing — is an effective way to morally educate children. 
Secondly, for punishment to be justified it has to not only be effective, the benefits have 
to be 'worth' the distress inflicted, and there has to be no comparably effective method that caus-
es less distress. As we saw above, Hampton doesn't even consider the possibility of punishment 
not being justified at all. She starts from the assumption that it is justified and then argues for a 
particular theory of justification, given that it is justified. Once we drop that assumption, we can 
165Shafer-Landau (1991), p. 200. We might think that Norwegian prisons (or at least the famous 
Bastøy and Halden prisons) could function as evidence in favour of this view.  Bastøy, for 
example, is minimum security, despite housing murderers and rapists. The surroundings are very 
pleasant — an entire island, with cottages and a lighthouse, no impregnable concrete walls — 
and there are many educational and social opportunities for the prisoners. They develop 
relationships with the guards, who are unarmed. In as much as they gradually become more 
morally educated, it is not because of any punishment they are receiving. It is notoriously 
difficult to compare recidivism rates, but it certainly appears that Bastøy does very well in this 
regard.
166There is evidence regarding which prison programs work and which don't, if we use reducing 
recidivism as our proxy measure for moral education. For example, adult education is effective 
and boot camps for adults or juveniles are not. See, for example, MacKenzie (2008).
167Hampton (1984), p. 228
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see that non-punitive alternatives need to be considered. In the absence of an empirical compari-
son between punishment and non-punitive alternatives, we have no reason to think that punish-
ment is justified as a method of moral education. In the criminal case, this means that we would 
need to show that punishments such as imprisonment are more effective methods of moral edu-
cation than non-punitive alternatives such as attending classes on the consequences of crime, em-
pathy workshops, watching video taped victim impact statements, reading books about ethics, 
and so on. (Or that punishment in conjunction with these other methods does a better job than the
non-punitive options alone.) Similarly in the case of PPC, we would need evidence that punish-
ments such as spanking, time-out, and privilege removal are more effective methods of moral ed-
ucation than non-punitive alternatives such as talking with a child and helping them to under-
stand why what they did was wrong. (Or that punishment in conjunction with a non-punitive 
method does a better job than the non-punitive options alone.)
Overall, my impression is that Hampton doesn't really want to intentionally cause dis-
tress, but because she's starting from the assumption that punishment is justified, feels that she 
must find some way to make it acceptable. She puts the question like this:
[W]hy isn't the infliction of mild sorts of pain and deprivations also climbing into the 
moral gutter with the criminal? The moral education theorist must provide an expla-
nation of why certain sorts of painful experiences (whose infliction on others we 
would normally condemn) may legitimately be inflicted in order to facilitate moral 
growth. But is such an explanation possible? And even if it is, would the infliction of 
pain always be the right way to send a moral message?168
As we might put the problem with respect to children: Why think that the infliction of distress on
children is morally educational? Furthermore, why isn't it "climbing into the moral gutter" and 
168Hampton (1984), p. 223
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teaching kids that it's morally acceptable to intentionally cause distress to someone less powerful
than oneself when one believes that the weaker person is morally lacking? Is it morally accept-
able to send a moral message through distress, pain or suffering?
Regarding Hampton's question of whether punishing children is "climbing into the moral 
gutter", that's really the issue we're discussing: Is intentionally causing distress to a child in the 
form of punishment morally justified? An occasional, mild punishment is unlikely to be very 
wrong — hardly climbing into the moral gutter — but the more frequent and/or more distress the
punishments cause, the closer a parent gets to the "moral gutter".
Hampton does not attempt to answer her own question regarding how punishment can be 
educational, but Morris does. To illustrate the special connection between punishment and 
learning how to become more "attached to the good", Morris refers to parental punishment of 
children, as the archetypal case of moral education. According to Morris:
[P]unishment has some special and logical relationship to wrongdoing and to the pos-
sibility of a child's acquiring the concept. Because of this relationship, punishment is 
connected with the good... in a way that blame or disapproval by themselves are not.
First, because of punishment children come to acquire an understanding of the
meaning of a limit on conduct. Logically connected with the concept of wrongdoing 
is the concept of a painful response that another is entitled to inflict because of the 
wrongful conduct. Second, a punitive response conveys to children the depth of 
parental attachment to the values underlying the limit. Just as children know from ex-
perience that they are disposed to strike out when they or what they care for are in-
jured, so they come to appreciate the seriousness of their parents' attachment to the 
limit and to the values supported by its existence by the parents' visiting some pain 
upon them. The degree of punishment, then, conveys to the child the importance par-
ents attach to their child's responding to the limit and promotes in children, not just an
appreciation that something is wrong, but how seriously wrong it is. It conveys, too, 
the significance of different degrees of fault in the doing of what is wrong. Further, 
particular punishments that are chosen often communicate to children the peculiar 
character of the evil caused by their disregard of the limit, the evil to others and the 
evil to themselves.169
169Morris (1981), p. 266
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Even if we are charitable and don't take literally the talk of a "logical connection" between pun-
ishment and acquisition of the concept of wrongdoing, it is nevertheless mysterious why Morris 
thinks that punishment is necessary in order for children to "acquire an understanding of the 
meaning of a limit on conduct". Indeed, even the most punitive parents are unlikely to punish 
their kids every time they cross the limit of acceptable behaviour. Being too noisy in the library 
might make a parent frown and put a finger to their lips, which the child understands as meaning 
that they've been too noisy and they need to quieten down. Children can clearly understand a 
limit on conduct some of the time without the need for punishment, and Morris gives us no rea-
son to think that they couldn't understand such a limit every time without the need for punish-
ment — indeed the existence of people who were not punished as children but who nevertheless 
acquire the concept of wrongdoing would seem to show that punishment is not necessary for the 
acquisition of the concept. Morris has provided no reason to think that punishment is necessary 
in order for a child to acquire the concept of a limit on conduct, so this point fails to provide a 
justification for punishment.
We might be able to speculate, as Morris does, on possible ways in which punishment 
might be necessary. Morris suggests that punishment and gaining the concept of wrongdoing (a 
limit on conduct) are closely connected because wrongdoing entitles another person to inflict a 
painful response on the wrongdoer because of the wrongdoing. Of course, it's precisely this enti-
tlement that is currently at issue: we are looking at the issue of whether parents are entitled to in-
flict distress on a child because of that child's wrongdoing. However, whether or not such an 
entitlement exists, it wouldn't be doing any work itself; it would be the children's and the parents'
beliefs regarding such an entitlement that would be causally efficacious in the acquisition of the 
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concept of wrongdoing. Here's the thought: Children believe that their parents are entitled to 
punish them for wrongdoing, and so children come to acquire the concept of wrongdoing, of a 
limit on conduct. 
It is hard to see how the belief that my parent is entitled to punish me for wrongdoing 
could be psychologically prior to the concept of wrongdoing or of a limit on conduct (which it 
would need to be if punishment was to be justified on the grounds that it is necessary in order for
children to acquire the concept of wrongdoing). So Morris needs to give us a plausible psycho-
logical mechanism here, which he does not do. And so we are left with mere speculation about 
how punishment is necessary in order for children acquire the concept of wrongdoing, which 
means that Morris has not provided a justification of PPC. We could equally speculate about how
punishment is detrimental to the acquisition of the concept of wrongdoing or a limit on conduct. 
For example, we might reasonably think that children are often confused by their parents' appar-
ent assumption that parents are entitled to spank their children or confine them to their room, but 
a child is not entitled to hit her little brother or lock him in his room when he does something 
wrong. 
Morris also suggests that children understand the parental punitive response because they 
understand how they themselves are inclined to strike out when they have been wronged. This 
suggestion is problematic because some children are inclined to strike out in the same way 
whether it's because their sibling kicked them or if there's an odd number of peas on their plate. 
On the other hand, some children are mellow and rarely inclined to strike out. There are also un-
fortunate children who do not strike out at all, despite being the victims of serious wrongdoing, 
such as physical, psychological, or sexual abuse. So reflecting on their own behavioural inclina-
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tions may not be at all helpful in analyzing how serious their parents consider a particular in-
stance of wrongdoing to be. 
Morris might concede that different children have differing inclinations to strike out, and 
so different children have differing tendencies to associate wrongdoing and punishment. But this 
would likely mean that a child whose tendency to strike out is greater than another child's would 
have an advantage when it comes to internalizing the association between wrongdoing and pun-
ishment; more aggressive kids would learn the association between wrongdoing and punishment 
faster, and thus acquire the concept of wrongdoing faster. Morris provides no reason to think this 
is true though. Do more aggressive children learn the association between wrongdoing and 
parental punishment faster than less aggressive children? Do more aggressive children thereby 
come to have the concept of wrongdoing sooner than less aggressive children?
Morris has given us various hypotheses regarding the acquisition of the concept of 
wrongdoing, which he thinks would justify punishment (that punishment is necessary for chil-
dren to acquire the concept of wrongdoing). However, he has not given us any good reason in 
favour of those hypotheses. And while we might speculate about how punishment might help 
with concept acquisition, we can equally speculate about how it might be a hindrance.
However, we might be inclined to be charitable to Morris here and not take so literally his
statements about acquiring the concept of wrongness and parental entitlement to punish. Perhaps 
we can preserve the kernel of truth in Morris' idea here if, first, we focus on moral internaliza-
tion — a very gradual, complex process — rather than the acquisition of the concept of wrong-
doing (which at least sounds like a single event). And second, if we focus on parental authority 
rather than parental entitlement. If we do this, it becomes more plausible that a child's moral in-
ternalization is facilitated by their recognition of parental authority. It's true that when children 
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accept their parents' authority (and most young children do), then their parents' approval or dis-
approval of their actions is influential. It matters to young children what their parents think about
their actions; parental approval and disapproval influences children's moral development. The 
question is whether or not it helpful for parental disapproval to be expressed or reflected in a 
punishment.
Empirical evidence
Instead of speculation, we need empirical evidence. What does the empirical evidence indicate 
about punishment's ability to morally educate children? If PPC did succeed in morally educating 
kids it would be at least plausible that PPC would be justified, given that the long term benefits 
of moral education are considerable. However, the evidence does not favour punishment.
Larzelere and Kuhn's 2005 meta-analysis found that no kind of punishment enhanced 
positive child development, such as conscience development, positive behaviours and feelings. 
That is, no punishment was was helpful for purposes of moral education. Furthermore, "rea-
soning was more effective than nonphysical [and physical] punishment for enhancing positive 
child characteristics."170 Other research has also found that conscience development is best 
achieved through rational, rather than coercive, means. Indeed, it's best (for development of con-
science) if rational communication about values, culpability, responsibility and so on, happens 
when children are less emotional — rather than during a conflict over misbehavior.171 Punish-
170Larzelere and Kuhn (2005), p. 29. The authors do not describe the kind of reasoning examined 
by the various studies they analyzed.
171As summarized in Thompson (2014).
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ment appears to slow down children's moral internalization; the emotional arousal caused by 
punishment actually makes it harder for them to learn moral lessons.172
Shen et al (2013) focused on a sample of 504 young adolescents (age 9 - 13) from three 
different ethnic groups and asked them (among other things) about their parents' discipline prac-
tices and also, using "five short stories depicting different situations where the protagonist’s 
needs are placed in opposition to another’s",173 the subjects' moral reasoning was evaluated. The 
most sophisticated level of prosocial reasoning is when the child has "internalized" moral princi-
ples and makes judgements based on their own moral beliefs (in contrast to, for example, making
judgements based on gaining the approval of others).
Overall, they found that "parental punitiveness directly and negatively predicted prosocial
moral reasoning". That is, the youth who reported more punitive parenting also displayed less so-
phisticated prosocial reasoning. However, it is important to note that although this was the over-
all result for the whole sample, it did differ between ethnic groups and for the Taiwanese youth, 
punitive parenting was not related to prosocial reasoning either way. The authors suggest this 
may be because the Taiwanese subjects perceive the degree of their parents' punitiveness differ-
ently from either the Mexican American or the European American subjects, but they were un-
able to draw any conclusions from their own data on this. It is equally important to note that 
parental punitiveness was not shown to be positively related to prosocial reasoning for any of the 
ethnic groups, including the Taiwanese. That is, for none of the groups was punitive parenting 
shown to be beneficial for moral education. 
172Kochanska and Thompson (1997),  Kochanska et al (2003), Parke (1969). 
173Shen et al (2013)
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Lopez et al (2001), however, did find a negative relationship between "minor corporal 
punishment"174 during childhood and both empathy levels and moral judgement in young adult-
hood. On the other hand, parental "induction" (i.e. parents explaining to children the effects of 
their actions on self and others, etc) during childhood was a significant predictor of empathy lev-
els in young adulthood; and empathy was a significant predictor of moral judgement. This re-
search supports the idea that moral education is fostered by parental induction, not by "minor 
corporal punishment".
These results are based on questionnaires completed by 109 undergraduate subjects about
their childhood experience of parental discipline and their current moral judgements and empath-
ic reactions. Moral judgement was assessed using the Defining Issues Test mentioned earlier and 
empathy was measured by a 33 item questionnaire, in which respondents   rate on a 9-point scale
their level of agreement with statements such as “It makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a 
group”.175 
On the face of it, this evidence supports the view that minor corporal punishment is child-
hood not helpful for moral education by young adulthood, and that parental induction is helpful. 
However, we might wonder first about the reliability of the recall data. Perhaps subjects who are 
more empathic or have more sophisticated moral judgement are more likely to recall more posi-
tive parenting; and subjects who are less empathic or have less sophisticated moral judgement 
are more likely to recall more aggressive parenting. That is, we might doubt that this research 
174Parents' "severe physical aggression" didn't have significant positive or negative correlations 
with anything. The authors suggest that this was because this sample of college students 
experienced so little of that during childhood that their research would have failed to detect any 
significant relationships, even if they exist.
175Lopez (2001), p. 198
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provides evidence of a causal connection from childhood corporal punishment to adult empathy 
and moral reasoning.
Second, we might wonder if children who misbehave more tend both to elicit more cor-
poral punishment and tend to develop into less empathic adults with less sophisticated moral 
judgement. And so it's child behaviour and characteristics that cause both the parents' corporal 
punishment and lead to the lower levels of adult empathy and moral judgement.  That is, once 
again, we might doubt that this research provides evidence of a causal connection from child-
hood corporal punishment to adult empathy and moral reasoning.
I will respond to these objections in turn. First, there is evidence that recall of childhood 
discipline is fairly reliable. Longitudinal studies that tracked childhood discipline and then asked 
young adults to recall that discipline demonstrate that they do tend to remember their parents' 
overall parenting tendencies, even if particular incidents are not well remembered.176
In response to the second objection, there is evidence that "parents increase the use of all 
forms of discipline interventions (not only corporal punishment) when confronted with more se-
vere violations" [italics added].177 So if children's characteristics explained both the childhood 
corporal punishment and the adult moral characteristics, we would expect to see correlations be-
176See, for example, Asselmann et al (2015) and Greenhoot et al (2005). The latter is particularly 
interesting because it first interviewed children between the ages of 6 and 12, documenting both 
corporal punishment and abuse they experienced or witnessed that year. The children who had 
witnessed or experienced abuse or experienced corporal punishment were re-interviewed six 
years later, between the ages of 12 and 18. While only 5% completely forgot that they had been 
subject to corporal punishment, 82% had no memory of having experienced abuse. Various 
explanations of this contrast are discussed in the paper including repression of traumatic 
memories and the possibility that abuse is often a rare or unique experience (unlike corporal 
punishment) and so without the constant "reinforcement" of repeated exposure (through the same
kind of action or through conversational recall) such memories tend to fade, just like other 
memories do.
177Lopez (2001), p. 201
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tween all forms of childhood discipline and adult empathy and moral judgement. That is, in addi-
tion to there being a negative correlation between corporal punishment and adult moral charac-
teristics, we would also expect to see a negative correlation between, say, non-physical 
punishments and adult moral characteristics. As Lopez (2011) puts it:
If children with low moral development simply require higher levels of discipline, a 
relationship between high levels of all types of discipline interventions and moral rea-
soning would be expected.178 
But this is not the pattern that Lopez (2011) found.179 No correlations were found for types of dis-
cipline other than minor corporal punishment or induction one way or the other. While this re-
search implies that minor corporal punishment is detrimental to moral education (and induction 
is useful), it doesn't imply anything about the relationship between any other types of discipline 
and adults' empathy and moral reasoning.
Consistent with the evidence, it's possible that some type of punishment that hasn't been 
empirically investigated will turn out to be morally educational. But that hardly seems likely giv-
en the range of punishments that have been considered. There's unlikely to be something special 
about any particular type of punishment that enables it to succeed where other punishments fail. 
So, for the time being, moral education fails to provide a justification for PPC. And in the ab-
178Lopez (2001), p. 201
179Similarly, Gershoff (2010) didn't find correlations between aggression and all forms of 
discipline (as would be expected if children's aggression explained increased parental discipline).
Instead, they found correlations between only some forms of discipline (4 out of 11 different 
types) and children's aggression. (We will look at this particular research in more detail in 
Chapter 6, on the risks and harms of punishment.)
131
sence of positive evidence that punishments are morally educational, the default should still be to
refrain from intentionally causing distress. 
In addition to the evidence that punishment does not help children become morally edu-
cated, the evidence indicates that it is actually detrimental to children's moral development, as 
we shall see in Chapter 6, which is on the harms and risks of punishment. Not only does moral 
education fail to provide a reason for parents to depart from the "don't intentionally cause others 
distress" rule — PPC also carries the risk of long term harm with respect to moral education, 
providing additional reasons not to punish children.
In fact, there is evidence that certain non-punitive methods do a better job of moral 
education. 
Methods that promote choice and autonomy and are characterized by parental expla-
nations and minimal use of power are generally found to be more effective at facilitat-
ing child moral internalization than methods that are reactive, harsh, and physically 
coercive.180
We will go into this kind of evidence in more detail in Chapter 9, which is on the empirical evi-
dence for non-punitive discipline. 
180Lansford et al (2009), p.1385
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CHAPTER FIVE: Consent theory/Social contract theory
This chapter will consider two related types of theory that originally addressed the problem of 
criminal punishment by the state: the consent theory of punishment and the related social con-
tract theory. (These are types of theory, and individual theories differ in their details.) Important-
ly, these are not instrumental theories of punishment, so the three requirements we've been using 
to evaluate the success of instrumental theories do not apply.
I will describe a consent theory of criminal punishment by the state (specifically, as pro-
posed by C. S. Nino), explaining how I think consent should be understood, and consider how 
such a theory could apply to parental punishment of children. I will conclude that, although it has
more plausibility than it might at first have seemed, it is ultimately unsuccessful as a theory of 
justification of PPC. 
Then I will turn to a related type of theory, social contract theories. These theories claim 
(roughly) that governments have legitimate power (including that of criminal punishment) over 
citizens because of those citizens' consent — explicit, tacit, or hypothetical — to be bound by 
that authority. In particular, we will look briefly at the work of Rawls. I will explain why neither 
Rawls' methodology of the original position, nor the decision-making principles resulting from 
it, are applicable in the case of punishing children — even if they are helpful in discussions of 
the justification of criminal punishment.
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Consent theory
The version of the consent theory of criminal punishment that I will focus on is that described by
C. S. Nino.181 He holds that state punishment is permissible because an offender, when they break
the law, consents to punishment. Ordinarily, it would be wrong to remove someone's property, or 
restrict their freedom but, Nino claims, it is permissible to perform these kind of actions on an of-
fender because the offender actually consents to be treated that way when they choose to break 
the law:
A necessary legal consequence of committing an offense is the loss of immunity from
punishment that the person previously enjoyed. This loss of immunity is obviously 
correlative... to the legal power on the part of certain public officials to punish the of-
fender. The individual who commits a crime assumes a legal liability to suffer punish-
ment and relinquishes the right that he would otherwise enjoy of seeking compensa-
tion or criminally prosecuting the official for the deprivation of rights involved in 
punishment.182
In just about every case of crime, of course there is no explicit consent to punishment so, 
if the offender consents to punishment, that consent is tacit consent, similar to how a passenger 
tacitly agrees to pay for their journey when they get into a taxi and ask the driver to take them 
somewhere, or a patron agrees to pay for their meal when they place an order in a restaurant. In 
these situations, there is (standardly) no explicit conversation about consent to pay, but neverthe-
less, a taxi passenger consents to pay for the journey by getting into the cab, and a restaurant pa-
tron consents to pay for the meal by ordering items from the menu. Note that it's not necessary 
that someone choose or consent to a consent-convention in order for them to have consented. 
181Nino (1983)
182Nino (1983), p. 297
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The passenger didn't choose or decide to adopt the consent-convention of getting into a taxi and 
asking the driver to take them somewhere being sufficient to consenting to pay. That convention 
arose accidentally. But once it's in place, that is a meaning that performing that action conveys.
How might this kind of idea apply in the case of PPC? In the case of PPC, a consent theo-
rist could maintain that, although it would ordinarily be impermissible for parents to intentionally
cause their kids distress, if the kids consent to punishment when they break the rules, then it's 
permissible for parents to punish their kids (to inflict intentional distress on them). Of course, it's
far from obvious that children do consent to punishment when they break the rules; and similarly,
it's far from obvious that offenders consent to punishment when they break the law. 
On the face of it — in both the criminal case and the PPC case — even if it's true that 
consent would justify punishment, it certainly seems implausible that either offenders or children
actually do consent to be punished (whether tacitly or not). It seems implausible not least be-
cause if we asked offenders or children if they consented, they would deny it. But, as we shall 
see, it is possible to sincerely deny that one consented to something even though one did indeed 
consent to it. This can happen when the conventions surrounding tacit consent are so familiar 
that we don't necessarily even notice them as such. 
There can be cases of genuine consent in which an agent doesn't believe that they've con-
sented. Suppose a little old man falls over on the sidewalk next to me. If he asks for my help and 
I simply start to help him, it sounds a little odd to say that I consented to help him and we 
wouldn't ordinarily put it that way. But it's clear, nevertheless, that I did consent to help him. It's 
just that in a scenario like that, our consent is usually tacit and so familiar, that we don't even no-
tice it as such. So I might be confused if someone asked me, "Did you consent to help him?" and 
I might even deny it. My sincere denial of consent does not mean that I did not in fact consent to 
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his request for help. Furthermore, it's a "conventional consequence" in such a situation that the 
obligation I incur as a result of my consent continues until I'm no longer needed (within conven-
tional limits; I'm not obligated for the next decade even if in some sense he needs me). This 
might be when the man is fine and steady on his feet, or it might be when someone else takes 
over. I can't abandon him on the sidewalk, if he needs to go to the hospital, just because it's in-
convenient to me. But if someone else offers to take him to the hospital, then my obligation is 
discharged. My action of offering my hand to pull him up, say, seems to count as consent (in 
part) because it was a communicative transaction that incurred between specific persons and I 
had sufficient knowledge of the conventional consequences of my action. And this is the case, 
even if I don't believe that I consented to help him (since that wouldn't be our normal way of de-
scribing such a situation).
So an offender's sincere denial that they tacitly consented to criminal punishment, or a 
child's sincere denial that they tacitly consented to parental punishment, is not sufficient to imply
that they did not in fact consent.
There is, however, a different epistemic requirement. When someone is completely igno-
rant of the (likely) conventional consequences of their action, their action cannot count as con-
sent to those consequences. Let's imagine someone who has no idea about the conventions of 
auctions, and they make eye contact with the auctioneer and nod, and so accidentally make the 
winning bid on a Ming vase. Depending on the details of the circumstances, we might be in-
clined to say that, despite their ignorance regarding auctions and how they work, they are never-
theless obligated to pay for the vase — but it doesn't seem correct to say that they consented to 
buy the vase. They would certainly deny that they consented to buy the vase, but as we've seen, 
sincere denial of consent doesn't mean that consent didn't take place. But their lack of knowledge
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of the conventional consequences of their action does seem to imply that they did not in fact con-
sent to incurring those consequences. They might have obligations, but these are despite their 
lack of consent. 
In the auction case, the person's ignorance regarding auctions, in particular regarding the 
conventional consequences of their actions, seems to imply that they didn't really consent to pay 
for the vase (although they nevertheless may incur moral responsibilities as a result of their ac-
tions). But, supposing an offender has even rough knowledge of the law and the standard penal-
ties for breaking them, then an offender can meet the "informed" condition on consent. Similarly 
for a child who is aware of the punishment for breaking a rule.
It seems that tacit consent is often (always?) a matter of known conventional conse-
quences being in place and some of them are so familiar that we don't even notice them as such 
and don't feel the need to make our consent explicit. Once I start to help the little old man, he 
reasonably expects me to continue to help him — not change my mind and leave him lying on 
the sidewalk. And I have an obligation to continue to do so. That is a behavioural convention that
has arisen between persons that it is reasonable to expect any sufficiently competent person in 
our society to be aware of. If an auction house invited a lot of new customers to come to an auc-
tion, it would make sense for them to provide information regarding the conventions around bid-
ding, and thus consenting to pay for an item if your bid ends up being the highest one. Similarly, 
it would seem that the state has an obligation to educate a population on any new laws and ex-
pected penalties for breaking them. (If it comes to the state's attention that many citizens are in-
deed ignorant of a particular law that's already in place, that would also recommend an education
program.) The state needn't use the terminology of "consenting to punishment" by breaking the 
law, but it could. 
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If informed consent to liability to punishment requires knowledge of the relevant law and 
the conventional consequences of breaking it, I don't think that poses much of a problem for the 
consent theorist. In the vast majority of cases, offenders are presumably well aware that they are 
breaking the law and that the conventional consequence of doing so is liability to punishment. 
When a new law is introduced that may not be obvious, such as seatbelt laws, for example, it is 
the state's responsibility to have a campaign to educate citizens on the new law and the conse-
quences of breaking it (a fine in a certain range, or whatever). It would also make sense to have a
period between the introduction of the new law and a deadline when it becomes a punishable of-
fense. So perhaps there's a year after the new seatbelt law is introduced, and if someone is caught
by the police during that year not wearing a seatbelt, they are not punished. But after a year of 
education (ads in the paper, billboards, mail outs, etc) it's reasonable to think that the state has 
discharged its duty to inform citizens of the new law and the punishments for breaking it, and it's
reasonable to assume that citizens are informed.183
Note that "knowing about the conventional consequences" does not require completely 
accurate and detailed knowledge. Fairly broad brushstrokes are sufficient, just as in other con-
texts where informed consent is important. Informed consent to a medical procedure doesn't re-
quire complete, encyclopedic knowledge in the relevant area (law or medicine). It also doesn't 
have to be based on entirely true beliefs — that's too strong a requirement. It's possible to have 
some false beliefs and still to count as informed.  If I wrongly believe that a particular study was 
performed by researchers at McGill rather than at Johns Hopkins, that's not enough to mean that 
183I think citizens also have a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that they are informed about 
laws that they might otherwise inadvertently break. If you move to a new country, and you want 
to drive there, it's your obligation to make sure you are familiar with the traffic laws, for 
example.
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my consent to the procedure was not informed. It's not necessary that I know all the details of all 
the studies that have ever been done regarding that procedure. But it is necessary that I know the 
approximate risk of the procedure and the chances of it being beneficial. Similarly, not knowing 
the exact dollar amount of a fine doesn't imply that an offender was not sufficiently informed 
when they know that breaking the seat belt law makes them liable to a fine. (How strict the re-
quirements are for consent counting as "informed" depends on context. The standards for in-
formed consent to brain surgery will be much higher than for informed consent to having your 
photo taken for the local newspaper.)
In the case of PPC, it's much easier for parents to ensure that there are no "ignorant offen-
ders", i.e. they can make sure that children know the rules and the punishments for breaking 
them. The consent theorist of PPC can insist on a requirement that children are sufficiently 
knowledgeable about the rules and punishments. And if parents fail to ensure children have this 
knowledge — and understanding — then the consent theorist can maintain that it is not justified 
for parents to punish children who break the rules. A 3 year old can understand simple rules and 
punishments (even if she doesn't always have the self-control to obey the rules). Even though, 
legally speaking, a 3 year old is not cognitively competent to consent (to medical treatment, for 
example) she can consent in a family setting to simple things she understands — she can consent
to being tickled, she can consent to a sibling having the bigger cookie, she can consent to feeding
the goldfish, and so on. A medical procedure is too complicated, and the idea of probability of 
harm is too difficult, for her consent to have legal weight. But she can understand that if she 
crayons on the wall again, she will be spanked.184
184I suspect that for many 3 year olds, even if they fully understand this connection, at the time of
drawing on the wall, they do not think of the threat. Children that young are often so fully "living
in the moment" that such threats may literally not occur to them at the time they break the rule. 
In which case, I am skeptical that the child could count as having consented to punishment when 
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Children will tend to have at least broad brushstrokes knowledge of the rules and poten-
tial punishments in their household (and the consent theorist for PPC could insist that it's a 
parental requirement to make sure kids do have this knowledge in order for punishment to be jus-
tified). If a child doesn't know or understand the rules, or the potential punishment for breaking 
them, it's open to the consent theorist for PPC to maintain that punishment in those circum-
stances would not be justified. As a child gets older, they come to have more rules, and more 
complicated rules, that govern their behaviour. And they are also able to infer some rules. If it's a 
rule for Jamie to wear a bike helmet every time he rides his bike, at some point he'll be cogni-
tively competent enough to have the ability to infer that it would also be a rule for him to wear a 
bike helmet if he rides his friend's bike (because Jamie understands the reason behind the rule 
and can understand that there's no relevant difference between riding his own bike and riding his 
friend's bike).
So it is plausible, after all, to think that when an offender breaks the law, they consent to 
punishment (assuming they are sufficiently cognitively competent). This is because they know 
that, in our society, the action they perform has certain "conventional consequences", i.e. conse-
quences that have been set up by persons, or have arisen between persons. And this can be the 
case even if they sincerely deny that they consented to punishment.
Sufficient knowledge and understanding of the conventional consequences of one's con-
sent is one of the background conditions that must be in place in order for consent to have moral 
weight (and for it to even be consent at all). There are other conditions too, of course. Consent 
they break the rule, because they fail the "cognitively competent" requirement, despite 
understanding the rule and the consequences. The consent theorist might try to restrict their 
theory to older children who are more cognitively competent. However, I will put this issue aside
for the time being, and continue trying to make a reasonable case for the consent theorist. 
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(tacit or explicit) always takes place in a context, and that context (background conditions) can 
determine the moral weight of the consent. For example, for it to be plausible that consent justi-
fies punishment in the criminal case, it's necessary that the following background conditions 
hold: the laws need to be just, the offender needs to have broken the law (not falsely believe that 
they have done so), the law needs to be fairly consistently applied, the punishment needs to be 
reasonable, etc. So if someone breaks an unjust law (an apartheid law, say) then even if we're 
willing to say that they consented to punishment, it is nevertheless not morally justified for them 
to be punished.185 Similarly for PPC. According to the consent theorist, in order for punishing a 
child to be justified, in addition to the child's consent, it would be necessary that various back-
ground conditions hold such as the child needs to have broken a rule, the rule needs to be fair, the
rule needs to be consistently applied, the punishment needs to be reasonable, etc.
This is not anything special about consent in the case of punishment, or something specif-
ic to tacit consent. It's standard for any kind of consent, including ordinary explicit consent. As 
Manson and O'Neill (2007) put it, we must bear in mind "the complex social and normative 
framework that must be in place and must be respected for effective communication" of con-
sent.186 If the necessary background conditions are in place, consent can make the difference be-
tween an impermissible action and a permissible one.187 That is, if the background conditions are 
185Boonin (2008), p. 156-171, makes a number of objections to the consent theory that can all be 
responded to by pointing out these necessary backgrounds conditions.
186Manson and O'Neill (2007), p. 49
187Is one of the necessary background conditions that the action consented to be otherwise 
permissible? Of course, this can't mean that it would be permissible without consent. There may 
well be some actions that are impermissible despite consent (and a necessary background 
condition would be that the consented-to action not be one of those) but of course it would beg 
the question for me to assume that punishment is one of those actions.
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all in place, consent can be "morally transformative,"188 i.e. the consent can make permissible an 
action which would otherwise have been impermissible.
So Boonin is mistaken when he claims that it's ad hoc for the consent theorist to maintain 
that just/reasonable laws are a necessary condition (along with consent) for the justifiability of 
punishment:
If consenting to be liable to punishment for violating a useful, effective law by 
breaking it suffices to permit punishment, why shouldn't consenting to be liable to 
punishment for violating a counterproductive, ineffective law by breaking it similarly 
suffice? If consenting to pay $10 million for a valuable painting by raising your hand 
at auction suffices to obligate you to pay $10 million for it, after all, then surely 
consenting to pay $10 million for a worthless painting by raising your hand at an 
auction also suffices to obligate you to pay $10 million for it. If putting your chips on 
the table means that you have consented to pay if you lose when making a wise 
choice with your cards, it must equally mean that you have consented to pay if you 
lose when making a foolish choice.189 
It's not true that raising your hand at an auction or placing your chips on the table suffices for 
being liable to pay or to losing money. For you to be morally obligated to pay up, certain 
background conditions have to hold. And if they don't hold, the convention of raising your hand 
or placing a bet does not mean that you are obligated to pay. There are a number of necessary 
background conditions that need to be met in order for it to be the case that your consent 
obligates you to pay.
In the case of the auction, if the painting was stolen and it comes to the attention of the 
police immediately after the auction, but before you have paid, then you are not obligated to pay 
for the painting even though you consented to doing so. (If you had already paid, then you would
188Miller and Wertheimer (2010 b)
189Boonin (2008), p. 169
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be owed your money back.) However, if the painting turns out to be worthless and it's simply 
your own ignorance that prevented you from seeing that, in the context of an auction, that's hard 
luck. The painting's actually being worth $10 million is not one of the background conditions 
that needs to hold in order for your consent to obligate you to pay for it. But the sale being legal 
is one of the conditions that needs to hold in order for your consent to obligate you to pay for it.
Similarly, if the cards in the deck had been stacked in order to cheat you out of your 
money, you would not be obligated to pay if the cards come up against you, even though you 
consented to doing so. One of the background conditions that needs to hold in order for your 
consent actually to obligate you to pay is that the deck is a fair deck — that the dealer is not 
trying to cheat you out of your money. It's not necessary (of course) that the cards come up in a 
way that is favourable to you, but it is necessary that the dealer isn't stacking the deck.
Furthermore, if someone had nodded their head and believed they were consenting to pay
for a painting at an auction, but they had not in fact been attending an auction, then they would 
not be obligated to pay for it. If someone accidentally walked in on a re-enactment of an auction 
of a valuable painting and, believing it to be a real auction, raised their hand to make a bid of $10
million, then they would not be obligated to pay $10 million to anyone, because there was not in 
fact an auction happening — even if we grant that they did consent to being liable to pay $10 
million for the painting, they are not obligated to pay $10 million and nobody has a right to $10 
million of their money.
In the case of breaking the law, one of the background conditions that needs to hold in 
order for it to be morally permissible to punish the lawbreaker is that the law is just and 
reasonable. According to the consent theorist, the criminal's consent is one necessary condition 
that needs to hold, and the law being just and reasonable is another. This is not ad hoc. There are 
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always background conditions that must hold in order for someone's consent to obligate them in 
some way. Similarly, in the case of PPC. The consent theorist can maintain that the rule a child 
breaks must be fair and reasonable, if it's to be morally permissible for a parent to punish them. 
Another background condition that the consent theorist could insist on in the case of PPC,
as in the case of legal punishment, is that there be no mitigating circumstances that would 
absolve the child or the offender. So even if an offender has broken the law and thus has, 
according to the consent theorist, consented to be liable to punishment, if there are mitigating 
circumstances, it may nevertheless not be permissible to punish the offender (or at least the 
punishment should be less severe). 
The same can apply in the case of PPC. 15 year old Thomas knows there is a rule against 
pouring water onto the living room carpet. But one day when he is home without his parents, 
taking care of Mattie, his 6 year old brother, Thomas comes out of the bathroom to see that 
Mattie has started a fire on the living room carpet. Thomas was in the bathroom only briefly, but 
Mattie got into trouble quickly; Thomas was not negligent in his duty to take care of Mattie. 
Thinking quickly, Thomas gets his brother out of the way, smothers the fire and douses it with 
water. Of course, Thomas should not be punished for throwing water on the living room carpet! 
But the consent theorist can agree with this by simply maintaining that an absence of mitigating 
circumstances is necessary in order for punishment to be justified. 
Importantly, as we've seen in multiple examples, consent is a relationship or transaction 
between specific persons (or groups or organizations of persons). In contrast, a restaurant's 
"open" sign, its menu on the table, and so on, constitute an offer or invitation to anyone who sees
it. A taxi's lit sign, or its waiting in the taxi stand, means the driver is offering a service (subject 
to other background conditions) to anyone who might see it. An offer or invitation may not be 
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between specific parties; it can be an offer or invitation that is open to anyone (or to a wide range
of people). Once a passenger gets into the taxi, or once a patron orders from the menu, the con-
sent relationship is between those two specific parties — the particular taxi driver and the partic-
ular passenger; the particular restaurant (an organization of persons) and the particular patron (or 
group of patrons).
So, not only must someone have sufficient knowledge of the (likely) consequences of 
their action for it to count as morally transformative consent (or even consent at all), it must be a 
communicative transaction between persons, or organizations of persons. If I freely and know-
ingly choose to throw a piece of paper into the fire, it's not correct to say that I consent to the pa-
per getting burnt (even though I know what happens to paper in fires). I do not consent to getting
wet when I knowingly go out in the rain without an umbrella; I do not consent to getting burnt 
when I knowingly touch the hot stove. Consent is a communicative transaction that happens be-
tween persons (or organizations of persons). Someone gives consent to be treated in a certain 
way by another person; or someone gives consent to have certain demands made of them by 
another person; and so on.
We can see the importance of consent as communicative transaction between persons in 
the following examples. Someone who walks through a violent neighbourhood at night, with a 
wad of $10 bills in their pocket (or even if they have only a dollar on them), knowing the high 
risk of being mugged, is not thereby consenting to having their money taken. Taking their money
would be theft. Similarly, someone who goes to a dive bar, wearing sexually provocative cloth-
ing, and then drinks lots of alcohol, knowing the high risk of sexual assault is not thereby con-
senting to sexual activity. Having sex with them would be rape. (The point of the one dollar 
example is to show that the harm does not have to be serious for us to say that the person didn't 
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consent.) Even though the pedestrian walking through the violent neighbourhood knows there's a
high risk of being mugged, even though they are not coerced into walking through the neigh-
bourhood, even though they are cognitively competent, they are not consenting to have their 
money taken. For it to be the case that they consent to have their money taken (in which case it 
wouldn't be theft), there would have to be a consent transaction between specific persons. But 
there is no such relationship between the pedestrian and any other person, so there is no consent, 
and taking the pedestrian's money would be theft.
The relationship between a citizen and the state is sufficiently like the relationship be-
tween two persons for it to be possible for a consent transaction to occur between them. This is 
because the state is comprised of persons. When I send off my signed passport application, I am 
consenting to the state using the requested information on the form for a specific purpose — 
producing my passport. (I am not consenting for it to be used in any other way.) When my new 
passport is issued to me, the state is consenting to certain responsibilities towards me when I 
travel abroad. It's not a natural law that offending leads to punishment (as it is in the paper and 
rain cases); it's a relationship or transaction that is set up by, or arises between, persons. 
There are requirements on both (or all) parties to a consent transaction in order for the 
consent to be morally transformative. For example, the consent-receiver has to take reasonable 
steps to ensure that the consent-giver has not been coerced, knows and understands the expected 
conventional consequences, and so on. What counts as "reasonable steps" will vary depending on
the context and the severity of the consequences if someone is not actually consenting. If some-
one is consenting to risky surgery, the steps are more stringent and more strongly required than if
someone is consenting to pay a taxi fare.
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So, in the case of punishment, is it true that — if all the necessary background conditions 
are in place — consent can turn an otherwise impermissible action into a permissible one? That 
is, in the case of punishment, is consent morally transformative? The consent theorist maintains 
that punishment is permissible because of the criminal's consent (to be liable to punishment), but 
the same treatment would be wrong in the absence of the criminal's consent (to be liable to pun-
ishment). Can consent really make this moral difference?
Certainly there appear to some cases in which consent seems to be morally transforma-
tive. Suppose that I'm considering getting a haircut, and you would like to cut it for me (perhaps 
because you like cutting hair and you need the cash). Suppose that there is good reason to think 
that I would be happier with short hair, you are not coercing me, you would do a good job of cut-
ting it and I know that to be the case, we agree on a reasonable fee, you've taken reasonable steps
to ensure that I'd be happier with short hair, etc. Suppose that all the background conditions are 
in place that are necessary for cutting my hair to be permissible — but I haven't yet consented to 
you cutting it. In this case, it would not be morally permissible for you to cut my hair, even 
though the haircut is in my interests. It would be wrong of you to sneak up on me while I was 
sleeping and cut it without my permission. But once I give informed consent to you cutting my 
hair, then it's permissible for you to do so. If all the necessary background conditions are in 
place, consent has turned an otherwise impermissible act into a permissible one.190 Consent also 
seems able to make the difference between impermissible and permissible is pairs such as theft-
gift, rape-consensual sex, murder-medically assisted dying, assault-surgery, etc. As Bergelson 
(2010) colourfully puts it, consent
190If my consent wasn't informed (perhaps you told me you were good at cutting hair, when in 
fact you're terrible) then it's not permissible for you to cut my hair. Same goes for any other 
background condition.
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turns a rape into love-making, a kidnapping into a Sunday drive, a battery into a foot-
ball tackle, a theft into a gift, and a trespass into a dinner party.191
Importantly, however, for consent to be morally transformative in this way, it seems it 
must be possible to withhold or withdraw consent.192 Boonin puts this as an objection to the con-
sent theorist and says that in standard cases of tacit consent it is possible to explicitly deny that 
one is granting consent to what is standardly expected. For example, a would-be passenger could
get into a taxi and explicitly tell the driver that she isn't planning on paying at the end of the jour-
ney. If the taxi driver agrees to drive the passenger who has made such an explicit declaration, it 
is not the case that the passenger is obligated to pay the taxi driver at the end of the journey and 
the taxi driver has no right to any of the passenger's money.
Another example Boonin gives is of a doctor who is playing roulette and receives a page. 
The doctor explicitly announces that although he is putting his chips down on red, he is not 
betting on red. He is just putting the chips down in order to answer the page. Therefore, the 
doctor is withdrawing his consent to bet on red.
If consent can be given — whether explicitly or implicitly — it seems that it must also be
possible to withhold or withdraw consent. But this appears to cause a problem for the consent 
theory of punishment. We don't want the justifiability of punishing an offender to depend on 
whether he chooses to announce that he is withholding or withdrawing his consent to being 
191Bergelson (2010), p. 164
192This would mean that if someone initially consents to sex, they are able to change their mind
and withdraw consent. Having sex with someone who has changed their mind and withdrawn
consent, would be rape, in most people's minds. North Carolina is unusual in that the law there
says that consent to sex cannot be withdrawn after it is given. See The Guardian article at https:/
/tinyurl.com/NCrapelaw.
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punished for his crime. And if an offender is not able to withdraw her consent, it doesn't seem 
that it was legitimate consent in the first place.
However, there is a crucial difference between the taxi driver and roulette playing cases 
on the one hand, and the criminal case on the other. The taxi driver agrees to take the non-paying
passenger and the roulette dealer agrees that the chips being placed on red does not amount to a 
bet on red. Of course their agreement itself might be tacit. The taxi driver needn't say, "Yes, I 
agree to take you where you want to go for free", but so long as the taxi driver heard the 
passenger say that she wasn't going to pay and so long as the passenger had good reason to think 
that the taxi driver heard her make her announcement, if the taxi driver nods assent (a kind of 
tacit consent) for her to get in the taxi, then they've agreed that the passenger is not obligated to 
pay. Imagine, however, that the passenger merely mumbled her intention not to pay and the taxi 
driver did not hear and the passenger had no reason to believe that the taxi driver heard, then 
there would be no agreement between them for a non-paying ride and the default convention 
would still be in place — and the passenger would owe the taxi driver money at the end of the 
journey. Similarly, if the dealer didn't hear the pager and the doctor mumbled his intention not to 
bet on red, then the default convention would still be in place — and the doctor would be liable 
to lose his chips if the wheel comes up black.
 In the criminal case, the consent theorist could maintain that an offender just saying that 
they are not consenting to punishment isn't sufficient to imply that they are not. The offender (or 
would-be offender) would have to successfully communicate with and get assent from the 
appropriate authorities. For example, in the jurisdiction where I live, growing marijuana is 
illegal, but medical exemptions can be granted by the appropriate authorities. So if I want to 
grow marijuana, my just saying that I don't consent to be punished when I break the law, doesn't 
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mean that I have successfully withdrawn that consent. I have to successfully communicate and 
get assent from the appropriate authorities. Consent is a communicative transaction between 
persons — and so is withdrawing or withholding consent.
Imbrisevic (2010) attempts to defend the consent theory from the problem of criminals 
not being able to withdraw consent by arguing that there's a special third kind of consent, in 
addition to tacit/implicit and express/explicit consent. And it's this kind of consent that is at work
when a criminal breaks the law. Crucially, it's a kind of consent that cannot be "uncoupled" from 
the act of breaking the law.
To illustrate this third kind of consent, Imbresevic provides an example of a pedestrian 
bridge that is damaged so badly that it is dangerous to cross on it. The city government where the
bridge is located puts up a big, clear sign saying that the bridge is unsafe and that anyone who 
crosses it does so at their own risk — the city is not responsible for injury or other costs incurred 
by people ignoring the sign. We may even suppose that they put "do not enter" tape across each 
end of the bridge. The city has clearly discharged its responsibility to be liable for injuries 
incurred. Imbrisevic maintains that when you cross the bridge, you are thereby consenting to be 
liable to any costs incurred due to possible injury. Your consent, he says, is not separable from 
the act. You cannot declare, "I do not consent to liable for costs incurred due to crossing the 
bridge" and thereby "uncouple" your consent from the act of crossing the and so not be so liable.
But Imbrisevic is mistaken that there's a special kind of consent that it is not possible to 
"uncouple" from crossing the bridge. It's simply because you failed to successfully communicate 
and get assent from the city to change the default convention already in place. Contrary to 
Imbrisevic's assumption, there is a default convention at work; there are conventions surrounding
of "At your own risk" signs and what they imply. And, as we noted before, a consent-convention 
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can arise accidentally and one can be bound by it, even if one neither chose it, nor consented to 
it. If the city put up a teeny-tiny sign or one in Swahili (in a predominantly English-speaking 
area) it would not have successfully communicated its intention to change the default assumption
that the city is responsible for the safety of bridges under its jurisdiction nor could it reasonably 
believe that it had your tacit consent to changing the default assumption. And the pedestrian's 
mere declaration that they are not consenting to be responsible for the risk of injury from 
crossing the bridge does not suffice to withdraw their tacit consent to be responsible for that risk.
The pedestrian would have to communicate with, and get assent from, the city in order not to be 
responsible for the risk they are taking when the cross the bridge.
So Boonin's objection can be responded to by Nino in a very simple way, simpler than 
Imbrisevic's route: the roulette-playing doctor and the non-paying taxi passenger succeed in 
withdrawing or withholding their consent only if they successfully communicate with their 
appropriate partner (roulette dealer, taxi driver) and get their consent to changing the default 
convention, which was already in place and enabled tacit consent. So the offender (or potential 
offender) cannot withdraw or withhold consent to liability to punishment just by announcing this.
They need to successfully communicate and get assent from the appropriate partner (in the case 
of a crime, this might be the police or a judge or the head of state). Similarly, a child cannot 
simply announce that they do not consent to be punished for rule-breaking and thereby cease to 
be liable to punishment. They would have to successfully communicate with a parent and get the 
parent's assent. And of course that is possible — a parent could grant an exception to the rule for 
whatever reason. Just as in the criminal case, paramedics rushing to an emergency have an 
exception to the speed restriction laws, there are medical exemptions granted for growing 
marijuana and so on. (Even after the fact, exemptions can be granted by a judge for extenuating 
151
circumstances.)
So, even if it's true that for consent to be genuine it must be possible to withdraw or 
withhold consent, that doesn't pose a problem for the consent theorist because, in both the 
criminal case and PPC, it's possible for an offender or a child to communicate and get assent for 
an exception to be made.
So the consent theory is, I think, much more plausible than it might first appear for both 
criminal punishment and parental punishment of children. However, I do think that, ultimately, it 
fails in both domains. That is because for consent to be morally transformative, two other back-
ground conditions have to hold, which do not hold in the case of punishment. First, the person 
who is consenting must not have their options impermissibly limited by the person (or organiza-
tion of persons) receiving the consent. And, second, the  unavailable option must not be the con-
senter's preferable option.
Consider the following example. Suppose someone lives in a small town and they have 
only one surgeon available who can perform a medical procedure they need. Suppose that this 
procedure can be safely performed with either general anesthetic or local anesthetic, all the risks 
are the same, the chances of the procedure being successful are the same, the costs are the same, 
and so on. It's simply a matter of patient preference between general or local anesthetic. But the 
surgeon — for no good reason — decides to withhold one of the options.193 Let's say they with-
193Some might think that the surgeon's limiting of (what turned out to be) the patient's preferable 
option means that the patient is, after all, coerced into consenting. I think it's a stretch to call it 
coercion. But it doesn't really matter if we consider impermissibly limiting someone's preferable 
option a form of coercion or not — either way, doing so means that acting on someone's 
informed consent is not permissible. The consent is not morally transformative. Wertheimer 
agrees that this kind of "coercion" is not really coercion "because A does not threaten to violate 
B's rights" as when A puts a gun to B's head, for example. But, he says, "I readily admit that 
there is a sense in which one is 'forced' to do that which there is no reasonable alternative to 
doing, but this is not the sort of 'force' or coercion that undermines moral transformation," 
Wertheimer (2010), p. 201. The example he has in mind is the "Lecherous Millionaire". B's child 
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hold the local anesthetic option. The surgeon has impermissibly limited the patient's options (and
it's impermissible, regardless of the patient's preferences, or what is actually best for the patient). 
The patient consents to the surgery with general anesthetic, and their consent is fully informed 
(including knowing about the surgeon's withholding of local anesthetic). 
Despite the impermissible limiting of options, is the patient's consent nevertheless moral-
ly transformative? It would be impermissible for the surgeon to perform surgery on the patient 
without consent; since the patient has consented, is it now permissible for the surgeon to perform 
surgery? We don't yet know enough. It also matters which option would have been preferable for 
the patient, had neither option been withheld. If the patient would have chosen general anesthetic
anyway, then it seems that the consent is morally transformative: It's both permissible for the sur-
geon to perform surgery (rather than not perform surgery at all), and it's also permissible to per-
form surgery with general anesthetic (rather than local anesthetic). If, on the other hand, the pa-
tient would have preferred local anesthetic, then their consent is not morally transformative. 
Surgery (of either kind) is impermissible without the patient's consent, and while the patient's 
consent does mean that surgery (of some kind) is now permissible, it's not permissible for the 
surgeon to perform surgery with general anesthetic (rather than local anesthetic). Note that this 
result does not depend on a prior moral judgement regarding the different surgeries. The moral 
needs expensive medical treatment. A proposes to pay for the treatment if B will meet him for 
sex twice a week for a year. B consents to this arrangement, but I think it is wrong for A to have 
sex with B (assuming B doesn't want to have sex with A), despite B's consent. The millionaire, 
A, is immorally limiting B's options. While we might not think that A is obligated to pay for the 
child's medical care "for nothing in return", there are plenty of other ways in which A would be 
able to help, but A does not make any other offer of help. And so A is impermissibly limiting B's 
preferable options; and so B's consent is not morally transformative; and so A is acting 
impermissibly when he has sex with B.
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status of the consented-to surgery depends on (1) the options being impermissibly limited and (2)
what is preferable for the consenter.
There's one more relevant complication. I used the phrase "what is preferable" for the 
consenter. This is somewhat ambiguous between what the consenter prefers and what is best for 
the consenter. In the case of a competent adult, consent is morally transformative (despite imper-
missible limiting of options) if their choice matches their well-informed preferences. It's nobody 
else's place to decide what is best for the consenter. That's part of the value of consent — it 
grants competent adults the freedom and authority to choose whatever they prefer, even if it is 
not what is best for them.194 In the case of a child, however, we are justifiably paternalistic. Chil-
dren are not free to to choose whatever they prefer (at least not always), if it is not what is best 
for them. 
In the case of state criminal punishment, it's certainly arguable that the state impermissi-
bly limits offenders' preferable options. And, if it is correct that the state impermissibly limits the
offender's (or potential offender's) preferable options, it would be impermissible for the state to 
punish an offender even if the consent theorist is correct that the offender's breaking the law 
counts as consent to punishment.
If, for example, the state refused to offer an offender alternatives to punishment, such as 
effective rehabilitative treatment, or addictions counselling, or psychiatric care, or employment 
training, or academic education, (or whatever else might help her in future), it could still be im-
permissible to punish her. If the state (perhaps in the form of members of the judicial system?) 
does not put morally sufficient effort into considering alternatives to punishing the offender, it 
194Because, ultimately, what is best is always a judgement call based on the available evidence. 
We do not have direct access to the truth about what is objectively best for someone, so once a 
competent person has grasped the relevant evidence, it's up to them to make that judgement.
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could still be impermissible to punish the offender. If the state failed to put at least as much effort
into crime preventative measures as it does into punitive measures, it could still be impermissible
to punish her. So we can see that in the case of criminal punishment, even if consent is necessary 
for the permissibility of punishment, and even if offenders do consent to punishment when they 
break the law, the question of the moral permissibility of punishment remains. This is the be-
cause the question remains whether or not preferable alternatives to punishment have been im-
permissibly limited.
Note that such an argument would not depend on a premise that state punishment is 
wrong. The argument wouldn't go: Consent fails to be morally transformative in the case of pun-
ishment because punishment is wrong, even when it's consented to. That would beg the question 
against the consent theory. Instead, the argument would conclude that state punishment is wrong,
even if it's consented to — on the grounds that the consenter's preferable options have been im-
permissibly limited. And such an argument would have to defend the view that the options have 
been impermissibly limited. If preferable options are impermissibly limited, consent fails to be 
morally transformative. If this is correct, state punishment would not be justified by the consent 
theory. (Of course, that would leave open that it may be justified in some other way.)
So: even if consent were necessary for the permissibility of criminal punishment, and 
even if offenders do give consent to be punished (by breaking the law), we would still need to 
ask whether punishment is permissible or not. If an offender's preferable options are being im-
permissibly limited by the state, then the offender's consent would not grant permissibility of 
punishment, even if the law they broke was a just one (and other necessary background condi-
tions were in place). The question of whether criminal punishment is justified would remain.
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In the case of parental punishment of children, my view is that punishing a child for 
breaking a rule is indeed impermissibly limiting the child's preferable options — so that even if a
child consents to punishment, it is nevertheless impermissible to punish them. The child's con-
sent is not morally transformative; it does not turn intentionally inflicting distress from a morally
impermissible action into a permissible one. If it's the case that the parent ought to offer alterna-
tives to punishment such as making amends, teaching the child, showing the child the effects of 
their action, encouraging the child to apologize, and so on, then punishment would be impermis-
sible. So, even if a child's consent is necessary for the permissibility of parental punishment, and 
even if children do consent to punishment when they break a rule, that consent is not morally 
transformative because parents are impermissibly limiting the child's preferable options.195 And 
what makes it the case that they are impermissibly limiting the child's options is not that punish-
ment is wrong (although of course I do believe that is it the case). Rather, it is that there are 
preferable options that there is no good reason not to offer, such as non-punitive discipline.
We can conclude that the type of consent theory of punishment championed by Nino has 
failed to justify PPC. Even if a child consents to being punished and even if that consent is in-
formed and non-coerced (and other necessary background conditions hold), that consent doesn't 
imply that PPC is justified, so long as the parent is impermissibly limiting the child's options by, 
for example, not offering non-punitive alternatives.
A note on Rawlsian social contract theory
Instead of actual (albeit tacit) consent as in Nino's theory, we might think it's more plausible that 
195Of course, there are plenty of ordinary examples in which a parent permissibly limits a child's 
options, such as when they offer tacos or fish fingers but don't offer spaghetti (for some good 
reason or other).
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the justification of state criminal punishment depends on hypothetical consent, as proposed by 
John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. On this view, criminal punishment is justified (if it is) by the 
political principles that would be consented to by reasonable citizens who know neither their own
position in society nor various facts about themselves, but do know basic, general facts about 
human nature:
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in 
society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I 
shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their 
special psychological propensities.196
To extrapolate from this, these rational agents also don't know their race, gender, or sexuality; 
their education level; their birthplace; their religion or lack of it; whether they have any 
disabilities, diseases, or medical conditions; and so on. This "veil of ignorance" means they 
cannot be misled by self-interest (or the interests of their in-group) when deciding on the 
principles around which to structure society.
This "original position" is a hypothetical scenario in which reasonable parties would 
decide on the principles that would determine the structure of society. So even though there was 
no real, historical occasion on which citizens literally consented to be governed by the state, if 
society is based on such principles, then there is what we might call hypothetical consent to state 
governance — which would include use of state coercion, such as in the case of criminal 
punishment.197
196Rawls (1971), p. 12
197Rawls himself doesn't go into detail and try to justify state punishment. Dolovich (2004) is a 
detailed investigation into how Rawls’ technique of the original position and the veil of 
ignorance, and the basic principles he derives, could generate principles that justify state 
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However, even if this methodology is successful in the case of criminal punishment, it is 
not applicable in the case of parental punishment of children, and cannot be adapted to it (unlike 
the other theories we've looked at). The parties in the original position are assumed to be 
rational and mutually disinterested. This does not mean that the parties are egoists, 
that is, individuals with only certain kinds of interests, say in wealth, prestige, and 
domination. But they are conceived as not taking an interest in one another's 
interests.198
This makes sense when the parties are considering the principles that should structure society 
and govern the behaviour of citizens, so that they can have the liberty to pursue their own ends, 
while at the same time minimizing the interference with others' pursuit of their ends:
A just social system defines the scope within which individuals must develop their 
aims, and it provides a framework of rights and opportunities and the means of 
satisfaction within and by the use of which these ends may be equitably pursued.199
Citizens might have reason to expect other citizens to have a general interest in justice, but they 
would not expect other citizens to consistently look out for one another's interests, just as they 
themselves don't consistently look out for others' interests. They can reasonably expect citizens 
to be generally interested in securing their own ends, and — given their general knowledge of 
punishment in a liberal democracy. She concludes that from behind the veil of ignorance, parties 
would agree on principles that are fundamentally variants of what she calls the ‘parsimony 
principle’: “the basic idea of which is that the punishment of convicted offenders must be no 
more severe than necessary to yield an appreciable deterrent effect on the commission of serious 
offenses.” Dolovich (2004), p. 325-6.
198Rawls (1971), p. 13
199Rawls (1971), p. 31
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human nature — they would expect that at least sometimes citizens would attempt to do this at 
others' expense:
Fearing crime at the hands of their fellows, the parties would look to the state to 
impose punishment as a way of providing them protection. At the same time, fearing 
the violation of their security and integrity that punishment represents, they would be 
wary of investing the state with the authority to exercise this kind of coercive power. 
The challege the parties thus face it to identify principles of punishment that would 
answer both concerns, providing them the protection they will need in a partially 
compliant world both from fellow citizens and from the state.200
Of course, all of this stands in stark contrast to the family. Family members are 
paradigmatic examples of persons who are not "mutually disinterested". They are not fearful of 
one another, and they don't need to worry about unequal distribution of resources. There’s 
typically no tendency towards competition for scarce resources (or whatever) between parents 
and their children. Typically, there is trust between family members, which there isn't between 
citizens (or wouldn't be in the absence of laws limiting citizens' behaviour). It's not unusual for 
parents to make sacrifices — sometimes very significant sacrifices — for the welfare of their 
children. This is not the case between citizens, of course. And it is not appropriate to abstract 
away from the relationships and features that define the very institution. So, as Rawls writes:
We wouldn't want political principles of justice — including principles of distributive 
justice — to apply directly to the internal life of the family.201
Along with the family, there are other institutions to which political principles don't directly 
200Dolovich (2004), p. 379
201Rawls (1997), p. 790
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apply, such as 
churches or universities, professional or scientific associations, business firms or 
labor unions. The family is not peculiar in this respect. To illustrate: it is clear that 
liberal principles of political justice do not require ecclesiastical governance to be 
democratic. Bishops and cardinals need not be elected; nor need the benefits attached 
to a church's hierarchy of offices satisfy a specified distributive principle, certainly 
not the difference principle. This shows how the principles of political justice do not 
apply to the internal life of a church, nor is it desirable, or consistent with liberty of 
conscience of freedom of association, that they should.202
So, it makes sense to abstract away from citizens' positions and relationships in society in order 
to decide on fair principles governing how society should be structured and on the limits on 
citizens' freedom to pursue their own ends. In contrast, the family consists of necessarily partial 
relationships; features such as trust, concern, self-sacrifice; and a non-democratic power 
structure. "[I]f we assume that the correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature
of that thing",203 it doesn't make sense to abstract away from the relationships and features that 
make a family what it is. While it can definitely be instructive to try to put ourselves in the 
position of children and seriously consider what is best for them from their point of view, it's not 
useful to completely abstract away from the parent-child relationship.204
Furthermore, the decision-making principles themselves that result from Rawls' 
methodology are not applicable to the case of PPC. For example, Rawls argues that the parties in 
the original position would agree to the "maximin" decision-making procedure when deciding 
202Rawls (1997), p. 789
203Rawls (1971), p. 29
204I don't think it's necessarily a problem that a family involves children. The parties in the
original position presumably have to take into consideration the lives of citizens over their whole
life span.
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which principles should determine the structure of society. This procedure says that the parties, 
when deciding between two alternative political principles, would prefer the one in which the 
worst-off person was better off than in the other. Even if we supposed that parties in the original 
position were not deciding on society level principles, but instead on principles governing the 
family, the maximin decision-making procedure doesn't even get off the ground. Whereas it is 
highly relevant to the morality of a societal structure how society addresses inequality and how it
helps the worst-off, it's not relevant to the morality of PPC who is the overall worst-off over the 
course of their lifetime, a parent or a child. (One or the other could have a terrible life or a 
fantastic life overall, due to factors completely unrelated to PPC.) Concern for the worst-off is 
legitimate for a just society. It doesn't apply in the case of a family. 
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CHAPTER SIX: The long term harms of parental punishment
At this point, it might be worth a reminder of my overall argument in this dissertation. I argue 
that there is a default rule of human behaviour, Avoid intentionally causing others distress, and 
because punishing children is a departure from this rule, it needs justification. If punishment is 
not justified, we should stick with the default and avoid punishing. To be justified, an instrumen-
talist theory (i.e. a theory that attempts to justify punishment by its usefulness in achieving some 
goal) must meet three requirements:
(1) The distress inflicted (both intended and not intended) is not excessive, compared 
to the amount and/or type of benefit gained.
(2) The distress inflicted will likely lead to the intended goal.
(3) There is no comparably effective alternative that causes less distress.
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, we have seen how various instrumentalist theories fail requirement (2).205 
That is, the evidence indicates that punishment is not effective for various goals that parents 
might have (such as moral education or behavioural training). That is sufficient to show that pun-
ishment is not justified by these theories. In this chapter, I will argue that these theories also fail 
205You may recall from Chapter 2 that obedience for a combination of reasoning + punishment 
was the only possible exception. Larzelere et al (1998) found that there was a delay in 
misbehaviour if a punishment "back-up" was more recent than if it was longer ago. However, I 
would argue that this small benefit (42 minutes) is not 'worth' punishing a child for, so the 
obedience theory of justification fails (1), even if we grant (2). In the present chapter, we will 
look at the unintended side effects of punishment, which lends further support to the view that 
reasoning + punishment fails (1). Furthermore, Larzelere et al (1998) didn't compare reasoning +
punishment to any non-punitive alternatives other than reasoning alone (with 3 year olds!), so 
there would be no reason to think it passes (3).
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requirement (1), because (together with the distress initially inflicted) there are important side ef-
fects of punishing children. This gives us further reason to reject instrumentalist theories of pun-
ishment of children, and to stick with the default of avoiding intentionally causing others 
distress. 
In Chapter 5, we looked at a consent theory for justification of PPC. I argued that the con-
sent theory of PPC fails because parents are impermissibly limiting their children's preferable op-
tions when they punish them. And this means that the child's consent is not morally transforma-
tive — that is, it cannot turn intentionally inflicting distress on a child into a morally permissible 
action. The evidence presented in the previous chapters (on the lack of benefits of punishment), 
together with the evidence in this chapter (on the long term harms of punishment) and in Chapter
9 (on the benefits of non-punitive discipline), supports the view that non-punitive options are 
preferable to punishing a child.
PPC inflicts distress immediately, but it also has various long term harms. In this chapter, 
I will be focusing specifically on the evidence regarding those long term harms. In Chapter 7, I 
will consider a more general consequentialist justification of punishment, and of course all the 
evidence regarding punishment's potential harms and its lack of benefits is relevant to what a 
consequentialist would say about punishment of children. In Chapter 8, I will consider retribu-
tivism. Although some retributivists seem to think that their views are immune to empirical evi-
dence, I think that they are mistaken. I think it should matter to the retributivist what the evi-
dence indicates about the benefits and harms of punishment. I agree with Rawls' view that, "All 
ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One 
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which did not would simply be irrational, crazy."206 If this is correct, the evidence in this chapter 
will be relevant to retributivism too.
Overall, the evidence seems to indicate numerous negative side effects of both physical 
and nonphysical punishment, both in childhood and extending into adulthood. The evidence is 
stronger for physical punishment because more work has been done on it. But there is also some 
evidence that non-physical punishments (such as time-outs) have long term harms too. And the 
evidence for the influence of spanking on externalizing behaviour (such as aggression) is 
stronger than for any other kind of side effect.
It is worth noting at the outset that although there's a near consensus among researchers 
who work in this area that corporal punishment (including spanking) has various long term nega-
tive effects, this conclusion is not without controversy. For example, Ferguson (2013) argues that
although there do appear to be negative long term effects of spanking (on internalizing and ex-
ternalizing behaviour, and cognitive performance) those effects have been exaggerated by anti-
spanking researchers. This debate centres on complex issues regarding the correct statistical 
models to use and how to interpret those results, but note that even though Ferguson thinks anti-
spanking researchers have exaggerated the harms of spanking, he nonetheless agrees that spank-
ing is indeed correlated with those negative long term effects, as are some other types of punish-
ment — in contrast with positive discipline:
[S]mall to moderate but non-trivial... correlational relationships were found between 
spanking/[corporal punishment] and negative outcomes including externalizing and 
internalizing symptoms and lower cognitive performance... Similar effects were 
found for harsh verbal punishment and arbitrary discipline, but not for positive dis-
206Rawls (1971), p. 30
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ciplinary strategies which were not significantly correlated with externalizing symp-
tom outcomes, the only outcome with a sufficient number of studies.207
It is important to remember, however, that even if spanking caused no long term harms, there is 
evidence that it is not beneficial — and that is sufficient to make spanking impermissible. If I 
slap your face but you nevertheless recover and suffer no long term ill effects (physical or psy-
chological) it was still wrong for me to slap you if there's no reason to think that doing so will be 
beneficial. (If I slap you to arouse you from unconsciousness, for example, then my doing so is 
likely justified.) The same goes for intentionally causing non-physical distress. If I yell upsetting 
insults at you but you get over it and suffer no long term ill effects (physical or psychological) it 
was still wrong for me to yell insults at you, if there's no reason to think that doing so will be 
beneficial.208 Causing even short term distress needs to be justified, whether it is distress caused 
to an adult or to one's child, whether it is physical pain or psychological upset.
Despite this controversy over the size of the negative effects, keep in mind the near con-
sensus among contemporary psychologists and social scientists who investigate parental punish-
ment of children that spanking has harmful long term effects (far fewer researchers investigate 
other forms of punishment). Furthermore, bear in mind that the handful of prominent researchers 
who disagree with the anti-spanking consensus, such as Robert Larzelere and Diana Baumrind, 
also usually find negative effects of spanking and have failed to find any beneficial effects of 
spanking. Larzelere and Baumrind are pro-spanking not because they have found beneficial ef-
207Ferguson (2013)
208Perhaps there are situations in which yelling upsetting insults at someone might be beneficial. 
After many calm, patient conversations, if someone is just not getting the message that their 
views are racist or sexist (or otherwise harmful), it might be that an emotional outburst from 
someone they respect causes them to reconsider their views.
165
fects of it (they haven't). It's just that they don't think that spanking is any worse than non-physi-
cal punishment, so they think parents should have it as an option. They admit that even if spank-
ing is not harmful in the long term, neither is it beneficial. Usually, when they look for negative 
effects of spanking, they find them. But a study in which they failed to find negative effects of 
spanking was one that looked at spanking at preschool age, and effects in early adolescence (so 
over a long period of time):
Normative physical punishment (spanking) never predicted adverse (or beneficial) 
outcomes after controlling for preexisting differences at T1.209
And even though they are pro-spanking, they say:
Like any kind of punishment, spanking is intended to be aversive and is unpleasant to 
inflict as well as to receive, and like punishment of any kind, should be used only 
when its estimated benefits outweigh these costs. Singling out spanking for censure 
obscures the fact that all punishment causes pain and so must be justified by the ends 
it is expected to achieve.210
But given that they typically find no benefits of spanking,211 it's hard to see how they could justi-
fy spanking by its benefits. In Baumrind et al (2010), they compare spanking to "psychological 
control and verbal hostility" and found them "to be more strongly associated than total physical 
punishment with adverse adolescent attributes."212 And in their eyes, this is supportive of spank-
209Baumrind et al (2010)
210Baumrind et al (2010)
211 Larzelere et al (1998) did find an average addition of 42 minutes of delay until the next 
misbehaviour when punishment was combined "more recently" with reasoning with toddlers.
212Baumrind et al (2010)
166
ing — i.e. because spanking is not as bad as "psychological control and verbal hostility". But 
note this is comparing instances of spanking (which may be frequent or infrequent) with a very 
general, negative overall style of parenting. Although "psychological control and verbal hostili-
ty" can include using non-physical punishments (such ignoring a child until their behaviour im-
proves, or insulting a child in order to correct misbehaviour) it's more about general parental atti-
tudes and overall family environment. For example, a parent who is psychologically controlling 
engages in behaviour such as habitually interrupting a child, trying to tell them what to think or 
how to feel, giving them "guilt trips", belittling them, ridiculing their feelings, and so on.213 This 
parenting style has been shown to have negative effects on child outcomes, particularly depres-
sion, but it's not directly related to punishment. (A parent could be psychologically controlling in 
this way and never punish, or they could be psychologically controlling and punish frequently.) 
However, pro-spanking researchers such as Baumrind and Larzelere are correct that it's 
not legitimate to single out spanking for special censure, as if it is supposed to contrast un-
favourably with all other forms of punishment. As we proceed thought this chapter, we will see 
how both spanking and other forms of punishment have harmful long term effects (although, as I
mentioned earlier, the evidence is stronger for spanking). In this chapter, in each section on a 
specific type of side effect, I will talk first about the evidence regarding spanking and then about 
the evidence regarding non-physical punishments.
213See, for example, Barber (1996) and Barber et al (2005), which Baumrind refers to. Note that 
giving a child a "guilt trip" is very different from helping a child see the impact of their specific 
action on someone else, which might serve to induce guilt in that child. A child feeling 
appropriately guilty for a specific wrongful action that hurt someone else is quite different from a
parent who habitually tries to make their child feel guilty by going on about how much they do 
for their child, how miserable their child makes them feel, how much better off the parent would 
be if the child was different (or absent), and so on. 
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Increased aggression and other behavioural problems
There is strong evidence that spanking, in particular, causes increases in aggression and other be-
havioural problems. We will look first at this evidence and then turn to other forms of punish-
ment, which have also been found to have similar effects.
MacKenzie et al (2013) found that
[A]ge 5 maternal spanking, at both low and high frequency, is a significant predictor 
of higher downstream age 9 externalizing behavior, even after an extensive set of 
child and family characteristics were controlled for...
Numerous studies find that the more spanking kids receive, the more aggressive they are later.214 
Children who are spanked more often have also been found to more strongly prefer aggressive 
problem solving with siblings and peers than children who are spanked less often.215 Even when 
children's initial levels of misbehaviour are taken into account, the groups that used least corpo-
ral punishment, or that stopped using it, had better outcomes than those that used more and/or 
didn't stop using it.216 A study in the early 1990s showed that when parents reduce their use of 
physical punishment, there are subsequent reductions in their children's aggressive behaviour.217 
This is, of course, evidence that parents' spanking is having an effect on their children's behav-
214For example: Strassberg et al (1994), Straus et al (1997), Slade & Wissow (2004), Knox 
(2010),  Taylor et al (2010 b), Afifi et al (2012), Lee et al (2013), MacKenzie et al (2012), 
Maguire-Jack et al (2012), Gershoff et al (2012), Altschul et al (2016), and Paterson et al (2013).
215Simons & Wurtele (2010)
216Straus et al (1997), Lansford et al (2009), Taylor et al (2010)
217Forgatch (1991) 
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iour (rather than solely kids' behaviour having an effect on parents' discipline). This result was 
replicated in a 2012 study:
In a randomized controlled trial of an intervention designed to reduce difficult child 
behaviours, parents in more than 500 families were trained to decrease their use of 
physical punishment. The significant parallel decline seen in the difficult behaviours 
of children in the treatment group was largely explained by the parents’ reduction in 
their use of physical punishment.218
Gershoff et al (2010) also found that spanking has negative effects on kids' aggressive be-
haviour. Researchers interviewed 292 mothers and their children, in six countries, and found that 
corporal punishment, (along with other parental behaviours: expressing disappointment, yelling, 
and scolding) was associated with increased child aggression. If more aggressive children elicit 
more parental discipline (rather than parental discipline causing children to become more aggres-
sive), one would expect that more aggressive children would elicit more of all forms of discip-
line — including non-punitive discipline — but that appears not to be the case:
[W]e did not find that parents use more of all forms of discipline with aggressive 
children; rather, only four of the eleven forms of discipline were significantly 
associated with child aggression. If aggressive children were eliciting more parent 
discipline overall, we would have expected them to elicit more of the most frequently 
reported forms of discipline. However, although mothers reported they teach about 
good and bad behavior and get child to apologize most often, they were not using 
these techniques any more frequently for children they rated as high in aggression. 
These findings are not consistent with a “child effect” explanation.219
A 2012 article in the Canadian Medical Association Journal, summarizing 20 years of 
such research, states that "results consistently suggest that physical punishment has a 
218Durrant & Ensom (2012)
219Gershoff et al (2010)
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direct causal effect on externalizing behaviour [i.e. various forms of antisocial 
behaviour]"220:
One of the first large prospective studies (1997, n = 807) controlled for initial levels 
of child antisocial behaviour and sex, family socioeconomic status and levels of emo-
tional support and cognitive stimulation in the home. Even with these controls, physi-
cal punishment between the ages of six and nine years predicted higher levels of anti-
social behaviour two years later. Subsequent prospective studies yielded similar 
results, whether they controlled for parental age, child age, race and family structure; 
poverty, child age, emotional support, cognitive stimulation, sex, race and the interac-
tions among these variables; or other factors. These studies provide the strongest evi-
dence available that physical punishment is a risk factor for child aggression and anti-
social behaviour.221
In a 2013 study of more than 3000 preschoolers, increases in spanking between ages 1 
and 3 years of age, predicted increases in children's aggression between ages 3 and 5, over and 
above the children's initial levels of aggression — and this effect is not counteracted by mothers' 
warmth towards their children.222 
Another factor that doesn't help reduce the negative behavioural effects of corporal pun-
ishment is lax discipline (i.e. discipline that "is typified by permissiveness and inconsistency... 
[i.e.] the lack of follow-through in maintaining and adhering to rules for children's behavior... 
[and] of giving into coercive child behavior").223 Indeed, on the contrary, combining lax parent-
ing and harsh discipline (characterised as using corporal punishment) makes each worse than ei-
ther by themselves:
220Durrant & Ensom (2012)
221Durrant & Ensom (2012)
222Lee et al (2013) 
223Parent et al (2016), p. 397
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[G]iven average levels of harsh discipline..., higher levels of lax discipline were asso-
ciated with higher levels of youth externalizing problems... [G]iven average levels of 
lax discipline, higher levels of harsh discipline were associated with higher levels of 
youth externalizing problems.224
Extending the research to consider the effects of corporal punishment beyond childhood, Gamez-
Guadix et al (2010) investigated the link between corporal punishment at age 10, and antisocial 
traits and behavior in young adulthood. They found that positive parenting did not counteract the 
apparent negative effects of corporal punishment (and they also found that parents' psychological
aggression didn't make a difference either): 
CP [corporal punishment] was associated with an increased probability of ATB [anti-
social traits and behavior] regardless of whether there was positive parenting and psy-
chological aggression.225
In their meta-analysis, Larzelere and Kuhn (2005) point out that spanking isn't any worse 
than other forms of punishment, but their point can of course also be taken as saying that other 
forms of punishment are just as bad as spanking. Spanking was compared to time-out, love with-
drawal, privilege removal, and scolding in numerous studies, and they conclude that:
[T]his meta-analysis found no evidence that physical punishment was more strongly 
associated with physical aggression than other disciplinary tactics.226
224Parent et al (2016), p. 402
225Gamez-Guadix et al (2010)
226Larzelere & Kuhn (2005), p. 27.
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[T]his meta-analysis failed to detect negative side effects unique to physical 
punishment.227
[I]f physical punishment increases aggression and antisocial behavior, it does so to 
the same degree or less than the disciplinary tactics to which it has been directly 
compared.228
Most of the previous evidence against physical punishment does not appear to be 
unique to physical punishment. Equivalent analyses produce similar evidence against 
a range of alternative disciplinary tactics as well.229
And, as we saw in Chapter 3, Larzelere et al (2010) found in a study with 785 children aged 6 to 
9 years old:
More frequent use of all three types of nonphysical punishment [grounding, removing
privileges, sending children to their room] was associated with higher subsequent 
antisocial behavior, with effect sizes similar to spanking.230
In short, spanking children is associated with increases in antisocial behaviour over time — as 
are other punishments. If spanking causes behavioural problems, then we have reason to think 
that non-physical punishments do too.231 
227Larzelere & Kuhn (2005), p. 27. Italics added.
228Larzelere & Kuhn (2005), p. 27.
229Larzelere & Kuhn (2005), p. 28.
230Larzelere et al (2010), p. 11
231See also Campbell et al (2000), which provides evidence that, for children with behavioural 
problems in toddlerhood, "negative parenting" is a risk factor for continuing behavioural 
problems at school age.
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In addition to the non-physical punishments considered in Larzelere's research, another 
form of non-physical punishment that appears to have detrimental effects on child antisocial be-
haviour is what Wang and Kenny (2013) call "harsh verbal discipline". They define harsh verbal 
discipline as "the use of psychological force with the intention of causing a child to experience 
emotional pain or discomfort for the purposes of correction or control of misbehavior."232 Calling
a child a "lazy slob" in order to try to motivate them to tidy their room is an example of intentio-
nally causing the child emotional discomfort, in response to unwanted behaviour, for the purpos-
es of correcting that behaviour. The researchers collected survey data from 976 two-parent fami-
lies. Both mothers and fathers answered questionnaires about their verbal discipline of their 
child, on a scale from never to always (i.e. In the past year, after your child has disobeyed you or 
done something wrong, how often have you: (a) shouted, yelled, or screamed at the child; (b) 
swore or cursed at the child; and (c) called the child dumb or lazy or some other name like that?).
Children answered questionnaires about their conduct problems on a scale from never to 10 or 
more times (i.e. in the past year, how often have you (a) been disobedient in school, (b) lied to 
your parents, (c) stolen from a store, (d) been involved in a gang fight, and (e) damaged public or
private property for fun?). 
The researchers administered the questionnaires when the children were 13 years old and 
then again a year later, and they investigated the relationship between parents' harsh verbal dis-
cipline at age 13, and their 13 and 14 year old children's misbehaviour ("conduct problems"). 
They found that as well as children's conduct problems causing parents to use harsh verbal dis-
cipline, harsh verbal discipline also increased children's conduct problems:
232Wang and Kenny (2013)
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[H]igher levels of mothers’ and fathers’ harsh verbal discipline at age 13 predicted in-
creases in adolescents’ conduct problems between ages 13 and 14... Higher levels of 
adolescents’ conduct problems at age 13 also predicted increases in mothers’ and fa-
thers’ harsh verbal discipline between ages 13 and 14.233
A 2014 study based on survey data and interviews with 475 girls found that harsh discip-
line (including yelling, as well as corporal punishment) during girls' childhood and early adoles-
cence increases the risk of experiencing dating violence — both as perpetrator and victim — in 
late adolescence: 
More severe initial HP [harsh punishment] at age 10 significantly predicted a greater 
likelihood of PDV [physical dating violence] at age 17... Furthermore, a more rapid 
increase in HP from ages 10 to 13 was associated with PDV at age 17.234
A study of 500 five year olds, who had been surveyed repeatedly during infancy and tod-
dlerhood, found that, "The strongest predictors of externalising behaviour at 5 years of age were 
male sex, harsh discipline and maternal stress".235 The harsh discipline is not only physical pun-
ishment, but also includes frequent use of non-physical punishments such as yelling, scolding, 
and time-out (i.e. defined as "sending a child to a room or corner in the house as punishment").236
To summarize, there is strong evidence that corporal punishment increases the risk of lat-
er behavioural problems (including, perhaps, into adulthood). In addition to this, there is moder-
233Wang and Kenny (2013), p. 914
234Hipwell et al (2014)
235Bayer et al (2012)
236From the Parent Behavior Checklist: http://www.duq.edu/Documents/education/_pdf/DCPSE/
psychology/parent-behavior-checklist.pdf
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ate evidence that non-physical punishments (such as harsh verbal punishment, time-out, ground-
ing, removing privileges, and so on) also increase the risk of behavioural problems.
Impaired cognitive and moral development
There is moderate evidence that spanking has detrimental effects on cognitive and moral devel-
opment. And there is some evidence that other kinds of punishment have similar effects, but it  is
currently much weaker.
Various studies have found that spanking is associated with impaired cognitive develop-
ment, even when controlling for a raft of other potential influencing factors. For example, in a 
sample of 2573 children, Berlin et al (2009) found that spanking at age 1 predicted lower mental 
development scores at age 3.237 By itself, this result would be consistent with either spanking 
causing lower scores, or lower scores causing parents to spank. But the researchers also found 
that lower scores at age 1 did not predict spanking at age 3. That is, if a child was spanked at age 
1, they are more likely to have lower mental development scores at age 3 than children who are 
not spanked. In contrast, children with lower mental development scores at age 1 were not more 
likely than children with higher scores to be spanked at age 3. So the explanation for spanked 
children having lower mental development scores is unlikely to be because parents spank kids 
more if they have lower mental development. (Child fussiness at age 1, on the other hand, did 
predict later spanking. That is, it's likely that fussiness causally contributes to parental spanking.)
This is evidence that spanking is having a detrimental effect on young children's mental 
development. 
237As measured on the Bayley Scales of Infant Development. http:/
/www.psychometrics.cam.ac.uk/services/psychometric-tests/bayley-scales
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MacKenzie et al (2012) used data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study 
and looked at the effects of spanking at age 3 on 1150 children. They found that spanking at age 
3 had detrimental effects on 5 year olds' receptive vocabulary (i.e. words that a child can under-
stand and respond to, even if they cannot produce them). This is after controlling for numerous 
factors that might influence children's cognitive abilities, such as "family structure/size, SES, ed-
ucation, work, parenting stress, caregiver mental health and emotionality, [parental] substance 
use, warmth, child temperament and earlier child behaviour."238 Looking at similar effects over 
the longer term, using the same survey data, MacKenzie et al (2013) found, "evidence of [a detri-
mental] effect of paternal spanking at age 5 on the development of child verbal capacity at age 
9."239 
Straus and Paschall (2009) also found that kids who are spanked more often have slower 
cognitive development, compared to kids who are spanked less often. This was a study of two 
groups of kids. One cohort was 806 kids aged 2-4 years old at T1, and the second was 704 kids 
aged 5-9 years old at T1. The study was based on both questionnaire data and phone interviews 
of the parents during two one-week periods for each cohort. This study controlled for 10 differ-
ent parenting and demographic factors (including maternal education, mother's emotional sup-
portiveness, mother's cognitively stimulating activities with the child such as reading, child's 
birth weight, mother's age, and so on). The mean scores on the cognitive tests that were used at 
T1 and T2 were standardized to 100. The tests are age appropriate, so a child who gets a score of 
100 at T1 and a score of 100 four years later at T2 has developed exactly at the average rate — it 
doesn't mean that their development has stalled. 
238MacKenzie et al (2012)
239MacKenzie et al (2013)
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In both age groups, "The more CP experienced, the more they fell behind children who 
were not spanked."240 The children who were 2-4 years old at T1 and who weren't spanked at all 
during the two week-long study periods gained, on average, 5.5 points between T1 and T2, com-
pared to the mean. The standard deviation was only 14-15 points, so this is a moderate effect. 
The children who were spanked 3 or more times during the two week-long study periods stayed 
at the mean of 100 (which is what one would expect, since being spanked that frequently is 
standard for that age group).241 For the 5-9 year old children, spanking frequency is much lower. 
15% of this group were spanked three or more times. The majority (58%) were spanked at least 
once in the two week study period. Children in this age group who were spanked once stayed at 
about average over the 4 year period. And children who were spanked two or more times fell 
slightly behind the average over the 4 years. 242
Children 2–4 years old who experienced no CP in either of the 2 sample weeks gained
a mean of 5.5 cognitive ability points (on a scale with a mean of 100 and a standard 
deviation of 15) relative to children whose mothers used CP. Similarly, children 5–9 
years old whose mothers did not use CP in either week gained a mean of about 2 
points relative to children whose mothers used CP.243
Of course, with an association between spanking and lower cognitive ability at the same point in 
time (even repeated for many points in time, and for many subjects), one might wonder if it's the 
child's lower cognitive ability causing their parents to spank, rather than spanking causing the 
240Straus and Paschall (2009), p. 459
24148% of the 2-4 year olds were spanked three or more times in the two week study period.
Straus and Paschall (2009), p. 472
242Straus and Paschall (2009), p. 473
243Straus and Paschall (2009), p. 476-477
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lower cognitive ability. (Or they could be effects of a common cause.) As Straus and Paschall 
(2009) put it:
Low cognitive ability (i.e., a “slow” child) could lead parents to use more CP because
of frustration in dealing with such children or out of disappointment and resentment. 
If so, the correlations showing that the CP is associated with lower cognitive ability 
leave unanswered the question of which is the cause and which is the effect. We be-
lieve there is a bidirectional relationship. On the one hand, parents could be more 
likely to hit cognitively “slow” children than children with average or higher ability. 
On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, children experience CP as highly stressful 
and stress is known to interfere with cognitive functioning and to result in changes in 
brain functioning.244
And this study helps to confirm that, whether or not there is a child effect on parents, there is an 
effect of spanking over time on children's cognitive development. Spanked kids and non-spanked
kids start off all over the cognitive ability scale, but it's true that on average spanked kids' scores 
are lower than non-spanked kids' scores. This is consistent with either a child effect (lower cog-
nitive ability causing frustrated parents to spank more) or a parent effect (spanking causing kids 
to have lower cognitive ability). But the trajectory of their average scores is different over time. 
Spanked kids' cognitive development is slower than non-spanked kids' cognitive development. 
The difference in the trajectories is small (an average of a few points on a test) and it's more like-
ly that spanking has a small effect on the developmental trajectory than that parents' rate of 
spanking changes in response to these fairly subtle developmental differences. (Furthermore, 
another paper published in the same year, Berlin (2009), which we looked at earlier, found that 
lower mental development scores at age 1 did not predict spanking at age 3. That is, there is no 
evidence that the child's mental development influenced a parent's decision to spank.) 
244Straus and Paschall (2009), p. 470-471
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Looking at the relationship between parental punishment in childhood and moral judge-
ment in young adulthood, Lopez et al (2001) found that, "Minor use of physical discipline was 
significantly [negatively] related to Principled Morality."245 This questionnaire-based study of 
109 young adults, found that if someone experienced minor physical discipline during childhood,
then they were more likely than those who were not spanked to score lower on tests designed to 
evaluate the sophistication of respondents' moral reasoning regarding various moral dilemmas. 
Another study with a similar format, Shen et al (2013), found detrimental effects of "punitive 
parenting" generally, which includes both physical and non-physical punishment. They found 
that parental punitiveness was correlated with less sophisticated moral reasoning in adulthood 
(e.g. basing moral judgements on others' approval, rather than on the needs of others).
There is other evidence that suggests that non-physical punishment is detrimental to chil-
dren's cognitive development and moral internalization, but I would consider it inconclusive for 
present purposes, since it tends to look at parents' "power assertion" more generally, without dif-
ferentiating punishment from other forms of power assertion.246 Forcing a child to have a time-
out as a punishment is power assertion. Putting a fragile item out of reach of a child is also power
assertion; doing up a high chair strap so a child doesn't fall out, even if the child doesn't want it 
done up, is also power assertion — but these are not punishments. It is a well-tested hypothesis 
that "power assertion" is detrimental to children's moral internalization. And, indeed, this hypoth-
esis does appear to be supported by the evidence, but we don't know how much of that effect is 
due to non-physical punishment, and how much (if any) is due to non-punitive power assertion. 
245Lopez et al (2001), p. 200
246See, for example, Grusec and Goodnow (1994), Kochanska and Thompson (1997), Kochanska
et al (2003), Kochanska et al (2007), Grusec (2011), Barnett and Quackenbush (1996), Grolnick 
et al (1997) and Thompson (2014).
It would be helpful for future research to distinguish between non-physical punishment and non-
punitive power assertion. 
In sum, there is moderate evidence that corporal punishment hampers children's cognitive
development and moral internalization. Punishment more generally may have detrimental effects 
on kids' (especially more fearful or anxious kids')247 cognitive development and moral internal-
ization, but given the current state of empirical research, I think we are forced to withhold judge-
ment for the time being.
Increased dishonesty
Another important behaviour that parents value in their children is telling the truth. However, 
there is evidence that punishment encourages dishonesty. In particular, it appears that children 
who are punished more often are more likely to lie about their misbehaviour than children who 
are punished less often. This is difficult topic to study because researchers need to know when a 
child has lied (which can be hard in real life circumstances). However, an experimental situation 
has been devised in which children lie fairly reliably. 
In one experiment, researchers studied 84 children, aged 3 and 4 years old, half from a 
"punitive" school and half from a "non-punitive" school. (The non-punitive school did use some 
punishments, including time-outs, but less often than the punitive school did, which used punish-
ments much more routinely, including physical punishments for very minor transgressions such 
as forgetting a pencil. The schools and the families' demographics were otherwise very similar.)
247Gershoff et al (2010)
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Children were told not to peek at a toy when left alone in a room. Most children could
not resist the temptation and peeked at the toy. When the experimenter asked them if 
they had peeked, the majority of the punitive school peekers lied about peeking at the 
toy while significantly fewer nonpunitive school children did so. The punitive school 
children were better able to maintain their deception than nonpunitive school children
when answering follow-up questions. Thus, a punitive environment not only fosters 
increased dishonesty but also children's abilities to conceal their transgressions.248
About 80% of all the kids did what they were told not to do and peeked at the toy. "Children in 
both schools were equally likely to peek at the toy when left alone,"249 so the punitive school 
hadn't managed to make kids more likely to do what they were told on this occasion. But about 
94% of kids from the punitive school lied about peeking, compared to 56% at the "non-punitive" 
school. (One wonders what the percentage would have been from a completely non-punitive 
school.) The kids from the punitive school were also better liars (as judged by experimenters 
who didn't know which school the kids were from).250 
Talwar et al (2015) pursued further the apparent detrimental effect of punishment on chil-
dren's honesty. With their sample of 372 4-8 year olds, they used the same peeking experimental 
paradigm, and looked at the relationship between the threat of punishment and children's lying.251
Most children peeked despite having been told not to do so (67.5% of the total sample peeked; 
82.3% of the preschoolers and 52.7% of the older children). Of the children who peeked, 66.5% 
of them lied about having peeked, with older children lying more often than younger children 
248Talwar & Lee (2011), p. 1751. The parents' attitudes towards punishment did not differ 
significantly between the two schools and none of the parents cited the schools' discipline 
strategies as a reason to select either school, so the discipline the kids received at home is 
unlikely to have differed much.
249Talwar & Lee (2011), p. 1754
250Talwar & Lee (2011), p. 1753
251Talwar et al (2015) 
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(63.4% of preschoolers, 71.4% of older children). Children were more likely to lie if a punish-
ment was implied for having peeked ("You'll be in trouble"). Children were less likely to lie if 
they were given reasons for telling the truth — either that they would feel better about them-
selves by doing so ("internal appeal"), or that the experimenter would be pleased with them if 
they did ("external appeal"). With the children in this sample, the external appeal was a more ef-
fective incentive to tell the truth than the internal appeal. (The authors speculate that perhaps an 
internal appeal would be more effective with older children, who have internalized moral rules 
better.) The biggest difference was between the children who were given internal appeals and a 
threat of punishment, and those who were given internal appeals and no threat of punishment. 
The children who were not threatened with punishment told the truth 55% of the time; those 
threatened with punishment told the truth only 14% of the time.252 That is quite a big difference. 
So there is evidence that punishments make kids lie more often, and more convincingly.
Mental health problems253
Associations have been found between childhood punishment and mental health problems, both 
in childhood and, later, in adulthood. Some of the studies on mental health in adults are based on 
questionnaires that ask adults to recall the punishment they received as children. One might won-
der how reliable such data is — perhaps, for example, adults who suffer from mental health 
problems are more likely to (mis)remember more childhood punishment, not because they expe-
rienced more, but as an effect of their current mental health problems. Depression, say, could 
252Talwar et al (2015)
253In addition to the studies I describe in detail in this section, see also Laurin et al (2015), 
Carneiro et al (2016) and Petts & Kysar-Moon (2012). Johan Vanderfaeillie et al (2013) finds 
similar effects for foster parents.
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cause an adult to have an overly negative view of their childhood, rather than their childhood 
punishment making them more likely to become depressed in adulthood. 
However, as we saw in Chapter 4, it turns out there's no reason to think that depressed 
adults who recall more childhood spanking have less reliable memories than non-depressed 
adults who recall less childhood spanking, because independent evidence has been collected re-
garding the reliability of subjects' childhood memories and
there is evidence that supports the validity of accurate recall of adverse childhood 
events and that psychopathology [i.e. the presence of mental or behavioural disorders]
is not linked to less reliable or less valid self-reported data on adverse childhood 
experiences.254
Subjects are generally pretty reliable about their parents' overall discipline, even if they don't re-
member particular incidents well.255 
Using recall data, MacMillan et al (1999) found that adults who were spanked during 
childhood "sometimes" or "often" (but who did not experience abuse), have significantly higher 
lifetime rates of anxiety disorders, alcohol abuse or dependence, and externalizing problems than
those who recalled "never" having been spanked during childhood. The prevalence of alcohol 
abuse and externalizing problems among those who were spanked "sometimes/often" was double
that of those who were "never" spanked.256 
254Afifi et al (2012), p. 5
255See, for example, Asselmann et al (2015) and Greenhoot et al (2005).
2565.8% of those who were "never" spanked or slapped experienced alcohol abuse or dependence;
13.2% of those who were spanked "sometimes/often" did. 7.5% of those who were "never" 
spanked or slapped suffered from one or more externalizing problem; 16.7% of those who were 
spanked "sometimes/often" did. Table 2, MacMillan et al (1999).
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A 2014 study, based on a survey of 4609 people aged between 15-80 had similar results. 
Respondents who received more than average physical punishment as children were more likely 
to have psychological problems as adults such as schizotypal personality, alcohol abuse, depres-
sion, and other mental health problems.257  
Respondents who had had suicidal thoughts during the previous 12 months, and those 
who had attempted suicide during the previous 12 months, had experienced significantly more 
physical punishment as children than those who had not had suicidal thoughts or attempted 
suicide.258
These associations are consistent with the childhood spanking and the adult mental health
problems being effects of a common cause (although all the studies did control for numerous fac-
tors that could plausibly fill this role, such as parents' alcohol misuse). However, there is evi-
dence that supports the view that there is causal influence from spanking to mental health issues. 
Researchers interviewed 292 mothers and, separately, their children in six different countries, 
asking them about the household use of different forms of discipline, and the kids' anxiety.  As 
reported in Gershoff et al (2010), it was found that anxiety was associated with corporal punish-
ment (along with time-outs, expressing disappointment, and shaming). Although one might sus-
pect that aggression, say, would tend to cause parents to spank children more, it seems unlikely 
that parents would spank anxious children more:
[A]lthough it is not hard to imagine an aggressive child eliciting more discipline from
a parent, it is less clear whether a child's symptoms of anxiety would elicit discipline, 
particularly potentially harsh techniques such as corporal punishment and yelling. 
Rather, longitudinal research has found that parents typically use less, not more, harsh
257Osterman et al (2014), p. 576
258Osterman et al (2014), p. 577.
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discipline with anxious and fearful children... Children's levels of depression and 
anxiety have also been found to predict less corporal punishment in particular... 
Clearly these analyses will need to be replicated with quasi-experimental and/or 
longitudinal data to definitively identify direction of effect, but our findings for both 
child aggression and child anxiety are more consistent with a parent effect rather than 
a child effect explanation.259
It is unlikely that parents would spank anxious or depressed kids more often; it's more 
likely that the spanking is causing the anxiety and depression, rather than the other way around. 
Indeed, there is independent evidence that children's depression and anxiety predicts less corpo-
ral punishment.260 And in Gershoff et al (2010), seven discipline techniques were not correlated 
with anxiety at all, which, if greater anxiety provoked greater levels of discipline, one would ex-
pect that to apply to all of them (or to apply to the least harsh ones more than the harsher ones 
because even if parents discipline anxious kids more often, perhaps they tend to choose less 
harsh discipline when they do so). Those seven discipline techniques are: (1) teach child about 
good/bad behaviour, (2) get child to apologize, (3) remove privileges, (4) yelling and scolding, 
(5) telling child that parent won't love them any more if they act that way again, (6) threaten 
child with punishment, and (7) promise child a treat or privilege for good behaviour. So this sup-
ports the conclusion that corporal punishment has negative effects on children's anxiety.
Lax parenting is characterized by permissiveness, and by inconsistency in following 
through on rules and consequences, and researchers believe it increases the risk of internalizing 
problems. Parent et al (2016) found that use of corporal punishment (which is the type of punish-
259Gershoff et al (2010), p. 499
260Grogan-Kaylor & Otis (2007) 
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ment they take to characterize "harsh punishment") made the effects of lax parenting worse for 
children between the ages of 3 and 12:
[G]iven average levels of lax discipline,... higher levels of harsh discipline were asso-
ciated with higher levels of child, but not adolescent, internalizing problems.261
There's also evidence that nonphysical punishments cause mental health problems too. 
Along with spanking, time-outs, for example, are positively associated with anxiety in children, 
according to the Gershoff et al (2010) study we looked at above. A 2014 study with 295 children 
found that punitive parenting (which includes removing privileges, yelling when a child misbe-
haves, as well as physical punishment) when children were 3 years of age predicted certain 
changes in their brains at 6 years of age; and it's already known that these particular changes 
(ERN, or error-related negativity) are in turn a predictor of various mental health problems in 
children, such as clinical anxiety and non-clinical anxiety, and clinical OCD and non-clinical 
OCD symptoms.262
Bayer et al (2012) found, in a follow-up study of 500 5 year olds who had been surveyed 
multiple times during infancy and toddlerhood that, for internalizing behaviours at age 5, "The 
most consistent and cumulative predictors of externalising behaviours were harsh discipline and 
maternal stress."263 Again, "harsh discipline" is not just corporal punishment. It also includes 
261Parent et al (2016), p. 400. In this study, the child age groups were 3-7 and 8-12 years old. The
adolescent group was 13-17 years old.
262Meyer et al (2014)
263Bayer et al (2012)
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yelling, scolding, and time-out (i.e. sending a child to their room or a corner in the house as a 
punishment).
The same kind of relationship was found in van der Sluis et al (2015). This study 
measured child anxiety in 211 kids, 4-12 years old, and also assessed parents' behaviour using 
the Child Development Questionnaire:
The CDQ consists of vignettes in which a child is showing anxious behavior and par-
ents are asked how they would respond to the behavior of the child. They indicate 
how often they would use certain behaviors representing punishment, positive rein-
forcement [i.e. reward], reinforcement of dependency, force, and modeling/reassur-
ance on a scale of 1 to 5.264
In this study, punishment is understood broadly, including more than just spanking: "Punishment 
as assessed within the CDQ involved behaviors by the parents such as giving negative conse-
quences to the child (e.g. mild spanking), decline of something positive (e.g. not permitted to see
friends), belittling the child and making threats."265 The researchers did indeed find a positive 
correlation between punishment and anxiety, albeit small. (This could reflect the fact that anxiety
is influenced by many factors, including genetics,266 but that parental punishment contributes to it
too.) This is a cross-sectional study (i.e the factor being studied — anxiety — is measured at the 
same time as the variables, e.g. child age, punishment, positive reinforcement etc.). This means 
that it cannot demonstrate a causal relationship between punishment and anxiety. That is, it's pos-
sible that punishment has a causal effect on anxiety (the more a child is punished, the more 
264Van der Sluis et al (2015), p. 3656
265Van der Sluis et al (2015), p. 3657
266On the genetic influence on anxiety in children see, for example, Trzaskowski et al (2012).
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symptoms of anxiety they experienced), but it's also possible that a causal relationship goes the 
other way around (the more symptoms of anxiety a child experiences, the more a child is 
punished). 
But, presumably, (as with corporal punishments) parents are not likely to use nonphysical
punishments on anxious children more than on less anxious children, so the causal direction is 
likely from punishment to anxiety, rather than from anxiety to punishment.
Harsh verbal discipline also has detrimental effects on mental health. We've already 
looked at Wang and Kenny (2013) on the relationship between harsh verbal discipline and be-
havioural problems. They also used the data from 976 two-parent families to investigate the rela-
tionship between parents' harsh verbal discipline and their 13 and 14 year old children's depres-
sive symptoms. In addition, they investigated whether parental warmth could mitigate any 
damaging effects of harsh verbal discipline. Here are some of their conclusions: 
[W]e found that harsh parental verbal discipline did not lessen or eliminate the mani-
festation of adolescent conduct problems, but rather increased conduct problems and 
depressive symptoms over time.
Harsh verbal discipline was associated with increased conduct problems and depres-
sive symptoms regardless of whether parenting style was characterized by low, mod-
erate, or high levels of maternal and paternal warmth.
[H]arsh verbal discipline is ineffective at reducing conduct problems and, in fact, 
leads to increased adolescent conduct problems and depressive symptoms. 
Children's conduct problems both predict and are predicted by parents' harsh verbal discipline, 
which is an indicator of a bidirectional causal relationship: children's misconduct causes parents 
to use more harsh verbal discipline, and parents' harsh verbal discipline also causes children's be-
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haviour to worsen. However, children's depressive symptoms do not predict parents' harsh verbal
discipline, but parents' harsh verbal discipline does predict children's depressive symptoms, 
which is evidence that harsh verbal discipline causes the depressive symptoms, but not the other 
way around. The correlations are only moderate,267 but given the evidence that these punishments
are also not beneficial for children, there is good reason for parents to refrain from punishment.
One final risk
Kids who are physically punished are at greater risk of physical abuse at the hands of their 
parents:
Although research began to accumulate in the 1970s that showed that most physical 
abuse is physical punishment (in intent, form and effect), studies of child maltreat-
ment have since clarified this finding. For example, the first cycle of the Canadian In-
cidence Study of Reported Child Abuse and Neglect (CIS 1998) showed that 75% of 
substantiated physical abuse of children occurred during episodes of physical punish-
ment. This finding was replicated in the second cycle of the study (CIS 2003). Anoth-
er large Canadian study found that children who were spanked by their parents were 
seven times more likely to be severely assaulted by their parents (e.g., punched or 
kicked) than children who were not spanked. In an American study, infants in their 
first year of life who had been spanked by their parents in the previous month were 
2.3 times more likely to suffer an injury requiring medical attention than infants who 
had not been spanked.268
This is similar to the findings of Zolotor et al (2008), which performed anonymous telephone 
surveys of 1435 mothers in North and South Carolina. Parenting behaviour by the mothers and 
their partners, if there was one in the household, was assessed and 45% of mothers reported that 
267E.g. 0.25 correlation between maternal harsh verbal discipline at age 13 and depression at age
14.
268Durrant & Ensom (2012)
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the child was spanked (i.e. with an open hand on the buttocks) in the last year, and 25% reported 
that the child was spanked with an object on the buttocks in the past year. For the purposes of 
this study, child physical abuse was defined as follows:
[B]eating, burning, kicking, hitting with an object somewhere other than the buttocks,
or shaking a child aged <2 years.269
As defined, 4% of mothers reported physical abuse in the past year. (This means that about 60 
kids in the sample of 1435 had experienced abuse during the past year.) The researchers found 
associations between spanking and child abuse:
Spanking was significantly associated with child physical abuse... Spanking with an 
object is strongly associated with abuse.270
For every 1-event increase in spanking frequency, parents have a 3% higher odds of 
reporting abuse as defined.271
Two percent of mothers who report that neither they nor their partner has spanked the 
child report child abuse. Six percent of mothers who report spanking also report phys-
ical abuse. Twelve percent of mothers who report spanking with an object report 
physical abuse.272
Mothers who report that they or their partner hit the index child with an object on the 
buttocks are nearly nine times more likely to report potentially abusive behaviors.273
269Zolotor et al (2008), p. 364
270Zolotor et al (2008), p. 366
271Zolotor et al (2008), p. 367
272Zolotor et al (2008), p. 367
273Zolotor et al (2008), p. 368
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The study was very careful to assure respondents that their responses would be anonymous (al-
though, slightly reassuringly given the prevalence of abuse, they provided everyone with phone 
numbers for parenting resources at the end). But there is always the possibility of underreporting 
socially undesirable behaviour. In this case, however, it appears that underreporting is unlikely 
because "physical abuse as defined was more than 40 times more prevalent than protective ser-
vices-substantiated cases of physical abuse in the Carolinas during the same year."274
So, a child who experiences physical punishment is at greater risk of child abuse than 
children who don't experience physical punishment. (And more physical punishment is a greater 
risk.) Of course, child abuse is a terrible outcome, even if it had no further detrimental effects. 
But, unsurprisingly, physical abuse is a risk factor for further harms.
For example, Dube et al (2002) found that child physical abuse increased the risk of later 
alcohol misuse in adulthood. This risk was present even if the child's parents did not misuse alco-
hol, although having parents who also misused alcohol increased the children's risk even more.
The prospective longitudinal study, Lansford et al (2002), used data collected annually 
from a community-based (not clinic based) sample of 585 children. They found that child physi-
cal maltreatment (abuse) during the first five years of life had detrimental effects into adoles-
cence (grade 11), "above and beyond other risk factors related to maltreatment" including child 
characteristics. So, even if child characteristics have a causal influence on both child physical 
maltreatment and negative outcomes in adolescence, this study provides evidence that the mal-
treatment adds its own causal influence. (The child characteristics they assessed were "resistance
to control, unadaptability, and difficult temperament".)
274Zolotor et al (2008), p. 368
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Kids who experience nonphysical punishment are at greater risk of nonphysical abuse by 
their parents. Calling a child a lazy slob in order to punish them for having an untidy bedroom is 
a form of verbal or emotional aggression. Not all verbal or emotional aggression is punishment, 
of course. Sometimes a parent will insult a child when it's not in response to the child's misbe-
haviour, or it's not with an intention to improve their behaviour — in either case it would not be a
punishment. Frequent or extreme verbal aggression is a form of verbal or emotional abuse, 
whether the intention behind it is punishment or not:
As in the case of physical aggression, we believe that contemporary social norms tol-
erate a certain amount of verbal aggression by parents. If this is correct, then just as 
an occasional spanking does not constitute physical abuse, occasional verbal aggres-
sion does not constitute verbal abuse. That leaves open the question of how frequent 
verbal aggression needs to be before it is considered abuse.275
So these researchers considered different thresholds for verbal abuse and calculated the rates at 
those thresholds. For example, if we consider 25+ instances of verbal aggression towards a child 
in a year to be verbal abuse, then the rate of verbal abuse is 113 per 1000 children.276 The average
was 12.6 times per year. But wherever we draw the line between verbal abuse and non-abusive 
verbal aggression, using verbal aggression as a means to punish children makes it more likely 
that a parent will cross that threshold and end up verbally abusing their child. And subsequent 
evidence indicates that as the verbal or emotional aggression children receives increases, so too 
275Vissing & Straus (1991), p. 230
276Vissing & Straus (1991), p. 231
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does their risk of poor child adjustment;277 personality disorders;278 teenage physical aggres-
sion;279 depression, anxiety and anger-hostility;280 adult obesity;281 and adult physical health.282 
Once again, in such studies, there is a correlation between increased parental verbal/emo-
tional aggression and increased risk for the various harms mentioned. As with physical abuse, it 
is consistent with such evidence that, for example, a child's innate temperament, or a parent's al-
cohol misuse,283 causes both the parental verbal/emotional aggression and the later harms. How-
ever, a 2012 meta-analysis that looked at 124 articles on the available evidence concluded that: 
This overview of the evidence suggests a causal relationship between non-sexual 
child maltreatment [including emotional abuse] and a range of mental disorders, drug 
use, suicide attempts, sexually transmitted infections, and risky sexual behaviour.284
To move beyond a suggestion of a causal relationship, evidence for such a relationship is 
stronger when other factors that could explain the correlation are controlled for. For example,  
Dube et al (2002) (which was mentioned earlier in connection with child physical abuse) also 
found that child verbal abuse increased the risk of later alcohol misuse in adulthood, even if the 
277Moore and Peplar (2006)
278Johnson  et al (2001)
279Spillane-Grieco (2000)
280Teicher et al (2006) 
281Williamson et al (2002)
282Moeller et al (1993)
283For example, Widom et al (2007) found that parental alcohol use appears to causally influence 
both child abuse and the abused child's adult alcohol use.
284Norman et al (2012) 
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child's parents did not misuse alcohol. (The children's risk of developing alcohol problems in 
adulthood was increased if they also had parents who misused alcohol.) This lends support to the
view that even if parents' alcohol misuse causally influences their children's later alcohol misuse,
child abuse adds its own causal influence. 
So, the more often a parent is verbally aggressive towards their child, the closer they are 
to verbally/emotionally abusing their child, just as the more often a parent is physically aggres-
sive towards their child, the closer they are to physically abusing their child. This means any 
kind of punishment — whether physical or non-physical — is a risk factor for abuse. And abuse 
is a risk factor for all kinds of further harms.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Consequentialist justifications
In this chapter, I will be considering the views of consequentialists who think that all conse-
quences need to be taken into consideration when deciding whether or not a punishment is justi-
fied. Recall that although we might loosely refer to "consequentialist" theories of punishment 
that try to justify punishment by reference to particular kinds of consequence, such as moral edu-
cation or behavioural training or obedience, I prefer to call these latter kinds of theories "instru-
mentalist", in order to distinguish them from consequentialist theories.285 Instrumentalist theories 
maintain that punishment is justified by its instrumental value, that is, by specific outcomes it 
can contribute to achieving such as compliance, moral education, behavioural training, and so 
on. I have discussed these kinds of theory separately in previous chapters. Theories of punish-
ment that are, strictly speaking, "consequentialist", try to justify punishment by taking all its con-
sequences into consideration.
There are of course many different varieties of consequentialism,286 and different varieties
can be sub-divided more and more finely, and combined in different ways, depending on exactly 
how a theorist understands the nature and role of values, reasons, agents, and subjects of con-
cern, and so on. I will focus on the two broad categories — act consequentialism and rule 
consequentialism.
285Thanks to Gerald Postema for raising the need for this clarification.
286See, for example, Brink (2007).
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A classical act consequentialist could try to justify PPC by saying that it is justified on all
and only those occasions when the consequences of PPC are better than the consequences of the 
available alternatives (including non-punitive options). They think that at least sometimes a child
ought to be punished: whenever the consequences of doing so are better than the alternative 
courses of action. Different sub-categories of classical act consequentialism will involve differ-
ent understandings of what counts as better or worse consequences, depending on how they un-
derstand value.
Hedonistic act utilitarianism is one type of classical act consequentialism, and this dis-
tinction will become important later. Hedonistic act utilitarianism maintains that, fundamentally, 
the only positive value is pleasure and the only negative value is pain — and the positive or neg-
ative value of anything else (truth, love, freedom, inequality, ignorance, etc) is reducible to 
pleasure and pain. Other versions of classical act consequentialism needn't accept this restricted 
understanding of value.
I will mostly refer to the broader category of classical act consequentialism (abbreviated 
to classical consequentialism) including hedonistic act utilitarianism under this umbrella. But, as 
we shall see later, Boonin's objections to the latter as a theory of punishment can be parried by 
other versions of classical act consequentialism that include a broader conception of value. A 
variation or evolution of classical act consequentialism is rational choice or "expected utility" 
consequentialism which holds that it's the reasonably expected consequences that determine 
whether or not an action is morally right or permissible.287 
287This type of theory is also sometimes referred to as "subjective consequentialism" (the right 
action depends on the evidence, or evidence available to the agent, or what is expected). This 
contrasts with "objective consequentialism" (the right action depends on its actual 
consequences). See Feldman (2006) for an argument that a consequentialist theory based on 
maximizing expected utility is no more practical for action guidance than a consequentialist 
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A rule consequentialist could try to justify PPC by saying that it is better for humanity 
overall if we accept a rule that permits (or requires) punishment of children when they do wrong.
They think that children ought to be punished if, and only if, it is true that accepting a rule that 
allows punishment when children have misbehaved has overall better consequences for humanity
than accepting alternative rules. (Act consequentialists might accept a rule consequentialist deci-
sion-making procedure. On such view, what determines the rightness of a particular action are 
the consequences it actually has, compared to the consequences of alternative actions. But since 
agents are not in an epistemic position to evaluate all the potential consequences of all the possi-
ble actions they could perform, agents should instead decide what to do on the basis of rules that,
if they were accepted, would have the best overall consequences.) 
One question that is relevant to all types of consequentialism: When comparing alterna-
tive courses of action, which ones do we include in the comparison? Instead of punishing my 
child, I could decide to skip the punishment, sell all our but our absolutely essential belongings 
and donate the proceeds to a charity that vaccinates children in the developing world. There will 
always be something a parent could do that has better consequences than a punishment (and al-
ways something they could do that would be worse). The interesting question is really to com-
pare the close alternatives. In this case, this means comparing punishing a child to things like ig-
noring the child's behaviour, showing the child the results of their behaviour, explaining to the 
child why their behaviour is unacceptable, distracting the child, bribing the child, encouraging 
the child to apologize, and so on.
theory based on maximizing actual utility.
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Rule consequentialism
We will first consider rule consequentialism as a theory of justification of PPC. Given that we 
know that punishment always inflicts immediate distress, and the evidence we have reviewed 
shows that it does not tend to produce benefits, and it also incurs the risk of various long term 
harms, every indication is that if there is a consequentialist rule regarding PPC, it would be along
the lines of instructing parents to refrain from punishing their children — rather than one that 
justifies them doing so. Taken together, the evidence regarding the harms caused by PPC and the 
evidence regarding its lack of benefits means that there's no reason to think that PPC, as a gener-
al practice, could be justified by its consequences, compared to non-punitive discipline. Indeed, 
there's reason to think that it is not justified. If this is correct, then the rule consequentialist can-
not justify punishing children.
However, perhaps it's the case that there would be significant side effects of the accep-
tance of a rule against punishing children. Perhaps if parents accept a non-punishment rule, the 
consequences of doing so would somehow be worse than if they did not accept such a rule. So 
even if we allow that the evidence we have reviewed indicates that a rule allowing punishment of
children was not particularly good, the alternatives could be worse. So a rule allowing punish-
ment might, after all, be one of the correct moral rules and punishment of children might, after 
all, be justified (according to some version or other of rule consequentialism). Under what 
circumstances could this be the case? If parents don't know how to discipline their kids non-puni-
tively, and if they accepted a rule against punishment, perhaps instead of punishment, they would
turn away from discipline altogether and end up neglecting their children. Or perhaps, because 
their attempts at non-punitive discipline fail, they become so frustrated and eventually end up 
abusing their misbehaving children. These would indeed be worse options than parents accepting
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a rule that allows PPC. But do we have any reason to think that those results are more likely than
that parents' attempts at non-punitive discipline would be reasonably successful? How do we go 
about even evaluting the issue?
One thing we can do is look at the effects of educational programs that try to train parents
to reduce their use of punishment in favour of positive discipline — do such programs work? Do 
they have any of the unwanted side effects I mentioned? And another thing we can do is look at 
the effects of corporal punishment bans in countries that have instituted them. (As January 2017, 
there are 52 countries that ban all forms of corporal punishment of children, including in the 
home by parents.)288 Of course, this is not the same as a country adopting a law against punitive 
discipline more generally, but it will perhaps give us some idea what might happen if punishment
generally was ruled out.
The evidence indicates that such bans "are associated with declining support and practice 
of corporal punishment."289 Furthermore, a study that addressed the question of whether parents 
increased their use of other forms of punishment once corporal punishment was banned in Ger-
many found that "the decreasing use of violent forms of punishment has not been compensated 
by a significant increase in other sanctions (psychological forms of punishment or prohibi-
tions)."290 Romania prohibited corporal punishment of children in 2004, and researchers found 
that a decline in the use of corporal punishment was accompanied by "a decrease in parents' use 
288http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/progress/prohibiting-states/
289Zolotor and Puzia (2010)
290Bussman (2004)
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of verbal abuse: 22% of children reported experiencing this in 2001, compared to 16% in 
2012".291
Sweden was the first country to ban corporal punishment of children, and the ban has 
been in place since 1979. There is no evidence to suggest that the ban has had any detrimental ef-
fects, and there appear to be positive effects:
[T]he prevalence, frequency and harshness of physical punishment have declined dra-
matically in Sweden over two generations. Substantial proportions of women who be-
came mothers in the 1950s struck their children at least weekly (e.g., 55% of mothers 
of 4-year-old daughters; 20% of mothers of 8-year-old sons)... Among 3- to 5-year-
old children of that generation, implements were used by 13% of mothers... In con-
trast, the majority of young people born in the 1980s report never having been physi-
cally punished... Of those who were, the vast majority experienced it no more than 
once or twice in their childhood. Virtually no children are hit with implements in 
Sweden today.292
All of the studies [examining the relationship between milder and more severe forms 
of parental aggression against children] have found that the more often parents use 
mild physical punishment, the more likely they are to inflict severe violence on a 
child... Data from a range of sources indicate that Swedish parents are unlikely to use 
even minor forms of physical punishment with their children, and they are even less 
likely to use more severe forms.293
So there is no empirical evidence that suggests any harmful effects of introducing a country-wide
ban on corporal punishment. 
291See Alexandrescu et al (2013). Quote from research summary by the Global Initiative to End
All Corporal Punishment of Children: http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/assets/pdfs/
research-summaries/Summary-of-research-impact-of-prohibition.pdf
292Durrant and Janson (2005), p. 149
293Durrant and Janson (2005), p. 150-151
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What about the empirical evidence regarding educational programs that attempt to train 
parents to reject punitive discipline in favour of non-punitive discipline? Do these indicate any 
detrimental effects of parents "adopting a rule" against PPC?
Winter et al (2012) looked at the effects on 91 parents who were enrolled in a parenting 
program (Triple P) designed, in part, to reduce parental use of punitive discipline. Compared to 
before the program, parents showed greater knowledge of child development, greater parenting 
confidence, and less dysfunctional parenting. (The questionnaire the parents filled out 4 weeks 
after the program included items like: "I spank, grab, slap, or hit my child",  "I insult my child, 
say mean things, or call my child names". It also asked about lax parenting, such as, "When I say
my child can't do something, I let my child do it anyway.") The parents also reported that their 
children misbehaved less after the parents had completed the program and "The reduction in ex-
ternalised child behavior reported by parents at post-intervention was accounted to the greatest 
extent by reductions in dysfunction."294 It's important that parents had greater confidence in their 
parenting because one of the worries we might have about parents adopting a rule against PPC is 
that they feel so inept or frustrated that it has negative effects on their parenting. But that worry 
appears not to be borne out by this research. Parents who had completed the program were less 
dysfunctional (including using less harsh discipline and less lax parenting) and they felt more 
confident in their ability to handle child behavioural issues. This study looked at relatively short 
term effects, however.295
294Winter et al (2012), p. 888
295And it's also possible, of course, that the parents responded to the post-training in ways that 
"justified" (to themselves) the time invested in the training. Looking at differences over a longer 
period of time would reduce the influence of such post hoc rationalizations.
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Similar findings were made by Reedtz et al (2011), which used a different parent educa-
tional program (Incredible Years) and, importantly, looked at the difference between parents en-
rolled in the program and a non-enrolled control group one year later. Their sample was 189 fam-
ilies, with children aged between 2 and 8 years old. Even after a year, compared to a control 
group who did not participate in the educational program, parents who had completed the pro-
gram used less harsh discipline, more positive parenting, and expressed greater parenting satis-
faction and efficacy.
In a meta-analysis looking specifically at educational parenting programs developed and 
implemented in Portugal,
significant and positive intervention effects were found for parental stress, effective 
parenting attitudes (i.e., empathic responding, use of punitive discipline, and endorse-
ment of parental roles), perception of the informal social support network and child 
behavioural and emotional difficulties.296
Even when parenting programs don't include any elements specifically to do with discip-
line, they can help parents feel more effective, and help reduce children's misbehaviour. So a rule
against punishment could be complemented by such programs.297
Given the evidence reviewed in previous chapters regarding the harms and lack of bene-
fits of punishment, and the evidence regarding the positive effects (and, even more confidently, 
the lack of negative effects) of parent education programs, and the evidence in countries that 
296Almeida et al (2012), p. 135
297See, for example, Landy and Menna (2006).
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have adopted bans on corporal punishment, it's reasonable to conclude that adopting a rule 
against punishment of children would be justified.298
Classical consequentialism
Now let's turn to classical consequentialism. Strictly speaking, classical consequentialism cannot 
begin to justify punishment simply because it cannot begin to justify any type of action at all (in-
cluding non-punitive discipline, including helping little old ladies to cross the road, including 
feeding starving children). But this isn't enough to rule it out as a candidate theory for justifying 
punishment because perhaps it could justify individual instances of punishment — perhaps even 
very many instances.
Classical consequentialism would say that PPC is justified on all and only those occa-
sions when the consequences of punishment turn out better (all things considered) than alterna-
tive courses of action (including non-punitive discipline). Of course, this is consistent with the 
possibility that PPC is never in fact justified. But we can assume that anyone who suggested such
a justification would maintain that, at least sometimes, PPC is indeed justified. In this section, we
are considering whether classical consequentialism could be successful in justifying individual 
instances of PPC (even though it can't justify it as a type of behaviour).
A standard objection to a proposed consequentialist justification of criminal punishment, 
which can apply also to a consequentialist justification of PPC is that since consequentialist theo-
ries are concerned solely with consequences, it is entirely irrelevant to the consequentialist 
298Practically speaking, such a rule wouldn't be adopted over night. It would be something to 
work towards. Anti-spanking laws are preceded by changing attitudes and they appear to be more
successful (i.e. they help to continue, or accelerate, the decrease in approval of, and use of, 
corporal punishment more) in countries that engage in significant educational programs to 
inform parents of the law once it has passed.
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whether or not someone is in fact guilty of committing a crime — or in the present case, whether 
or not a child has done anything wrong. So, just as a consequentialist justification of criminal 
punishment might say that, in a particular circumstance, the right thing to do is to imprison an in-
nocent person, a consequentialist justification of PPC might say that, in a particular circum-
stance, the right thing to do is to give a time-out or a spanking to a child who has done nothing 
wrong. This is the "punishing the innocent" objection, which tries to demonstrate that a classical 
consequentialist theory of punishment (or, more usually, an instrumentalist theory) must be false 
because it has implications that we intuitively judge to be false.
A quick matter of clarification: So long as an agent believes that the recipient of their 
punishment is guilty, then I think it is strictly correct to call their action a punishment, even if the
recipient is in fact innocent. If, on the other hand, an agent believes the recipient to be innocent, 
and the recipient is indeed innocent, then their action is not, strictly speaking, a punishment.299 It 
is an instance of intentionally harming the innocent (which Rawls named "telishment").300 How-
ever, the problem at hand is usually called "punishing the innocent" despite, strictly speaking, not
involving punishment (but instead punishment-like instances of intentionally harming an inno-
cent person). The problem is that theory appears to imply that it can be justified to, for example, 
scapegoat an innocent person. These are the kinds of case that many people find problematic. Af-
299There is also the situation in which an agent believes that the recipient of a punishment is 
innocent, but they are in fact guilty (so the agent might be attempting to scapegoat a person they 
believe to be innocent, who actually turns out to be guilty). This is also a case of "punishing the 
innocent" in the relevant sense (i.e. intentionally inflicting distress on someone who is believed 
to be innocent). And the moral problem for the consequentialist is that the theory appears to 
imply that it's justified to punish (i.e. intentionally inflict distress on) those who are believed to 
be innocent — whenever doing so would lead to better consequences than the alternatives. 
Thanks to Geoffrey Sayre-McCord for raising this kind of case.
300Rawls (1955), p. 9
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ter all, presumably most people's intuitions would be in line with the view that a punishment is 
morally justified when, on the basis of excellent, beyond-a-reasonable-doubt evidence, an agent 
believes someone is guilty even though as a matter of unknown fact, they are innocent. Because 
there is no clash of theoretical result and intuition in this latter kind of "punishing the innocent" 
case, it's not thought to be a problem for the consequentialist if their theory implies that it can be 
justified to punish the innocent when the agent reasonably believes them to be guilty. So the 
problem of "punishing the innocent" is really the problem of agents intentionally inflicting pun-
ishment-like suffering on innocent people whom they also believe to be innocent.
In addition to justifying the punishment of the innocent, the consequentialist would also 
be committed to not punishing those who have done wrong, if refraining from punishment would
produce the best consequences of all the available options. While many will be loath to accept re-
fraining from punishing vicious murderers, not punishing the guilty seems to be less of a prob-
lem in the case of PPC. If it could be established that it is not overall beneficial to punish a child,
even if they have done wrong, I assume that most people could accept the idea of refraining from
punishing them. Punishing the innocent, however, is an unwelcome theoretical upshot for both 
criminal punishment and PPC. I assume that most people would baulk at the idea of punishing a 
child — whether by spanking them or withdrawing privileges or putting them into a time-out — 
when the child has done nothing wrong.
One response the classical consequentialist might make to the "punishing the innocent" 
objection is to deny that it is a consequence of their theory in the first place. A second possibility 
is for them to bite the bullet and accept the consequence, but attempt to make it more intuitively 
palatable. 
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How might a classical consequentialist deny that their theory has the consequence of 
"punishing the innocent"? One way of taking this route in the case of state punishment is to 
maintain that "The fundamental aim of government is not to maximize the aggregate happiness 
in the community."301 In which case, the pleasure or happiness of everyone in a society is not 
simply added to together so it can then "outweigh" the harm done to an innocent individual who 
is punished. According to Gerald Postema, contrary to the generally received view of his theory, 
Bentham held such a position:
[I]t would be a mistake to attribute to Bentham a view of the welfare of the communi-
ty that simply submerges the interests and well-being of individuals into an undiffer-
entiated sum of interests of the whole.302
Bentham thought it fundamentally important that the welfare of each individual be 
considered one-by-one. He did not accept the view, often attributed to him, that the 
good or welfare of an individual could be entirely subordinated to the welfare of the 
community as a whole.303
So, while it is a legitimate concern of the government that each person's overall welfare or happi-
ness is higher rather than lower, society's happiness "as a whole" is not its primary concern (to 
the extent that it even makes sense to talk of a society's happiness as a whole, since societies 
aren't the kind of things that can be happy or not; people are). Instead of adding together John's 
happiness and Aisha's happiness and Omar's happiness and Maria's happiness and so on to form 
the "community's happiness", each person's happiness or pleasure or welfare is necessarily at-
301Postema (2006), p. 130
302Postema (2006), p. 126
303Postema (2006 b), p. 41
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tached to that particular individual. And the legitimate role of the government is not to focus on 
increasing the happiness of the society as a whole — which would seem to allow sacrificing indi-
viduals for an increase in the abstract total happiness of the community. 
Instead, (if I understand correctly, and I don't feel at all confident that I do), the legitimate
role of government is to increase the happiness of each and every individual in a society, by 
maximizing the equal share of the basic interests that they have in common. Basic interests are 
things like security, on which their other interests (and, ultimately, their pleasure or happiness) 
depend. Each person's happiness is dependent on that person having a sufficient share in the ba-
sic interests. Without security, for example, it's much harder for people to find pleasure and hap-
piness in their pursuits. (Indeed, if the situation is bad enough, it's hard for them to have pursuits 
at all.) And so long as they each have an equal share in the basic interests, then they each have 
equal opportunity to increase their own happiness, in their own idiosyncratic ways — whether it 
be bungee jumping or stamp collecting; a quiet home life or world travel. It's not the govern-
ment's job to ensure "the equal happiness of all"304 — which would be impossible given the 
largely incomparable, idiosyncratic pleasures people have, varying inclinations to seek pleasur-
able activities, and differing propensities to find pleasure in them. Instead, it is the government's 
job to ensure that everyone has an equal share in the basic interests and to maximize those. (So 
the government's role is to increase security, for example, while also ensuring that it is equal for 
everyone. The government is not morally permitted to increase security for some at the expense 
of others, which scapegoating might do.)
So, let's suppose that scapegoating Omar (who is innocent of any crime) would make 
John happier, and Aisha happier, and Maria happier, and so on. Why shouldn't a government that 
304Postema (2006), p. 130
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acts according to Bentham's version of classical consequentialism do this? The reason is that the 
government's morally legitimate role is to maximize every person's equal share in the basic inter-
ests. And, of course, sacrificing Omar is not maximizing every person's equal share in the basic 
interests. It is singling out Omar and sacrificing his interests (including his basic interests) in or-
der to benefit everyone else.
However, even if this response is helpful to the classical consequentialist in the case of 
state punishment of the innocent, it doesn't seem to apply in the case of parental punishment of 
children. The fundamental reason not to punish the innocent in the case of state punishment is 
that the government ought to respect and promote every individual's welfare (rather than sacrific-
ing the one for the many). But this doesn't apply in the case of PPC. Punishing a child who hasn't
done anything wrong wouldn't (typically) be a case of scapegoating for the benefit of others. If 
punishing a child who has done nothing wrong were beneficial for that child (and perhaps their 
immediate family), it's not clear how the Benthamite approach just described could be helpful. 
(This is similar to the conclusion we reached after discussing Rawls on punishment. It's hard to 
adapt some more broadly political theories of punishment so they can apply to the personal 
moral issue of PPC.)
Alternatively, instead of denying that their theory implies that punishing the innocent can 
be justified, what if the classical consequentialist instead bites the bullet and accepts that impli-
cation? First, let's consider the standard "appeal to reality" that the classical consequentialist 
might make at this point. They might say that scapegoating the innocent is indeed an implication 
of their theory, but this is not really a problem since it'll be a rare occurrence in real life; it will 
rarely turn out to be the case that scapegoating will turn out to have the best overall conse-
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quences (because the state is limited in its ability to keep such an act secret, because the public 
would find out the truth, and so on). Boonin says that this kind of response misses the point.
The point of the objection is not to prove that the theory does, in fact, direct you to do
a deeply immoral act. Rather, the point is to demonstrate that you should not accept 
the theory because it entails a judgment that you do not accept.305
As long as you are unwilling to accept this implication [that the state ought to punish 
innocent people, whenever this would increase overall social utility], you must refuse 
to accept the theory that logically entails it. And so, the claim that punishing the inno-
cent always turns out to be impractical is irrelevant to assessing the merits of the pun-
ishing the innocent objection.... What matters is that the act-utilitarian is committed to
the conclusion that it would be the right thing to do if it were practical.306
But I don't think it's beside the point for the classical consequentialist to point out that it would 
be rare for scapegoating to be justified (according to their standards). This is because if you 
know and understand why it would be rare, you might be happier to accept the implication, and 
thus more inclined to accept the theory that implies it. In the case of PPC, classical consequen-
tialism has the unintuitive implication that, sometimes, children who have done nothing wrong 
ought to be punished. But if the classical consequentialist is persuasive that this would be the 
right thing to do only very rarely, that would make the implication more palatable, and thus make
the theory as a whole more attractive.
But Boonin thinks there's a further "punishing the innocent" problem for the classical 
consequentialist. The problem is more fundamental than the theory simply having unintuitive 
consequences (which, after all, we may learn to live with). The problem is that failing to distin-
305Boonin (2008), p. 49-50
306Boonin (2008), p. 50
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guish between the innocent and the guilty means that hedonistic act utilitarian necessarily fails to
justify punishment at all; it's not even in the right ballpark. I think that Boonin's objection fails to
show that hedonistic act utilitarianism — and other forms of classical consequentialism — nec-
essarily cannot justify punishment. (Since I think his objection applies to the broader category of 
classical consequentialism, and not just to hedonistic act utilitarian, and since I think that it fails 
against both the broader category and the more specific theory, I will simply refer to "classical 
consequentialism" in the following discussion.) Boonin says:
If "the reason [the classical consequentialist] has given for deliberately harming guilty
people... is also a reason for sometimes deliberately harming innocent people... then 
her position does not justify punishment in the first place, even of those who are are 
guilty."307
Punishment "involves not simply harming an offender, but harming an offender be-
cause she has committed an offense."308 
Boonin's view is that if the same reason is given to justify punishment as is given to justify in-
flicting other suffering (e.g. on the innocent), then punishment has not really been justified at all. 
In Boonin's view, a punishment is the infliction of suffering that is necessarily performed for a 
reason (i.e. the offender's guilt). And if an offender's guilt or innocence makes absolutely no dif-
ference to the justification of punishment, then it's not the case that punishment has been 
justified.
Some may feel that Boonin's objection to a general consequentialist justification of pun-
ishment is a cheap shot. But I think that the objection does need to be addressed: given that con-
307Boonin (2008), p. 50-51
308Boonin (2008), p. 51
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sequentialism is necessarily entirely forward-looking, whilst punishments are essentially back-
ward-looking, how could a consequentialist justify punishment? For a consequentialist, the past 
has no moral significance and can play no role in justifying a present action, so it seems to 
Boonin that a consequentialist has no way to justify an action that must take the past into consid-
eration. (Of course, agents' beliefs about the past can have effects in the future, and past events 
can have effects that stretch into the future. But to the extent that the past is over and done with, 
it is not morally relevant to the consequentialist.309 Only the future matters morally.) Relatedly, 
given that consequentialism is concerned entirely with the consequences of actions (and not with 
morally evaluating agents' psychology), whilst punishments essentially involve agents having 
certain kinds of reasons or motives in mind, how could a consequentialist justify punishment? 
For a consequentialist, agents' reasons and motives have no moral significance independently of 
their consequences. (I.e. the consequentialist is not concerned to defend some moral motives or 
reasons as good/right, or bad/wrong, independent of their consequences. Motives of jealousy or 
greed or vindictiveness, for example, are not morally wrong "in themselves"; motives of kind-
ness or helpfulness or generosity are not morally right "in themselves". All that matters is 
whether or not acting on such motives has better or worse consequences than the alternatives.) 
Given that punishment is a type of action that necessarily depends on an agent having a certain 
type of reason or motive in mind, it seems to Boonin that a consequentialist has no way to justify
an action that must take reasons or motives into consideration. 
309"What we may call the utilitarian view holds... the principle that bygones are bygones and only
future consequences are material to present decisions", Rawls (1955). However, it's possible that 
it's rare for bygones really to be bygones — think about how lasting damage to the ozone layer 
results from seemingly trivial actions, some in the distant past. See Elgin (2015).
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I think Boonin is mistaken. If I give the same reason for justifying punishing my children 
as I give for justifying rewarding them — that it improves their behaviour, say — does that mean
I haven't really given a justification of punishment at all? If I give the same reason to justify do-
nating to charity as I do for walking my dog (e.g. that it makes me feel good or that it is kind to 
other sentient beings to do so) does that mean I have failed to give a justification for either? It 
seems not. So why would giving the same reason for justifying punishing the guilty as for justi-
fying intentionally harming the innocent — namely, promotion of the best possible conse-
quences — mean that a justification of punishment hasn't really been given at all?
Boonin thinks it's problematic to rely on the same reason to justify inflicting suffering on 
both the guilty and the innocent because, "Punishment, after all, is a practice in which the fact 
that one person is guilty and another is innocent is treated as a reason to harm the former but not 
the latter."310 Boonin's version of the "punishing the innocent" objection is that classical conse-
quentialism cannot begin to justify punishment because it relies on the very same reason (i.e. 
promotion of good consequences) to justify punishing the guilty as it does to justify punishing 
the innocent. But, according to Boonin, that means that it fails to justify punishment at all — be-
cause a necessary element of a successful justification of punishment is treating guilt (in contrast 
to innocence) as a reason to punish.
Although Boonin is correct that punishment is a type of action that is necessarily per-
formed for a certain kind of reason, he is mistaken that this is a problem for the classical conse-
quentialist, such that it means that they necessarily fail to justify punishments. This is because 
one of the features of classical consequentialism is that the moral justification for an action 
needn't be (indeed, usually won't be) the same as the reasons that an agent has in mind when they
310Boonin (2008), p. 52
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perform that action.311 So, for an agent's action actually to be a punishment, it's true that the 
agent's reasons for punishing person A must include the belief that person A is guilty of wrong-
doing — but that reason is irrelevant to the classical consequentialist's justification of the action 
of punishing person A. If an agent's reason for intentionally inflicting distress on person A has 
nothing to do with the fact that A is guilty of a crime then Boonin is right to point out that the 
agent's action is, therefore, not a punishment. And, similarly, if a parent's reason for inflicting 
distress on their child has nothing to do with the child's wrongdoing, then the parent's action is 
not a punishment. But what justifies an agent's action, according to the classical consequentialist 
has absolutely nothing to do with the agent's reasons, motives, goals or any other psychological 
fact about them (except in so far as those reasons, motives etc result in actions that have better or
worse consequences). The moral status of an action depends entirely on the consequences of that 
action (not on the "intrinsic nature" of the reasons or motives that prompted it). If the action 
results in the best consequences, compared to alternatives, then it is the morally right thing to do.
If it doesn't, it isn't. 
The classical consequentialist does not maintain that agents ought to be judging which 
action will have the best possible consequences, and that only if agents act with the intention of 
producing the best possible consequences are their actions justified. No, the classical consequen-
tialist simply doesn't care, morally speaking, what reasons prompt an agent to act. All that mat-
ters morally are the consequences of the agent's action, no matter what their reasons for action 
are. And, in principle, there is no problem with the classical consequentialist disregarding an 
agent's reasons when it comes to assessing whether or not their action is justified. An agent's ac-
311A variation on the familiar point that classical consequentialism is not action-guiding, as both
Bentham and Mill recognized.
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tion can be a punishment (i.e. the agent performs the action in part because the agent believes the
recipient to be guilty) but the agent's reasons for performing that action may play no role in the 
moral justification of it (i.e. all that matters is the action's consequences).
As a matter of empirical fact, humans do sometimes issue punishments. That is, they per-
form actions that intentionally cause distress to (those believed to be) wrongdoers, after (be-
lieved) wrongdoing, and because of that (believed) wrongdoing. They intentionally cause dis-
tress to other people with quite specific motives and reasons in mind. We can ask of that class of 
actions (punishments): Under what circumstances, if any, are they justified? The classical conse-
quentialist will say: When and only when they in fact produce the best consequences, compared 
to the alternatives.
So, although Boonin's version of the punishing the innocent objection is unsuccessful in 
showing that, in principle, the classical consequentialist cannot justify punishment, they are still 
left with the original version of the problem. Classical consequentialism appears to have the im-
plication that it is morally permissible for parents to punish children they know have done noth-
ing wrong, if doing so leads to the best overall consequences, compared to the available alterna-
tives. Is there a way for the classical consequentialist to make it more palatable to accept this 
conclusion? When a theory has unintuitive implications, we can't expect the theorist to convince 
everyone to change their intuitions. However, we can ask them to demonstrate that it's at least 
reasonable — not completely ridiculous — to accept the unintuitive implications. I think that in 
this case, even if we don't come to change our intuitions about the theory's implications, it can be
shown that it is at least reasonable to accept them, despite their (initial) unintuitiveness. 
Suppose one describes a case where punishment of an innocent man would yield a 
balance of good, and insures that this is so simply by stipulating certain striking bene-
fits which will derive from it, and explicitly eliminating all the harms one can think 
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of. If one finds oneself still half-inclined to call such punishment wrong, it may well 
be because one does not really succeed in envisaging the situation just as described, 
but surrounds it with the circumstances of real life which would in fact create a 
greater probability of unhappiness in its consequences than happiness.312
And I think it's likely easier for the classical consequentialist to succeed in sufficiently 
nudging our intuitions in the case of PPC where the situation is more "manageable", and relevant
harms and benefits are relatively small (compared to the grave injustice of punishing an innocent
person for a crime they did not commit). Classical consequentialists can reasonably claim that 
misgivings about intentionally causing innocent children to suffer are misguided — because if 
spanking a child was genuinely all things considered the best thing to do (regardless of wrongdo-
ing) then we should just swallow our misgivings and accept that fact, whether we like it or not. 
After all, we might have misgivings about having our babies poked with sharp needles that deliv-
er (weakened or dead) viruses into their bodies, but nonetheless if doing so is genuinely all 
things considered the best thing to do (regardless of wrongdoing) then we should just swallow 
our misgivings and accept that fact, whether we like it or not. It's not unfair, unjust, or cruel to 
cause our children distress — whether by spanking or by vaccinating — if doing so is overall 
more beneficial than the alternatives. The classical consequentialist might well ask: If a treatment
is genuinely beneficial, why should we stick to giving it only those who have done wrong? It 
would be wrong to withhold such a beneficial treatment! If Jenny breaks a rule and it is morally 
right to punish her because doing so is more beneficial than the alternatives, it could also be right
to punish her brother Robbie who has done nothing wrong. If punishing Robbie leads the best 
overall consequences, compared to the alternatives, then punishing Robbie — spanking him or 
312Sprigge (1965) in Ezorsky (1977), p. 68-69
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giving him a time-out or whatever — is the right thing to do, despite the fact that Robbie has 
done nothing wrong. To refrain from punishing the innocent Robbie when it would be beneficial 
to do so would be no different from refraining from vaccinating Robbie when it would be benefi-
cial to do so. We shouldn't let our emotional aversions get in the way of doing what is actually 
best for our children. 
And, the consequentialist might argue, although punishing the innocent seems unfair, 
once we genuinely appreciate that it is beneficial (in the circumstances that it is), then we should 
be able to "get over" (at least to a certain extent) our intuitions that punishing the innocent is 
unfair.313
I think this is at least a plausible line of response. But Boonin wouldn't think that it is 
enough. The problem is not that there is a moral blanket ban on ever intentionally causing other 
people distress. After all, as Boonin says:
Commonsense morality might permit the state to deliberately harm an innocent per-
son as a means of avoiding a catastrophe, but the act-utilitarian solution will insist 
that the state must deliberately harm an innocent person every time this will produce 
at least a little more utility overall than not doing so.314
Rather, the problem is that:
313In the case of state punishment, such a response to the problem of punishing the innocent may 
not be satisfactory because it doesn't seem to address a crucial aspect of punishment: As well as 
intentionally inflicting distress, it also communicates disapproval of the action the punishment 
recipient performed. Part of the harm of punishing the innocent is the damage to the recipient's 
reputation. But this is obviously much less of a concern in the case of PPC.
314Boonin (2008), p. 48
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[Hedonistic act utilitarianism] gives absolutely no independent weight to the fact that 
the person being harmed is innocent [or guilty].315 
But a successful defense of punishment must give weight to this crucial difference, according to 
Boonin. So, even if the consequentialist is able to massage our moral intuitions sufficiently to get
us to countenance the idea of punishing the innocent when the benefits are significant (such as 
"avoiding a catastrophe"), they are still left with the problem, according to Boonin, that they will 
recommend punishing the innocent even when the difference in benefit is very slight, compared 
to alternatives. So even if a poke with a needle is justified because it causes a very brief, minor 
pain and its benefits are huge, this does little to help persuade us that it's morally acceptable to 
punish a child who has done nothing wrong. (Because even optimists about the effects of punish-
ment do not claim that the effects of one punishment will be hugely beneficial.)
Let's deal with the general complaint that classical consequentialism justifies intentional-
ly harming an innocent person even when there is just a tiny bit of additional overall "utility" 
compared to alternative actions that don't harm an innocent person. This is where it becomes im-
portant that Boonin is discussing hedonistic act-utilitarianism, and I am discussing the broader 
category of classical consequentialism, because there is a solution to this problem that is open to 
some versions of classical consequentialism, but not to hedonistic utilitarianism. A non-utilitarian
consequentialist can accept that there are values other than pleasure and pain, and this makes the 
theory much more plausible — and enables it to respond to this objection. The classical conse-
quentialist can accept that even if the guilty offender and the innocent offender suffer equally 
from the same punishment, it is nevertheless worse to punish someone who is innocent.316 As 
315Boonin (2008), p. 48
316It also might be possible to defend the claim that even if the punishment is the same, an 
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well as the offender's suffering that has to be taken into account, we also have to take into ac-
count the badness of harming the innocent. We value innocence, freedom, equality, truth etc — 
and these values are not reducible to pleasure and pain/suffering. (We can well accept the idea 
that a slave would prefer to be free than to be enslaved, even if their life would, overall, involve 
more suffering if they were free. We can well accept the idea that a spouse would prefer to know 
the truth about their partner's unfaithfulness, even if their life would, overall, involve more suf-
fering if they knew the truth.) 
So, imagine the following scenario in which harming an innocent person is compared to 
not doing so:
(A) Punish innocent person [-10 harm] ---> 1,000,000 benefit = 999,990 overall
(B) Not punish innocent person [0 harm] ---> 999,989 benefit = 999,989 overall
In this scenario, taking option (A) and punishing an innocent person would cause -10 units of 
harm and 1,000,000 units of benefit, resulting in 999,990 units of benefit overall. Taking option 
(B) and not punishing an innocent person would avoid any harm, and cause slightly less benefit: 
999,989 units, with a net result of 999,989 units of benefit overall, slightly less than option (A). 
So the problem is that the classical consequentialist is committed to recommending (A), on the 
grounds that it produces the overall better result — but that's intuitively wrong because (A) in-
volves punishing an innocent person and (B) does not. In Boonin's terms, (A) is not "avoiding a 
innocent person suffers more than a guilty person because they are innocent. See, for example, 
Sprigge (1965) in Ezorsky (1977), p. 73.
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catastrophe", and the very slight difference in resulting overall benefit compared to (B) doesn't 
seem sufficient to justify punishing an innocent person.
Note that to get the overall balance of harms/benefits to come out very close in the end 
(999,989 vs 999,990), the difference in the benefit caused by each action (999,989 vs 1,000,000) 
has to be only slightly bigger (+11) than the initial harm caused by punishing the innocent person
(-10). If we judge that the difference in benefit between option (A) and option (B) — in this case 
+11 in favour of option (A) — is not sufficient to justify punishing an innocent person then that 
tells us is that we need to re-think the value we assigned to innocence. So in this example, I as-
signed a value of -10 to punishing an innocent person. That is, taking into consideration the suf-
fering of that person as well as the disvalue of an innocent person being punished, I assigned a 
value of -10 (and perhaps punishing a guilty person, which takes into consideration only the suf-
fering of the offender would be something like -5). But if we think that the end result favouring 
option (A) is mistaken, then that's an indication that we have misassigned the values. Perhaps 
punishing an innocent person in option (A) should be assigned a negative value of -50, say:
(A) Punish innocent person [-50 harm] ---> 1,000,000 benefit = 999,950 overall
(B) Not punish innocent person [0 harm] ---> 999,989 benefit = 999,989 overall
In this case, it becomes preferable to take option (B) because the overall balance of harms/bene-
fits ends up being better in that case. So it turns out that punishing an innocent person is not justi-
fied by classical consequentialism — so long as the theory accepts the value of innocence. (And 
perhaps the negative value of punishing an innocent person should be even greater, in which case
the difference between the end results would be even greater.) Of course we could argue about 
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whether or not, ultimately, the classical consequentialist is able to sustain the idea of values such 
as innocence, truth etc independently of pleasure and pain or suffering. But for present purposes, 
it is enough to have shown that the non-hedonistic classical consequentialist has resources with 
which to respond to the punishing the innocent objection.317 It's still in the running as a theory of 
justification of punishment.
Scapegoating an innocent person and punishing them for a crime they didn't commit is a 
terrible thing to do, so for it to be justified by classical consequentialist standards, it would have 
to result in a significant benefit over alternatives that do not involve punishing an innocent per-
son. A parent punishing a child who hasn't misbehaved is not nearly as bad, so for it to be justi-
fied, it won't have to result in such a large benefit over the alternatives. But, nevertheless, there 
would still have to be a significant difference in benefit, in order to justify punishing an innocent 
child.
This response to the punishing the innocent objection claimed that the way to make that 
implication of classical consequentialism more palatable depended on understanding the conse-
quentialist's theory of value in a certain way. Specifically, it depended on accepting that there is 
something worse about punishing an innocent person than about punishing a guilty person (even 
if everything else is held constant). So long as a classical consequentialist accepts innocence as a 
value, I think it can adequately respond to the punishing the innocent objection.
There's a further benefit of taking this route: Any time that we judge that the difference in 
resulting benefit is not great enough to justify the initial harm, the classical consequentialist can 
take that as a sign that we have not assigned the correct value to the initial harm. This same point
enables the classical consequentialist to respond to another of Boonin's objections. He says that 
317See Sprigge (1965) for other responses to this objection.
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hedonistic act utilitarianism wrongly justifies disproportionate punishments. That is, "it cannot 
render permissible an intuitively appropriate amount of punishment."318  
[M]ost people strongly believe that the severity of punishment should be at least 
roughly proportional to the offense: that trivial offenses should mandate minor pun-
ishments, while serious offenses should require severe punishments. The dispropor-
tionate punishment objection maintains that the act-utilitarian solution cannot account
for these central judgments. In some cases the solution will justify unacceptably se-
vere punishment, and in others it will justify an unacceptably mild one.319
Since this is an objection that applies equally to other forms of act consequentialism, I will again 
speak generally about classical consequentialism. No doubt Boonin is correct that many would 
have this intuition, which may be grounded in retributivist intuitions. It is open to the classical 
consequentialist to simply embrace the theory's unintuitive results, but is there a way for them to 
make it more palatable, at least in the case of PPC (if not in the case of criminal punishment)? I 
think the classical consequentialist can spell out the details of a kind of situation in which inflict-
ing a disproportionate punishment would be the right thing to do, and thus make the consequence
intuitively less objectionable. 
Suppose that a 12 year old child is home 10 minutes late from their friend's house down 
the street and they had been warned that if they were late, they would be punished. One might 
think that a proportionate punishment is that the child is not allowed to go to their friend's house 
the next day, for example. A disproportionate punishment could be that the child is banned from 
going to their friend's house for a year. Intuitively, this does seem unduly harsh. But, the classical
consequentialist reminds us, remember that for a much harsher punishment to be justified, it 
318Boonin (2008), p. 54
319Boonin (2008), p. 54
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must have significantly better consequences than the alternative options. So banning the child for
a year must have much better consequences than banning the child for one day, even taking into 
consideration the distress caused by the bans. Perhaps during the year long ban the friend down 
the street becomes a teenage drug dealer and banning the child from going to their house for year
prevents the child from getting caught up in criminal activity. Or perhaps the house of the friend 
down the street catches on fire one day and because your child is banned from visiting, the friend
is out at the park and so nobody is harmed in the fire when they otherwise would have been. 
The harshly punishing parent didn't intend or predict any of these purely lucky conse-
quences, but that doesn't matter to the consequentialist. The harsh punishment turned out to be 
the right action because it led to the best consequences, regardless of the parent's intentions. Of 
course, we can think of endless scenarios of this kind. The classical consequentialist can turn the 
tables and ask rhetorically: So you'd prefer to issue a one day ban and have your child get in-
volved in drug dealing, rather than issue a one year ban and keep them out of crime?! Or: You'd 
prefer to issue a one day ban and have your child and their friend be killed in a house fire, rather 
than issue a one year ban and keep them safe?! This is, I think, a promising line of response.
However, what about when there is only a slight difference in resulting benefits, but a 
large difference in distress from the punishments? For example, a very distressing, severe spank-
ing could turn out to have only very slightly more beneficial effects than a 3 minute time-out that
the child doesn't find particularly distressing. In which case, it appears that classical consequen-
tialism implies that the disproportionately harsh punishment (severe spanking) is justified. But it 
seems wrong to say that a severe spanking is justified for minor misbehaviour (and it seems that 
the 3 minute time-out would be much more fair), even if the severe spanking results in slightly 
more benefit. However, the classical consequentialist could reasonably maintain that the signifi-
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cant difference in distress between a severe spanking and a 3 minute time-out would dwarf a 
"slight" difference between the consequences, and so classical consequentialism would not, after 
all, recommend the disproportionately harsh punishment in that case.320
Given that all the suffering and all the benefits caused by the punishments need to be tak-
en into consideration in order to determine justification, then it can never be the case that a justi-
fied punishment causes a lot of distress but very little additional benefit compared to an alterna-
tive that causes very little distress. Only when a harsh punishment results in much greater 
benefits than a milder punishment would classical consequentialism justify the harsher punish-
ment. (And this brings us back to the example of grounding the child for a year who would oth-
erwise have gotten mixed up in drug dealing.)
Classical consequential and the justification of punishment
So, supposing the classical consequentialist has the resources to respond to the various versions 
of the problem of punishing the innocent, and the problem of disproportionate punishments, can 
it justify punishment?
In previous chapters regarding instrumentalist theories (which might loosely be described
as "consequentialist") we've asked (for example): Could moral education (or behavioural training
etc) justify punishment? Does it succeed in doing so? The first is a theoretical question and the 
second is an empirical question. My goal is to persuade the reader — no matter what instrumen-
talist theory of punishment they hold — that parental punishment of children is unjustified. I'm 
less concerned to argue that any particular theory of punishment is false. Since classical conse-
320There could be intermediate effects, or influences from other actions/events, in addition to the 
original punishments that contribute to making the end consequences have only a slight 
difference. But then it's not correct that we're comparing the effects of only the punishments.
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quentialism is a general moral theory (not a theory only of punishment), I do not hope at all to ar-
gue that it is false (or defend it as true). Instead, I do hope to make a persuasive case for the con-
clusion that if classical consequentialism is true, it fails to justify PPC. I've defended it from 
various theoretical objections, now let's turn to the more empirical issues. 
Let's suppose that classical consequentialism is the true moral theory, and it's therefore 
theoretically possible for PPC to be morally justified by it. We can ask:  (1) Is PPC ever in fact 
justified? And we can ask about a specific instance of PPC: (2) Tomorrow, if I discover that my 
teenage son has broken a household rule and sneaked his iPod into his bedroom last night, should
I punish him? To take the second question first, the classical consequentialist says that I should 
punish him if doing so will lead to the best overall consequences, compared to alternative cours-
es of action. Otherwise, I shouldn't. All the evidence that we have reviewed in previous chapters 
indicates that I should not punish my son, that it would be morally wrong (by the classical conse-
quentialist's standards) for me to do so.
For any instance of PPC, we know from the evidence we have reviewed, that it is unlikely
to turn out to have the best consequences compared to alternative methods of discipline.321 So, 
for any instance of PPC, it's likely to be morally unjustified, by the classical consequentialist's 
standards.
It's possible (indeed, presumably it's likely) that in the whole history of humanity there 
are some instances of parental punishment of children that have turned out to have better conse-
quences than alternative courses of action that the parents could have taken.322 Of course, this 
321Let alone alternatives such as selling all one's non-essential property and donating the proceeds
to charity. But of course that applies to non-punitive discipline methods too. We will be sticking 
with comparing close alternatives.
322Well, cutting the classical consequentialist some slack and ignoring possible courses of action 
such as that mentioned in the previous footnote. It's very likely impossible for the classical 
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doesn't mean that punishment as a type of action is justified (as the rule consequentialist would 
wish to have it), and it would provide no action guidance whatsoever. It also may have nothing to
do with those actions being punishments that resulted in the consequences that were better than 
the alternatives. For example, perhaps a time-out once resulted in a child being removed from a 
room just before the roof collapsed, which would have caused them to be seriously injured and to
suffer terribly for the rest of their life. Any action will fall into many categories: a punishment; a 
time-out; a disciplinary action; a removal from a room; an injury-prevention; an upsetting inci-
dent; something that happened on a Tuesday. If it is true for the classical consequentialist to say 
that some punishments are justified because their consequences are better than their alternatives, 
it's also true for them to say that some actions that happen on a Tuesday are justified because 
their consequences are better than the alternatives. Justifying an action that happened on a Tues-
day isn't the same thing as justifying an action because it happened on a Tuesday; similarly, justi-
fying an action that is a punishment isn't the same thing as justifying an action because it is a 
punishment. It's true that some Tuesday-actions are justified, and some Tuesday-actions are not 
justified (by the classical consequentialist's standards). And the classical consequentialist can't 
say much more than that. They cannot generalize across any type of action, so it provides no ac-
tion guidance. But given that the classical consequentialist must want to maximize overall posi-
tive effects, their pragmatic guidance must be, given the empirical evidence: Parents ought not to
punish their kids. Following that advice will more often lead to better consequences than any 
other usable advice. ("Parents ought to punish whenever the consequences of doing so will turn 
consequentialist to maintain that punishment is literally the absolute best option in a given 
scenario when there are also generous acts of charity we could perform instead. However, of 
course this would sidestep the more interesting question of whether a classical consequentialist 
can support punishment over its close alternatives (such as non-punitive discipline, ignoring the 
child, bribing the child with a doughnut, and so on).
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out to be better than any alternative" is not usable advice.) Parents definitely pragmatically-ought
not to punish their kids and, on any particular occasion, they highly probably morally-ought not 
to do so. This is because of the evidence we have reviewed in earlier chapters: We know that a 
punishment has immediate negative effects on the child — pain, emotional upset, etc. It also car-
ries the risk of various long term harms, as reviewed in Chapter 6. Parents also often experience 
distress when they punish their children, as do some siblings; these are all negative consequences
that a consequentialist would need to take into consideration.323 We've also seen that we have no 
reason to think that PPC tends to have beneficial effects such as moral education or behavioural 
training. It may sometimes result in short term compliance, and even that is minimal and we have
no reason to think it's better than all non-punitive alternatives. (And it also seems to lead to less 
compliance in future.) It's not clear what other beneficial effects of PPC we might reasonably 
look for.
So, even if classical consequentialism is the correct moral theory, we have no reason to 
think that any real future instance of PPC would be justified. If classical consequentialism is true,
we are led by the empirical evidence to conclude that PPC is, generally speaking, morally wrong.
When facing any real life decision about whether to punish or not, it's reasonable to think that a 
parent would be unjustified in punishing their child.
Of course, according to classical consequentialism, it's possible that parents would on 
rare occasions do the wrong thing by following the evidence. But what else can they do? We 
don't increase our chances of doing what is right (by the standards of classical consequentialism) 
by acting contrary to the evidence. And, surely, the classical consequentialist prefers agents to act
323On the other hand, they would also have to take into consideration the satisfaction that some 
parents experience when they punish their children.
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in ways that are more likely, rather than less, to produce better consequences.324 So even the clas-
sical consequentialist should recommend that parents not punish their children, despite the fact 
that on some occasions, this will mean that parents will act morally wrongly by the classical con-
sequentialist's standards. In other words, the classical consequentialist should say that parents 
ought not to punish their children — because this strategy will minimize the number of wrong 
actions they will perform. The "ought" is pragmatic — given a goal of minimizing morally 
wrong actions, the pragmatic thing to do is to avoid PPC. On rare occasions, and contrary to the 
evidence, PPC might turn out to have the best consequences compared to the alternatives, and on
those occasions, parents who do not punish will act wrongly according to the classical conse-
quentialist. But, nevertheless, it's still correct for the classical consequentialist to recommend act-
ing according to evidence and claim that parents ought not to punish their children.
Of course, there are always outlandish hypothetical situations in which a punishment 
turns out to have the best consequences of all the options. For example, one in which evil aliens 
will destroy the planet unless a parent punishes their child. However, even in these cases, it's not 
actually obvious that the evidence would lean in favour of punishment. One might have better 
reason to think that one is hallucinating, than that evil aliens are making such a threat! However, 
I am happy to concede that there may be outlandish philosophical thought experiment situations 
in which the right thing to do (from a classical consequentialist perspective or not) is to punish 
one's child. But an outlandish hypothetical alternative is not a real alternative, and so it doesn't 
324It's not even clear that it's reasonable to talk about whether an overall positive or overall 
negative outcome is more or less likely, when we're talking about sets of open ended future 
possibilities (in contrast with, say, coin flips or dice throws). See Elgin (2015) on this. But, for 
the time being, let's grant the classical consequentialist that they can at least make sense of the 
idea of one set of overall consequences being more likely than another.
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tell us much about the morality of ordinary, everyday PPC, which is what I'm concerned with in 
this dissertation.325 
What about in a non-outlandish, but flukey, situation such as the when punishing a child 
"accidentally" leads to the best overall consequences (like grounding a child prevents them from 
being injured in an accident)? In such a situation, the classical consequentialist will maintain that
the morally right thing to do turned out to be punishing the child. But ahead of time, there was no
reason to believe that the right thing to do would be to punish the child; the evidence indicates 
that, in addition to the initial distress it intentionally inflicts, punishment is unlikely to be benefi-
cial and is likely to have long term negative effects. However, even for this kind of situation, it 
wasn't because the action was a punishment that it turned out to be beneficial; it wasn't because 
of the distress that the action intentionally inflicted that it turned out to be beneficial. It was ben-
eficial because it happened to keep a child at home when a drunk driver otherwise would have 
hit them (or whatever), so even if we grant that there are these kinds of cases in which an action 
that is a punishment turns out to have the best consequences of the available options, it is not be-
cause it is a punishment. And so the consequentialist should rank the option of "Keeping your 
child at home, non-punitively" higher than "Keeping your child at home as a punishment". (Even
though, of course, the parent would have no idea about the reasons favouring the non-punitive 
"grounding".) The punitive aspect of the action did not contribute to its good effects.
Are there examples in which a punishment has the best options because it is a punish-
ment? This would mean that a punishment, on a specific occasion, has beneficial effects because 
it intentionally inflicts distress in response to wrongdoing. So if a punishment actually does con-
325Furthermore, in such a case, a parent's intentions wouldn't only be to punish, but also to protect
the planet. My view is that this intention makes a difference to the moral status of the action 
(even if the action manages to still count as being a punishment).
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tribute to a child being obedient (regarding some important matter), or to learning an important 
moral rule or behaviour, then could it be justified, according to the classical consequentialist? It 
would have to be the case that giving the child a punitive time-out, say, on that occasion was 
overall better than all the (close) alternatives. We haven't yet looked at the evidence regarding 
non-punitive discipline in any detail, so we can't know how well it compares to punishment. But,
given the evidence we have reviewed so far regarding punishment's lack of benefits and its risk 
of long term harms (in addition to the immediate distress it inflicts), we currently have no reason 
to think, in any real life circumstance, that a punishment will have the best consequences of all 
the (close) alternatives. (And we will have even more evidence to support this judgement in 
Chapter 9, regarding non-punitive discipline.) And that's the best we can say. We can never be 
sure that any particular action will turn out to have better consequences than all the (close) al-
ternatives. We can look at the evidence and make a judgement about the probabilities. Given that 
classical consequentialism can't support any moral claims about types of action, the best we can 
do is: The available evidence indicates that, on any particular occasion, punishing a child will 
likely not have the best consequences of all the options and so, punishing a child is is likely 
morally wrong (by the standards of classical consequentialism).
As we've seen, the pragmatic advice of a classical consequentialist must be that parents 
ought to refrain from punishing their children (because it's more likely that doing so will lead to 
better consequences than punishing). Their moral advice must also be that parents ought not to 
punish their children because this means that that they will do the morally right thing more of-
ten — even though this means that, sometimes, parents will end up doing the wrong thing. (I.e. 
sometimes they will end up performing actions that have less good consequences that an alterna-
tive.) The rational choice (or "expected utility") consequentialist believes that the morally right 
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action is  the one that the evidence recommends (even though, occasionally, it'll turn out not to 
have better consequences than all the alternatives). This means that rational choice consequen-
tialism will recommend refraining from punishing children on every (realistic) occasion — be-
cause the evidence indicates that punishment is unlikely to have the best consequences (com-
pared to close alternatives).
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Retributivism
Generally speaking, I suspect that most parents tend to think that PPC is ultimately, overall, ben-
eficial to their children; that is why they think they are justified in punishing them. I suspect that 
far fewer parents would be attracted to a retributivist justification for PPC, which would maintain
that punishment can be justified despite not being beneficial — on the grounds that children de-
serve punishment for wrongdoing. But presumably there are some parents who do think it is their
duty to punish their children for wrongdoing, even if it's not in the child's interests, just as a par-
ent might reasonably believe it's their duty to report their own child to the police if they were 
guilty of a serious crime, even if it's not in the child's interests.326 Some philosophers will also 
likely be inclined towards such a position. For the retributivist, punishment is justified by the 
wrongdoer's past behaviour.327 (This is what is meant by retributivism being a "backward-
looking" theory.) No future benefits, such as moral education or improved behaviour, are neces-
sary in order to justify punishing a wrongdoer, according to the retributivist.
In this chapter, I will discuss retributivism and consider whether it could justify PPC. I 
will explain what I think are the most plausible elements of retributivism for PPC. Then I will 
326Thanks to Geoffrey Sayre-McCord for this point.
327Retributivists would maintain that certain other conditions need to hold too, such that desert is 
necessary for the justification of punishment, but not sufficient. They might believe that a 
criminal wrongdoer deserves punishment, but nevertheless think we ought to "leave the 
retribution to God" or to an organization, such as the state, which has appropriate authority to 
issue punishments. But, presumably, a retributivist defender of PPC would accept that, at least 
sometimes, parents ought to punish their children for their wrongdoing.
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explain what I think retributivism gets importantly right, and show where I think it goes wrong, 
concluding that a non-punitive alternative can capture what retributivism gets correct, while 
avoiding its mistakes.
First, let's distinguish negative and positive retributivism. Negative retributivism isn't a 
theory that attempts to justify punishment.328 All it says is that any punishment that is adminis-
tered must not be more than someone deserves — which, when applied to PPC instead of crimi-
nal punishment, would rule out punishing kids who haven't done anything wrong, rule out pun-
ishing kids more harshly than they deserve, and rule out punishing kids who aren't yet 
(sufficiently) responsible moral agents. It is consistent with negative retributivism that punish-
ment may be justified by other theories, with the negative retributivism requirement added on as 
a constraint. This would mean that even if a severe spanking would have the best overall results, 
according to a particular instrumentalist theory (e.g. for a behavioural training theory, this would 
mean that it contributes the most to promoting future good behaviour), the negative retributivist 
constraint would imply that this is not permissible if the child deserved only something less 
harsh than a severe spanking, such as a 10 minute time-out. However, as we've seen in previous 
chapters, the various instrumentalist justifications of PPC fail on empirical grounds. And in the 
absence of a positive justification for PPC, negative retributivism cannot justify it by itself. 
Similarly, a consent theorist also might attempt to combine their view with negative ret-
ributivism. On such a view, a child consents to punishment when they break a rule. And how 
harsh should their punishment be? No more than the child deserves, given the seriousness of 
their wrongdoing and their culpability. But consent theory fails as a justification of PPC because 
328See, for example, Duff (2011), p. 66. Mackie (1982) is the classic source of "negative
retributivism".
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parents impermissibly limit the child's preferable options when they fail to grant alternative re-
sponses to wrongdoing, such as non-punitive discipline. And negative retributivism can't do the 
work of justifying punishment by itself.
Positive retributivism is a theory (or class of theories) that purports to justify punishing 
wrongdoers on the basis of wrongdoers' desert, rather than by its instrumental value in producing
benefits. If an agent meets certain standards of rationality when they commit a crime (and there 
are no mitigating factors sufficient to excuse them), then they  deserve punishment for that 
wrongdoing. Within this class of theory, as with consequentialism, there are many subtle (and not
so subtle) variations. Michael S. Moore, for example, is a "traditional" retributivist, and the no-
tion of desert is central and dominates his theory:
Retributivism is the view that we ought to punish offenders because and only because
they deserve to be punished. Punishment is justified, for a retributivist, solely by the 
fact that those receiving it deserve it.329
A slightly weaker version of retributivism is that of Jeffrie Murphy, who says that a retributivist 
"believes that the primary justification for punishing a criminal is that the criminal deserves 
it."330 And Andrew von Hirsch is a retributivist who thinks that desert together with deterrence 
considerations fully justifies criminal punishment. On this "two-pronged"331 view, criminal pun-
ishment is justified (when it is) because it both censures offenders (to the extent that they de-
serve) and because punishment has a deterrent effect. A two-pronged theory in the case of 
329Moore (1993), p. 15. Italics added.
330Murphy (2007). Italics added.
331Von Hirsch (1990), p. 278. Of course, because von Hirsch's retributivism is mixed with an
instrumentalist element, some wouldn't classify him as a retributivist.
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parental punishment of children would mean that retributivism and certain benefits (such as obe-
dience or moral education or better behaviour) are combined to fully justify punishment. So ret-
ributivism would mean that a child gets punished to the extent that they deserve (dependent on 
the seriousness of their wrongdoing and their degree of culpability), and perhaps the choice of 
the specific type of punishment could depend on which was most morally educational or most 
conducive to obedience or better behaviour. Even if some kind of mixed theory could work in the
case of criminal punishment, as we've seen in previous chapters, the various instrumentalist justi-
fications of PPC fail on empirical grounds — which would leave only the retributivist element. 
Von Hirsch says, with respect to criminal punishment, that his "two-pronged rationale would per-
mit the abolition of legal punishment were it found to have too little preventive effect."332 If state 
punishment didn't have a sufficient deterrence effect, then punishment should be abolished, al-
though society should maintain a (non-punitive) official mechanism for communicating censure. 
I would argue that in the case of PPC, punishment does not have any instrumental benefit that 
could successfully be added to a retributive element and so a "two-pronged" approach will not 
work. If retributivism is going to justify PPC, it's going to have to do it alone.
Moral agents
As mentioned earlier, positive retributivism is a theory (or class of theories) that purports to justi-
fy punishing wrongdoers, so long as they meet certain standards of rationality etc. and thus de-
serve to be punished. If people do not meet those standards of rationality, then they are not re-
332Von Hirsch (1990), p. 278. He's not questioning the empirical claim that punishment is an 
effective deterrent in our own society. Instead, he's imagining a society that has improved in 
certain ways so that crime is rare. In which case, the deterrent effect of punishment wouldn't be 
worth the hardship it would inflict.
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sponsible moral agents and so cannot be said to have committed any wrongdoing, and so cannot 
deserve any punishment.
Babies and very young children are unlikely to meet the necessary standards of rationali-
ty — they are not yet moral agents — and so they cannot be said to deserve punishment. Accord-
ing to Thomas Hill, Kant believed that
in order to do something morally wrong one must be a person who satisfies at least 
minimum conditions of rationality and freedom. Some capacity for memory, fore-
sight, reflection, and self-control is necessary....Moral agents see themselves as hav-
ing alternatives, and they choose to act as they do for reasons, good or bad.333
However, Kant did think that younger (not yet rational) children could be punished for 
training purposes (rather like dogs and horses). In that respect, most parents would likely agree 
with Kant, as they tend to punish younger kids more than older kids. So, in as far as Kant was a 
retributivist, he thought that rational beings who do wrong deserve punishment, but non-rational 
beings (who don't deserve punishment) may be punished for training purposes. So, in that case, 
Kant was not a pure retributivist about childhood punishment. So let us imagine a retributivist 
system of PPC that justifies punishment on the grounds of desert for children who are sufficient-
ly rational, and allows punishment for the purposes of behavioural training for children who are 
not rational enough to be said to deserve punishment. (So we can focus on retributivism, let's 
grant that using punishment in order to train children to behave better is effective, ignoring the 
evidence that we looked at in Chapter 3.) 
333Hill (1999), p. 415
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Man may be either broken in, trained, and mechanically taught, or he may be really 
enlightened. Horses and dogs are broken in; and man, too, may be broken in.
It is, however, not enough that children should be merely broken in; for it is of 
greater importance that they shall learn to think.334
In the first period of childhood the child must learn submission and positive obedi-
ence. In the next stage he should be allowed to think for himself, and to enjoy a cer-
tain amount of freedom, although still obliged to follow certain rules. In the first peri-
od there is a mechanical, in the second a moral constraint.335
This mixed program of behavioural training and morally required punishment also accommod-
ates the fact that parents sometimes punish their kids when they think they have made a mistake, 
not only when they think their kids have behaved morally wrongly. They might punish a child by
withholding their allowance, with the goal of "reminding" the child not to forget their homework 
in future. The parent doesn't think that forgetting homework is a moral wrong that deserves retri-
bution — they think it's a mistake or a bad habit that needs correction through the experience of 
punishment.
So the first consequence of retributivism, as applied to PPC, is that it is justified to punish
older kids, who have attained a sufficient degree of rationality, on the grounds that they deserve 
punishment. If they are sufficiently rational to deserve punishment, they ought to be punished, 
without aiming for some further goal that is supposed to result from punishment — and so the 
evidence for how ineffective punishment is for reaching further goals (moral education, im-
proved behaviour etc) is irrelevant to the retributivist. On this picture,  no benefit beyond the 
punishment itself is necessary. A typically developing 10 year old child understands that it's 
334Kant, tr. Churton (1899/2003), p. 20
335Kant, tr. Churton (1899/2003), p. 26
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wrong to hit people. 10 year old Max, who hits his little sister because she accidentally spilt 
some of her juice on Max's favourite pants, knows that he has done something wrong. He was 
angry and, when he thought his parents weren't looking, he snuck up on his sister and hit her. 
This is the kind of situation in which a retributivist with respect to PPC would likely think it's 
justified to punish a child. Max is (let us suppose) at least a sufficiently rational moral agent, who
did something that he knew was morally wrong, and something he could have chosen not to do, 
and he deserves punishment for it. The retributivist might hold that to fail to punish Max is to fail
to treat him as a rational moral agent (to the extent that he is). Becoming liable to punishment for
one's immoral actions could even be considered a kind of rite of passage.336 Unlike Max, a 4 
month old baby who hurts its mother by pulling her hair does not know what it is doing, is not at 
all responsible for its actions. A 4 month old baby's hair-pulling is more like a "natural catastro-
phe" than a wrongdoing:
Were one, as a general practice, merely to lament the occurrence of a wrongful act 
and not confront the actor, that would be tantamount to treating actors as though they 
336If parents were conscientious retributivists, perhaps children would feel that when they became
mature enough to be punished, it would be akin to the honour that Hegel mentions: "To justify 
punishment [by threatening it as a deterrent] is like raising one's stick at a dog; it means treating 
a human being like a dog instead of respecting his honour and freedom." Section 99, reprinted in 
Tonry (2011 b), p. 45. This is not so far fetched when one considers the hardships that children 
have looked forward to because it meant that they were entering the adult world, for example: 
"The twenty-second of June, 1911, was Billy’s thirteenth birthday. He was woken by his father…
Momentarily he felt angry; but then he remembered that he had to get up, he even wanted to get 
up, and he opened his eyes and sat upright with a jerk… Today Billy would begin his working 
life by becoming an apprentice collier, as most of the men in town had done at his age. He 
wished he felt more like a miner. But he was determined not to make a fool of himself… [H]e 
did have a new pair of trousers, his first long ones, made of the thick water-repellent cotton 
called moleskin. They were the symbol of entry into the world of men, and he pulled them on 
proudly, enjoying the heavy masculine feel of the fabric." Follett (2012), p. 3-5. 
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were not responsible; it would be akin to treating wrongdoing like a natural catastro-
phe, where no one is really to blame.337
Max's three year old sister, however, may or may not count as a rational moral agent at all
(and certainly doesn't to the extent that Max does). So, when she lashes out and hits her father 
because he won't let her have ketchup and cookies for dinner, she is not responsible for her own 
actions in the same way, or to the same extent, that Max is responsible, and thus — like the 4 
month old baby — may not deserve punishment. Alternatively, perhaps the retributivist could say
that she does deserves punishment — if she understood well enough that she did something 
morally wrong — but that there are other considerations that rule out punishing a child that 
young. Perhaps, for example, a young child's need for positive attachment to a caregiver out-
weighs a requirement to punish, even when it's genuinely deserved. As Moore (2010) puts it:
The retributivist like anyone else can admit that there are other intrinsic goods [not 
only just deserts], such as the goods protected by the rights to life, liberty, and bodily 
integrity. The retributivist can also admit that sometimes some of these rights will 
trump the achieving of retributivist justice...338
So, let's grant that the retributivist distinguishes between children who are (sufficiently) 
rational moral agents and those who aren't, with only the former being (to some extent) responsi-
ble for their actions, and thus (to some extent) capable of moral wrongdoing, and thus (to some 
extent) deserving of punishment. And let's grant that the retributivist can also have good reasons 
for parents sometimes (perhaps frequently) refraining from punishing children to the extent that 
337Von Hirsch (1990), p. 272
338Moore (2010), p. 172
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they deserve. A retributivist justification for PPC doesn't imply that parents must punish every 
single instance of their children's wrongdoing.
Proportionality
As well as offenders being rational moral agents, another requirement for a punishment to be jus-
tified, according to the retributivist, is that the punishment is proportionate to the wrongdoing. As
detailed by Andrew von Hirsch, who holds an expressivist version of retributivism (which we 
will be looking at in more detail), there are two factors in determining proportionality of punish-
ments: ordinality and cardinality. The first is an ordering of matching punishment and crimes, ac-
cording to their severity:
In punishment, deprivation or hard treatment is the vehicle for expressing condemna-
tion. Therefore, when punishments are graded in severity, the gradations express the 
intensity of disapproval. Punishing the perpetrators of crime A more severely than the 
perpetrators of crime B conveys the greater disapprobation of those guilty of crime 
A... If the gradations in punishment express degrees of disapproval, then punishment 
should be allocated in proportion to the degree of disapproval warranted by different 
kinds of criminal conduct. To punish the perpetrators of crime A more than those of 
crime B, given the difference in disapprobation thereby expressed, is appropriate only
if crime A is, indeed, more reprehensible--that is, more serious. When penalties are 
ranked in severity inconsistently with the comparative seriousness of crimes, then less
reprehensible conduct will, inappropriately, receive the greater reprobation.339
But, without "anchoring points" for the scale, ordinality doesn't tell us how severe a punishment 
should be inflicted for crime A — just that it should be more severe than the punishment for 
crime B only if A was a more serious crime than B:
339Von Hirsch (1990), p. 279
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Whether X months, Y years, or somewhere in between is the appropriate penalty for 
robbery depends on how the scale has been anchored and what punishments have 
been prescribed for other crimes. Once the anchoring points have been fixed, howev-
er, the more restrictive requirements of ordinal proportionality apply.340
So how to come up with some anchoring points? Once one crime-punishment pair has been 
fixed, then it might be possible to come up with the others:
If the state has set the penalties for certain crimes, then it can fix the penalty for 
armed robbery by comparing the typical seriousness of this crime with the seriousness
of those other crimes. But this process requires a starting point, and no quantum of 
punishment suggests itself as the uniquely appropriate penalty for the crime or crimes
with which the scale begins. Why not? Expressive theory again provides the explana-
tion: The amount of disapproval conveyed by penal sanctions is a convention; when a
penalty scale has been devised to reflect the comparative gravity of crimes, altering 
the scale's magnitude and anchoring points by making pro rata increases or decreases 
would represent a change in that convention.341
But, of course, not just any old convention is acceptable. Von Hirsch says that cardinal propor-
tionality depends on other moral assumptions, such as the extent to which a society values liber-
ty, for example, or how a society rates the harm caused by a particular type of crime.342 Our soci-
ety tends to value liberty very highly, so a long prison sentence is a severe punishment; we also 
tend to value bodily integrity very highly, so rape is a very serious crime. Other societies might 
have different values, and thus have different judgements of the seriousness of particular types of
crime and the severity of particular types of punishment. 
340Von Hirsch (1990), p. 283
341Von Hirsch (1990), p. 282-3
342Von Hirsch (1990), p. 283
240
We can see how the analogue of this would work in the case of PPC. If one family values 
tidiness, say, and another family doesn't value it at all, it could be the case that a child in the first 
family deserves a punishment for, say, failing to tidy their room after playtime; whereas a child 
in the second family would not deserve such a punishment — because tidiness is not valued in 
that family. Presumably, however, there will be plenty of values in common between families in 
the same society such as nonviolence, consideration for others, honesty, and so on. If punishment
is a communicative or expressive act, as most contemporary retributivists tend to maintain,343 
then a punishment in each family would express the parent's values, which they wish to pass 
along to their offspring. It would also be important to a retributivist about PPC that instances of 
wrongdoing that are of similar seriousness receive punishments of similar severity, and so on. A 
punishment serves the purpose of forcefully expressing a parent's disapproval or censure of a 
child's action, so it stands to reason that more severe punishments express more serious censure, 
and similar degrees of wrongdoing should receive similar degrees of censure.
Punishment as communication of censure
Many contemporary retributivists believe that punishment is essentially a communicative or ex-
pressive act. Punishment is a way of forcefully communicating censure of the wrongdoing per-
formed and re-affirming the value of the victim, whom the offender has attempted to degrade 
through the commission of their crime.
On the face of it, for punishment to be justified as a method of communication, it seems 
that it would have to do a better job at achieving its goals than non-punitive methods of commu-
343In addition to von Hirsch (1990), Duff (2001), and Duff (2011), see also Feinberg (2011) and
Markel (2001).
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nication (which do not intentionally cause distress). Duff avoids this conclusion (in the case of 
state punishment) by denying that his version of retributivism implies that the connection be-
tween punishment and its goals is "contingent".344 As James Lynch, a sociologist at American 
University, tartly puts the point: "Unlike deterrence and rehabilitation, retribution has the advan-
tage that you don't have to prove it works."345
As with other versions of retributivism, Duff's version seeks to avoid empirical vulnera-
bility. It wouldn't matter to this version of retributivism if the empirical evidence indicated that a 
non-punitive response was less harmful and/or more successful at communicating censure than a 
punishment. Of course, we might wonder why must censure be conveyed through hard treatment/
intentionally inflicting distress, if it's not to be judged by its success in doing so. Duff's answer is
that it gets the offender's attention and enables them to focus on their wrongdoing. And he hopes 
that such hard treatment will result in them feeling remorse.
As we've seen, Von Hirsch has a different answer to the question of why censure must be 
expressed by punishment. His view is that punishment serves a dual purpose of communicating 
censure and also deterring crime. So censure is conveyed through punishment, and punishment 
also deters. Desert determines how much censure should be conveyed and thus determines the 
severity of the punishment; and censure should be conveyed by hard treatment (rather then just 
verbally, say) because punishment also deters. However, whatever we think about the purported 
deterrent effect of criminal punishment, we've already seen that there is no instrumental purpose 
that can work alongside retributivism in order to justify PPC, and so we shall stick with consider-
ing Duff's proposed justifications for punishment being the vehicle of censure.
344Duff (2001), p. 30
345Quoted in Wingert (1995).
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Another reason Duff emphasizes in support of censure being conveyed by punishment is 
that punishment plays the role of "burdensome apology". Duff makes the crucial point that when 
someone is a victim of a crime, they have been harmed by someone — they have been wronged, 
unlike if they had been harmed by a natural occurence such as a tornado. This is why mere com-
pensation is not enough to "right the wrong" they have endured. Returning stolen property is not 
enough. An apology from the offender is also required (as is the communication of censure by 
the state). Of course, even if an offender says they're sorry, we can't know if they are genuinely 
sorry. "Words are cheap," as Duff puts it.346 For an apology to be more than mere words, the of-
fender must undertake something burdensome: "some task that he undertakes for the benefit of 
the victim or the wider community":347
Of course, we know that many offenders who undergo punishment are not truly 
apologetic; in undergoing punishment they are not expressing a genuinely repentant 
recognition of the wrong they have done. Criminal punishment is, on this account, a 
species of required apology: the offender is required to go through the motions of 
apology, even if he does not mean it.
It might now be objected that such required apologies lack real value, and that to re-
quire people to apologize is inconsistent with a due respect for them as responsible 
moral agents. But we can still see value even in required apologies whose sincerity is 
unknown or doubtful: they make clear to the offender what he ought to do (apologize 
sincerely) and to the victim that the community recognizes and takes seriously the 
wrong he has suffered. As to respect, what punishment requires of the offender is not 
actual repentance, but that he undergo the ritual of apology and moral reparation. It is 
still up to him to make, or refuse to make, that apology a genuine one.348
346Duff (2011), p. 79
347Duff (2011), p. 79
348Duff (2011), p. 79
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Since we can't be sure that an offender's apology is genuine, we can nevertheless make him un-
dergo the ritual of a required apology, in the form of a punishment. And, even if we do think that 
an offender's apology is genuine, we can still make him go through the same ritual anyway. Ac-
cording to Duff, this is appropriate because of the public nature of crime. Private reconciliation 
between friends and family members might require genuine, heartfelt apologies. But "in the civic
life of a liberal polity that takes privacy seriously, what matters is that the ritual is undertaken."349
So, in the case of criminal punishment, Duff believes that punishment isn't simply a 
means by which certain goals are pursued (which would make it an instrumental theory, vulnera-
ble to empirical evidence). Rather, independently of its effectiveness, punishment is an "intrinsi-
cally appropriate" response to criminal wrongdoing. It doesn't matter to Duff how effective pun-
ishment is at eliciting remorse, because there is not a "contingent connection" between 
punishment and remorse. Instead, the connection between punishment and its goal is supposed to
be "internal" or "intrinsically appropriate". Duff says that even though punishment has goals, 
such as remorse or repentance,
This is not to say, however, that my account is a partly consequentialist one — that it 
seeks to marry a retributivist concern for desert with a consequentialist concern for 
future benefits: for the relation between punishment and its aim is not, as it is for con-
sequentialists, contingent and instrumental... but internal. The very aim of persuading 
responsible agents to repent the wrongs they have done makes punishment the appro-
priate method of pursuing it.350 
We can justify punishment... as a communicative enterprise focused on the past 
crime, as that for which the censure that punishment communicates is deserved; but 
also looking to a future aim to which it is related, not merely contingently as an in-
strumental technique, but internally as an intrinsically appropriate means... But these 
349Duff (2011), p. 80
350Duff (2001), p. 30
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two perspectives will not be separate and potentially conflicting, as they are on famil-
iar kinds of 'mixed' theory..., since the claim will be that the punishment that is de-
served for the past crime is itself the intrinsically appropriate way of pursuing the for-
ward-looking goals that punishment should serve.351
Just as in the private sphere an apology may not do as well at making a victim feel better as, say, 
an expensive gift would, an apology is nevertheless an "intrinsically appropriate" response to 
wrongdoing. (The retributivist needn't object to an expensive gift in addition to the apology; but 
the apology itself is morally necessary, while the gift is not.) In the private sphere, we value 
(genuine) apologies, and consider them right and appropriate, even if they turn out to be less ef-
fective at certain goals we might have — such as repairing relationships, making a victim feel 
better, and so on. There's no reason that a retributivist can't allow non-punitive responses in addi-
tion to a punitive response. So a criminal offender can receive a retributive punishment and also 
anger management classes, or a retributive punishment and also non-punitive community service
(or whatever else non-punitive option might work best in the particular situation). So a retribu-
tivist can maintain that while it's perfectly fine for a parent to engage in non-punitive responses 
when their children do wrong, this should be in addition to a punishment. 
Since Duff claims that the relationship between punishment and its goals is not "contin-
gent", it seems that Duff's version of retributivism is best understood as maintaining that the 
connection between punishment and its goals not a causal one. (Because if A causes B, there is a 
contingent relationship between A and B — and something else might do a better job of causing 
B than A does.) Instead, perhaps the relationship is best understood as one of instantiation. In 
which case, censure is not something that is supposed to be caused by retributive punishment; 
351Duff (2001), p. 89
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punishment is a form of censure. The offender's repentance or apology is not something that is 
supposed to be caused by retributive punishment; punishment is a form of repentance or apolo-
gy — albeit an enforced, ritualized form of repentance or apology. As far as the retributivist is 
concerned, the state can use other methods to reach other goals, or to contribute further to the 
same goals (censure, repentance, apology, etc), but punishment is appropriate, regardless of its 
effectiveness and no matter what other methods are used in addition to it. It's also important, as 
Duff puts it, that the ritualized apology be "burdensome" — for the retributivist it's appropriate 
that an offender undergo some kind of unpleasant experience; it's appropriate for an offender to 
be made to "feel bad" to some degree when they have done something wrong. If an offender is 
not bothered at all by the state imposed consequences of what they have done (they're rich 
enough that a fine doesn't impact them, or they positively enjoy community service, etc), then by 
the retributivist's standards, the state would have failed in its duty to impose a burdensome apol-
ogy. It's necessary for a retributivist that the consequences of criminal wrongdoing cause the of-
fender to "feel bad", i.e. causes them distress, and that's why a punishment is morally required. In
other words, the retributivist maintains that intentionally inflicting distress, pain, suffering etc is 
justified in order to instantiate censure, repentance, apology etc — where instantiation contrasts 
with a causal relationship.
We can see how this could apply in the case of PPC. A child does something wrong, and a
parent believes it's appropriate for the child to experience distress as a result — a punishment 
that expresses the parent's censure of the child's action, and also serves the function of being a 
ritualized form of repentance or burdensome apology (preferably in the form of a task that bene-
fits the victim of the wrongdoing, if there is one). A parent might reasonably believe that if a 
child isn't made to feel bad as a result of their wrongdoing — if the child is completely noncha-
246
lant and content afterwards — then they have failed to fulfil a moral duty that they have as par-
ents. To allow their child to fail to have appropriate moral emotions is to fail in a parenting duty.
To flesh this out a little, imagine that Matthew has been bullied by his next door neigh-
bour, Steven, over a significant period of time. (And Steven is old enough to "know better"; he is
old enough to count as a sufficiently rational moral agent for present purposes.) It wouldn't be 
enough for Steven's parents to take Matthew out for ice cream and a movie and buy him a 
present in order to "compensate" him for the bullying he's experienced, even if the bullying 
stopped for some reason (perhaps Steven's family moves house and leaves the neighbourhood). 
So even if Matthew is protected from Steven in future, we tend to feel that it's not enough. 
Matthew is the victim of a wrong, unlike the victim of an accident in which nobody is to 
blame — and because of that, Steven ought to be made to feel bad, to be made to experience 
some distress as a result of his wrongdoing. There's something wrong if Steven  just gets left to 
his own devices, happily continuing on, quite content to ignore his past bullying. Preventing fur-
ther harm to Matthew, and compensating him for his past harm, is not sufficient — because it 
does not address the fact that the harm to Matthew was caused by Steven's wrongdoing. Steven is
a moral agent, responsible (at least to a certain degree) for his actions; and his wrongdoing is not
akin to an animal biting someone or a tree branch falling on someone (or even to a baby pulling 
its mother's hair). The retributivist maintains that Steven's parents, at the very least, ought to pun-
ish Steven. (Of course, this doesn't preclude providing him help that he may also need.) Failing 
to punish Steven is failing to recognize that he is a moral agent, instead of an object to be manip-
ulated or an animal to be trained.
There is something important here that I believe retributivism gets right. When an agent 
does something wrong, many people feel that the agent ought to feel bad about what they've 
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done. It's important and "appropriate" for the wrongdoer to feel bad and appreciate the harm that 
they have caused by their wrongful action. Indeed, they might go so far as to believe that it's in-
tegral to being a moral agent to feel bad when you recognize that you've done something morally
wrong.352 It's not that the retributivist wants to get revenge, or to inflict suffering for its own sake.
They want the wrongdoer to really appreciate the wrongness of what they've done, and that's the 
purpose of any distress they are made to experience. Even though a wrongdoer's guilt and apolo-
gies do not "fix" anything, in a narrow sense, they are appropriate responses to wrongdoing — 
and, if it is genuine, feelings of guilt (in contrast to feelings of shame)353 would likely motivate 
the wrongdoer to take steps to actually fix things, to make amends, and a genuine apology would
make a victim of wrongdoing more likely to be willing to accept amends and overtures to restore
the relationship. 
I agree with the retributivist that it is appropriate for an agent to feel bad when they have 
done something wrong.354 It's appropriate for a moral agent to feel guilt or remorse when they 
have done something wrong and to feel sympathy towards the victim of their action. Parents 
ought to try to help their children to understand which of their actions are morally wrong and 
why, and to feel sympathy when other people suffer — even though feeling guilt and sympathy is
distressing to a certain extent.
352Some of the defining characteristics of a psychopath are that they don't feel guilt, remorse, or 
empathy. See, for example, Hare et al (2013), p. 234. Also, Aharoni et al (2011) found that, in 
their sample of 222 prison inmates, the moral judgements of psychopaths differ from non-
psychopaths. Psychopathic prison inmates are less inclined to support "harm prevention" and 
"fairness" as moral beliefs than non-psychopathic prison inmates.
353See, for example, Merkin (2017).
354See, for example, Clarke (2016).
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Where I think the retributivist makes a mistake is in thinking that the correct thing to do, 
therefore, is intentionally to make the wrongdoer feel bad (intentionally inflict distress on them), 
in the form of a punishment. We want wrongdoers to feel bad, but that "feeling bad" should not 
be inflicted on them by a punishment. The appropriate kind of  "feeling bad" is feeling guilty — 
that is, empathic concern for one's victim, and recognizing that it was one's own wrongdoing that
caused the harm to that victim. We will explore this further, but first I'd like to clarify briefly the 
distinction between guilt and shame.
Guilt and shame
I will explain my understanding of the contrast between guilt and shame sufficiently for present 
purposes. Guilt is based on recognition of one's own wrongdoing, especially if one caused harm 
to someone else.355 Guilt is focused on an agent's action and the harm that it caused to another (if
it did). Shame, on the other hand, is focused on the self. One feels disappointed in oneself (per-
haps because of one's wrongful behaviour, but not necessarily); one feels lesser, diminished as a 
person. A similar understanding of the distinction has been expressed by, for example, Rawls and
Morris:
In the [case of guilt] we focus on the infringement of the just claims of others and the 
injury we have done to them, and on their probable resentment or indignation should 
they discover our deed. Whereas [in the case of shame] we are struck by the loss to 
our self-esteem and our inability to carry out our aims: we sense the diminishment of 
self from our anxiety about the lesser respect that others may have for us and from 
our disappointment with ourself for failing to live up to our ideals.356
355There are nontypical instances of guilt such as "survivor guilt" or guilt when one has not done 
anything wrong (and one has not even been neglectful). I will put these kinds of guilt aside.
356Rawls (1971), p. 446. This conception of the difference between shame and guilt is of course 
not without controversy. (See, for example, Morris (1987) and Deigh (1983).) But I think it is 
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[F]eeling shame because of what we have done, we naturally see ourselves as shame-
ful persons and the steps that are appropriate to relieve shame are becoming a person 
that is not shameful. Shame leads to creativity; guilt to restoration... With shame there
is an inevitable derogation in one's status as a person; with guilt one's status is intact 
but one's relationship to others is affected.357
What is valued in a [guilt morality] is... a relationship with others... With guilt we 
have a conceptual scheme of obligations and entitlements [leading to] the idea of ow-
ing something to others... With guilt one's status is intact but one's relationship to oth-
ers is affected. [Guilt thus leads to attempts at] restoration.358
Of course, some theorists see a connection between feelings of guilt and a justification of 
punishment:
The shameful is not worthy of association; the guilty is still worthy but a price must 
be paid. Abandonment by others is the spontaneous result that follows upon knowl-
edge of a contemptible nature; punishment is not a spontaneous response but a price 
paid for restoration. A shame morality leads to casting outside the community, exile; a
guilt morality, to suffering in order to be accepted back within. We only trouble to 
punish those we still care about and respect.359
There is surely something to the idea that one who has committed a serious wrong 
should not be able to live a life of "freedom and contentment"... He should not be able
to carry on his life as if he had done no wrong. He should, we may think, suffer. But 
what should he suffer? One obvious answer is that he should suffer guilt: for guilt or 
remorse is a proper response to one's wrongdoing and is (when sincere) painful. Guilt,
however, is a kind of suffering that is essentially self-induced, flowing from one's 
own recognition that one did wrong. How can it ground a justification for punish-
ment — the infliction of suffering by others? Another obvious answer is that he de-
along the right lines and close enough for our purposes.
357Morris (1976), p. 62
358Morris (1976), p. 62
359Morris (1976), p. 62
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serves to suffer the angry or indignant condemnation of others But why should that 
involve punishing him?360
But the appropriateness of feelings of guilt does not, by itself, serve to justify punishment. An ar-
gument would still be needed to move from the appropriateness of feelings of guilt to the appro-
priateness of punishment:
A feeling of guilt is distinct from any action taken by any person — the guilty party 
or anyone else — to punish or inflict suffering on the blameworthy individual. Hence 
the desert of a feeling of guilt is not the desert of being treated in any such way.
If it is in some way good that someone who is blameworthy feel guilty, then an act, 
such as reproach, that brings it about that such a person feels guilty might be to some 
degree instrumentally good. Still, it would be a further claim to say that the blame-
worthy person deserves this treatment. Moreover, even if reproach is deserved, that 
falls short of the desert of punishment, for reproach need not aim at inflicting 
suffering.361
And why is the distinction between shame and guilt important for present purposes? I don't deny 
that, sometimes, shame is an appropriate response to one's own wrongdoing. I think it's appropri-
ate for murderers and rapists to feel shame for what they did. However, I don't think it's appropri-
ate or helpful for children to feel shame for normal childhood wrongdoings. So punishments that 
succeed in causing children to feel shame are not justified by that "success" — because shame is 
not an appropriate or helpful emotion for children to feel in response to normal childhood wrong-
doings. There is empirical evidence to support the view that shame is not generally a helpful 
emotion if we're hoping for empathy, apologies, and making amends:
360Duff (2001), p. 25
361Clarke (2016)
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Proneness to shame is generally inversely correlated with empathy, whereas prone-
ness to "shame-free" guilt is positively correlated with empathic responsiveness... 
Guilt serves a range of relationship-enhancing functions, perhaps most notably foster-
ing reparative behavior in response to interpersonal harm... There are numerous indi-
cations that shame may promote less helpful behavior in many instances (e.g. with-
drawal, anger, externalization of blame), at least among adults...362
Why might shame, but not guilt, interfere with other-oriented empathy? Shame's in-
herently egocentric focus on the 'bad self' (as opposed to the bad behavior) derails the 
empathic process. Individuals in the throes of shame turn tightly inward, and are thus 
less able to focus cognitive and emotional resources on the harmed other... In con-
trast, people experiencing guilt are specifically focused on the bad behavior, which in 
turn highlights the negative consequences experienced by others, thereby fostering an 
empathic response and motivating people to 'right the wrong'.363
Unlike shame, I think that children feeling guilty is an appropriate response to their own wrong-
doing. (At least for their more serious wrongdoings.) And parents may actually interfere with 
feelings of guilt when they punish. Instead of feeling empathic concern for the person she hurt, a 
child who is punished feels sorry for herself. While both feelings of guilt and punishment are dis-
tressing to a child, punishment intentionally inflicts distress that is typically of a self-oriented 
kind, whereas the distress that it is appropriate for a wrongdoer to experience is other-oriented: 
Punishments — non-physical as well as physical — teach children to focus on their 
own pains and pleasures in deciding how to act. If parents and teachers were to substi-
tute non-physical punishments for physical ones, they might avoid teaching children 
to hit, punch, and kick; yet, they would nevertheless perpetuate the idea that giving 
pain is a legitimate way to exercise power. If the substitute for physical punishment 
362Tangney et al (1996), p. 1267
363Tangney et al (2007). Shame as also been associated with various psychological problems such
as anxiety disorders, depression, eating disorders, alcohol and drug abuse, and so on. Guilt, on
the other hand, appears to be linked with psychological problems "when this emotion is
experienced in a ruminative way or merged with feelings of shame". Meesters et al (2017).
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were to be non-physical punishments, the consequences could be no less undermining
of compassion and social interests.364
It's appropriate for a wrongdoer to feel sympathy for their victim, and guilt for their wrongdoing 
which caused the harm to another. In such a circumstance, the distress a child feels is other-ori-
ented. Punishment, however, naturally makes those who experience it focus on their own distress
or suffering. You cannot punish someone into feeling sympathy and guilt — although, important-
ly, censure might help them in that direction.
Why censure and guilt are appropriate reactions to wrongdoing
Guilt is a normal human emotion that typically (but not necessarily) arises when (1) an agent rec-
ognizes the harm they have caused someone else and (2) the agent realizes that their own wrong-
ful action caused that harm and (3) the wrongfulness of the action was at least partly due to the 
agent failing to properly value the victim.365 (In the moment, the agent did not treat the victim as 
someone with equal worth, with rights and needs as important as the agent's own.) Someone who
understands that they've caused harm to another through their own wrongful action but does not 
care, does not feel guilty, does not feel bad, is quite possibly psychopathic. We feel bad about 
harm to other people because we can empathize with them — and empathic feelings can occur 
whether we are responsible for the harm or not. But when we ourselves are responsible for the 
harm due to wrongdoing, we feel the the distinct emotion of guilt. That person is harmed because
364McCord (1991), p. 175-6. Italics added.
365In cases in which someone is not harmed, an agent can feel bad about the risk of harm their
wrongful action caused. Someone can feel intense — and wholly appropriate — guilt for
reckless driving even though, luckily, they did not harm anyone. They failed to properly value
the people they could have harmed by their wrongful actions.
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of something I did, something that I shouldn't have done, something I could have chosen not to 
do. I feel bad because at the moment when I performed my action I was not thinking of the possi-
ble effects on others or I did not feel their importance or I was overly influenced by my own self-
interest. That is why guilt is an appropriate emotion to experience after wrongdoing — because it
indicates empathic concern for one's victim and the recognition that one's own wrongful action is
responsible for the harm to that victim (by, in some way, discounting the rights or needs of the 
victim in comparison to one's own desires).
These reasons are indeed reflected in the reasons that make censure appropriate. Why 
should the state censure someone who has committed a crime? Or an employer censure an em-
ployee? Or a parent censure a child? (1) So that the agent recognizes the harm they have caused 
someone else and (2) so that the agent realizes that it's their wrongful action that caused the harm
and (3) to reaffirm the value of the victim as a person366 with rights, which the agent wrongly dis-
regarded in some way. This reaffirmation is directed at the agent, the victim and, to the extent 
that is appropriate, to a wider audience. (So in the case of a serious crime, the wider audience 
would be society generally; in the case of a spat between siblings it might be all members of the 
family.) So, the same reasons that make guilt appropriate do indeed make censure appropriate.367 
This is something that contemporary retributivism captures, in contrast to instrumentalist theo-
366I am focusing on wrongdoing and harm between persons, but of course other sentient animals 
can also be victims of wrongdoing.
367Note that when I say that guilt is an appropriate reaction to wrongdoing, I'm talking about a 
child's feelings based on their recognition of harm to someone else due to their own wrongdoing.
The emotion is tied to a specific action. This contrasts with guilt trips, which are when a parent 
habitually tries to make a child feel guilty, not necessarily in response to wrongdoing. For 
example, a parent might try to make a child feel guilty for how hard the parent works to earn 
money so the child can play hockey. Guilt trips are not helpful. See Barber (1996).
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ries. However, those reasons do not support punishment either in addition to censure or as a 
method of censure.
While I agree with the retributivist that censure is an important and appropriate social 
function, I see no reason why censure has to be punitive. As we saw earlier, while championing 
the communicative function of punishment, von Hirsch nevertheless recognizes that censure 
needn't be punitive and acknowledges that if punishment lacked a sufficient deterrent effect (as a 
result of social improvements, say) then there would be no justification for censure being 
punitive.368 
Duff, on the other hand, thinks that censure must be punitive in order to "claim the actor's
attention".369 While it's of course true that "merely verbal censure"370 can indeed be ignored, and 
a punishment is hard to ignore, there is no reason to think that a punishment makes the agent at-
tend to the message of censure, rather than to the distress or suffering inherent in the punishment.
As I shall illustrate, punishment does not help an agent recognize the harm they have 
caused, does not help them realize that their wrongful action caused that harm, does not help 
them recognize how they (temporarily) disregarded or disvalued someone else's rights or needs. 
Given the "meaning" that criminal punishment currently has in our society, it does indeed com-
municate censure of the offender's crime both to the offender and to other members of society.371 
But words and other actions also can carry that meaning, and meanings can also change over 
368Von Hirsch (1990), p. 278
369Duff (1990), p. 275
370Duff (2011), p. 78
371 But I don't think punishment does a particularly good job of communicating the value of the 
victim. Victims are often largely left out of criminal justice proceedings.
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time. And while I see good reasons for the state to censure criminal acts, and to encourage offen-
ders to feel guilt regarding their criminal actions, these reasons do not imply that we should use 
punishment as the vehicle of censure, rather than a non-punitive alternative. Similarly for chil-
dren. While I see good reasons for parents to censure their children's wrongdoings, and to en-
courage (or enable, or allow) them to feel guilt regarding their actions,372 these reasons do not 
imply that parents should use punishment as the vehicle of censure, rather than a non-punitive 
alternative.
Let's think about criminal offenders first. Imagine a teenager who sprays graffiti on a 
storefront just for a lark in the middle of the night. Perhaps they are dared by a friend and, in the 
excitement of the moment, they spray the most shocking thing that comes to mind: a swastika, 
say. For them, it was just a moment of thoughtless tomfoolery. But if they witnessed (or were 
otherwise made vividly aware of) the store owner's distress at discovering the offensive graffiti 
and the effort and expense (perhaps causing its own additional hardship) necessary to remove it, 
the teenager might well come to feel sorry for what they had done; they might feel guilty because
their wrongful action had caused such harm to someone else. Of course, on some level, they al-
ready knew that their action was wrong — it was only (or largely) because it was wrong that it 
was exciting to do it. But because they did not pause to empathize with the store owner, they did 
not appreciate the harm of what they were doing. In such a circumstance, state censure could be 
useful. It could have the power of inducing guilt, and a desire to apologize and make amends to 
the victim.
372Of course, parents also need to be watchful that a child doesn't feel too much guilt for their 
wrongdoing.
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I suspect that many crimes fall into this category — essentially a lack of thoughtfulness 
and imagination in the moment. Opportunistic criminals, in particular, are thinking of the benefit 
to themselves in the moment, without fully appreciating the harm they are causing someone else.
If an offender could come to feel guilty — to truly appreciate the harm they've caused — then 
they should be given the opportunity to make amends. To scrub off the graffiti, to give back the 
stolen bicycle, to return the embezzled funds, and so on. They should have the opportunity to 
apologize and to admit to their victim(s) that they have done something wrong and that they are 
sorry for it. They should have the opportunity to demonstrate that they do in fact respect their 
victim's rights and don't consider themselves as more important than their victim. Such offenders
are perhaps more similar to ourselves than we usually care to admit. They are not bad people; 
they are people who made a mistake, perhaps a very bad one. Censure — and the opportunity to 
make amends, to apologize etc — in these cases can help such offenders, bring them back into 
the fold, as it were. In such cases, I see no reason to intentionally cause any distress, in addition 
to that caused by recognizing one's own wrongdoing, apologizing for it, and making amends for 
it. I see no reason to punish. (But my purpose here is not to provide a fully worked out argument 
against criminal punishment.)
Of course, however, there are more serious criminals who cannot be brought back into 
the fold so easily (or maybe they were never in the fold to begin with). Gang members, for exam-
ple, engage in more violent and serious offending than other young delinquents. And it has been 
found that
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gang membership systematically reduces anticipated guilt among adolescents, which 
suggests that the gang may provide situational contexts and/or normative standards 
that diminish or neutralize anticipated guilt.373
A gang member who kneecapped a fellow gang member who had been discovered to be a snitch 
is unlikely to come to feel guilty about what they've done just because the state verbally censures
their action. Indeed, some gangs (and also non-gang members engaged in street crime) operate 
with their own moral code of loyalty, rules of territory and hierarchy, and harsh punishment.374 If 
the state censures the assault, this is quite likely to be seen by the offender as a simple disagree-
ment by "mainstream" society which doesn't understand or appreciate gang life. And I suspect 
there's a good chance that punishment by the state will be seen as either unjust (because the 
kneecapping was itself a justified punishment for a breach of loyalty) or else just (because it's 
another use of power in order to punish, just as the gangs use on the streets). Punishment itself is 
unlikely to change such a criminal's moral beliefs, even if it does sometimes change behaviour, 
due to the criminal's  recognition of their own self-interest.375 But retributivists care about treat-
ing the offender as a moral agent, not just as a creature to be manipulated by self-interest; they 
care about the offender coming to believe that their action was morally wrong — not just that the
state will cause the offender to suffer if they perform such actions.
Education or treatment helps. Legal employment opportunities also help. Researchers 
who have studied the reasons that youths leave gangs and move away from crime found that the 
373Matsuda et al (2013), p. 445
374See, for example, Matsuda (2013).
375Although recidivism rates are typically high for violent criminals. It's clearly difficult for many
offenders to stay on the straight and narrow, even if they recognize it's in their self-interest to do 
so. (And, of course, sometimes it's not in their self-interest to refrain from crime.)
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most common reasons were: tiring of the violent lifestyle and the 'trouble' resulting from it, em-
ployment opportunities, and family commitments (such as to a girlfriend, boyfriend, spouse, or 
children).376 
Rarely, however, are law enforcement motives or criminal justice sanctions reported 
as reasons for desisting from gangs, suggesting a mismatch between traditional gang 
control strategies and the reality of gang membership.377
Part of the problem might be that those who are more fully embedded in a gang culture more ful-
ly accept a different ethic than "mainstream" society. There is evidence that instead of accepting 
a "guilt-ethic", based on concern for others and the idea that certain behaviours should be avoid-
ed because of their harmful effects on others, they tend to accept a "shame-ethic" which is con-
cerned with the idea of "respect" — that one must be perceived positively by one's peers and that
toughness and violence are necessary in order to maintain this respect. If a gang member loses 
the respect of their peers, they feel shame and a violent response is necessary in order to "save 
face" and regain respect.378
It appears that we all have a tendency to make our moral beliefs fit our actions, so that we
don't feel bad about what we've done (stealing stationary from the office, inflating claimed ex-
penses, and so on). Or we interpret ambiguous moral rules or norms in our favour. Or we make 
excuses for ourselves in order to justify our own behaviour while condemning the same behav-
376See Pyrooz and Decker (2011).
377O'Brien et al (2013), p. 422
378See, for example, Matsuda et al (2013), pp. 459-460.
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iour in others.379 And those involved in serious crime have more moral rationalization to do than 
most and it's not difficult to see how a "street code" that differs from "mainstream" morality in its
condoning of violence would assist in that process.
On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the state intentionally inflicting distress (suf-
fering, pain, deprivation) on offenders is in any way likely to communicate to such offenders that
a mainstream "guilt-ethic" is preferable to the code of the street. Indeed, punishment seems more 
compatible with the idea that "might makes right". 
If intentionally inflicting distress on offenders doesn't help them to see the error of their 
ways, what does? Offenders who succeed in spontaneously leaving gangs and coming to avoid 
crime tend to be those who were lower ranking in the gang and less inclined towards violence in 
the first place.380 However, there is evidence that even higher risk, 'hardened' offenders respond 
well to treatment in prison. Di Placido et al (2006) found that educational programs based on a 
cognitive-behavioural approach helped reduce recidivism, with the greatest difference between 
incarcerated gang members who received the treatment and those who didn't. (The programs also
included other interventions where appropriate such as education upgrading, life skills training, 
medication for mental illness, anger management, and so on.):
Treatment of gang members reduced their risk to recidivate compared to untreated 
gang members. The reduction in violent recidivism using a 2-year follow-up was 20%
between the [treated gang member] and [untreated gang member] groups, and 6% be-
tween the [treated non-gang member] and the [untreated non-gang member] groups. 
For nonviolent recidivism, the corresponding reductions were 11 and 17%.381
379See, for example, the fascinating Barkan et al (2012), Shalvi et al (2015), and Gino (2015).
380Di Placido et al (2006), p. 94
381Di Placido et al (2006), p. 108
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I hope that I've shown, in the criminal case, the importance and usefulness of state censure, as 
recognized by many contemporary retributivists. I also hope to have shown that non-punitive 
censure together with non-punitive treatment/education is at least a reasonable response to crimi-
nal wrongdoing if, like the retributivist, we care about offenders as moral agents, and not only 
about manipulating their behaviour. (Of course, much more argument and evidence would be re-
quired to conclude that criminal punishment is not justified, and I am not attempting that here.)
So now let's turn to censure and guilt in the case of PPC. Suppose that Jane — who is old 
enough to know better — takes little Adam's toy, and Adam starts to cry. Jane's parent could pun-
ish her because of her wrongdoing, and the retributivist may approve of such an action, assuming
that the punishment was of the appropriate severity. (The parent might also verbally emphasize 
to Jane what she has done wrong and the harm she has caused Adam. The retributivist has no ob-
jection to that, in addition to punishment.) Jane now feels bad, as an indirect result of her wrong-
doing — via her parent intentionally causing her distress in response to her wrongdoing. Howev-
er, in contrast to the retributivist, I maintain that it's not the right kind of "feeling bad" and it 
doesn't have the right cause. Jane's distress is self-oriented; she felt pain because she was 
spanked, or she feels upset or scared because she is forced to stay in her room by herself, or she 
is miserable because she knows she won't get to watch her favourite TV show later. In whatever 
manner she is punished, she feels sorry for herself. (She may well completely forget Adam, since
she's wrapped up in her own distress.) As well as her distress being self-oriented, it was intentio-
nally caused by a parent — it was caused neither by her recognition that she did something 
wrong (guilt), nor by her sympathy for Adam — and we consider these to be important sources 
of distress for moral agents. (She might even make herself feel better by attributing blame to her 
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parent who caused her to feel bad, or even to Adam for crying and getting her into trouble — in-
stead of blaming herself for what she did.)
The retributivist is correct to point out that we do tend to think that's appropriate for Jane 
to feel bad because of what she did. But it needs to be the right kind of "feeling bad", and to have
the right cause (and to be of the right degree; we don't want Jane to be frantically distraught over 
a minor misdemeanour). Suppose now that, instead of punishing Jane, her parent gently turns her
to face Adam and draws her attention to Adam's upset. Assuming Jane is a typically developing 
child, if she really is old enough "to know better", then she is old enough to feel empathy for 
Adam so long as she is not overwhelmed by personal distress. She is old enough to understand 
that her action caused Adam's upset. Jane's parent might intend her to feel (slightly) bad about 
what she did — and thus be motivated to fix the situation. Jane's parent might help her by sug-
gesting ways to improve things, "Taking the toy made Adam feel sad. You should return the toy 
to Adam, and maybe ask him if you could play with it when he's finished," or "Ask Adam if he'd 
like the toy back, or if you and he could play with it together," or "Do you feel you could apolo-
gize to Adam? Give the toy back to him and maybe you could ask him if he'd like a hug," and so 
on. (The exact response, of course, depends on many factors, including the details of the event 
and the ages and relationship of the children involved.) But the parent in this scenario is not pun-
ishing Jane, even if they anticipate or even intend Jane to experience a degree of distress in feel-
ing guilt and sympathy for Adam. In this scenario any distress that Jane experiences is not self-
oriented — she does not feel bad because of her own pain, isolation, or deprivation. Her distress 
is other-oriented — she feels bad because of Adam's upset, and because her action caused 
Adam's upset. If Jane does not feel empathy for Adam, if she does not recognize that she has 
done something wrong, punishing her is not going to help her do so.
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Punishment doesn't help Jane focus on what she's done wrong; it doesn't help her to hear 
her parent's message. Recall the evidence from Chapter 4, on the moral education theory, that 
punishment has not been shown to help with children's moral internalization. Indeed, corporal 
punishment in particular has actually been shown to hinder moral internalization,382 and only rea-
soning with children has been shown to be helpful in this regard.383 Punishment will likely make 
Jane focus on her own suffering and self-interest, contrary to Duff's hopes:
One function of burdensome punishment... is to make it harder for the offender to ig-
nore the message that punishment communicates. It is a way of helping to keep his at-
tention focused on his wrongdoing and its implications, with a view to inducing and 
strengthening a properly repentant understanding of what he has done.384
In addition to punishment getting the offender's attention, another reason that Duff thinks 
that censure should be in the form of punishment is that punishment serves the role of  a ritualis-
tic, burdensome apology.
However, if Jane gives a genuine apology to Adam, there is no reason to make her under-
go a "ritualized apology" in the form of a punishment (even if we concede that there might be in 
the criminal case). A parent is in much better position to gauge whether or not a child's apology 
is genuine than the judicial system is with a criminal offender. And a required, ritualized apology
may preclude a genuine one, which would be a loss, especially if there's a valuable relationship 
between Jane and Adam. And if a child's apology is not genuine, a parent is in a position to try to
understand why the child is not sorry for what they have done and address those issues, with 
382Straus and Paschall (2009)
383Larzelere and Kuhn (2005)
384Duff (2011) p. 78
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hope that the child will come to feel apologetic, if indeed they have done something wrong and 
properly ought to feel apologetic. A private, genuine apology may well contribute to making 
amends. (In the criminal case, we might be able to ensure that an offender takes steps to make 
amends. The fraudulent banker can be required to return the fortune they embezzled; the vandal 
can be required to repair the damage they caused. But we cannot be sure that their apology is 
genuine. And Duff thinks that, given the public nature of crime, and the liberal ideal of a mini-
mally intrusive state, it's not even the state's place to enquire as to the genuineness of an offend-
er's apology. Clearly, that doesn't apply in the case of PPC.)
It can feel very uncomfortable to apologize — whether it's a genuine or a forced apology. 
The discomfort of a genuine apology is appropriate — acknowledging that you acted wrongly, 
that you are responsible for some harm to the victim of your action, and so on. The discomfort of
a forced apology, which isn't genuine, is resentment and blame of whoever forced you to make it,
perhaps even blame towards the victim, a feeling of being victimized oneself (whether justly or 
not), and so on. These are not appropriate responses to one's own wrongdoing. If a child has the 
appropriate, desired response of guilt, sympathy, etc, that is likely despite a punishment, not be-
cause of it.
In the case I described earlier, we agree with the retributivist that the bully, Steven, ought 
to feel bad because he recognizes the wrongness of what he's done and because he's come to 
sympathize with his victim, Matthew. Although punishing Steven will indeed make him feel bad 
(it intentionally inflicts distress on him) it won't achieve the specific type of "bad feelings" that 
are actually appropriate. Talking with Steven might help. Perhaps Steven didn't recognize his ac-
tions as actually being wrong and hurtful to Matthew. Perhaps Steven is taking out his own frus-
tration and feelings of powerlessness on Matthew. Perhaps Steven has problems controlling his 
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anger. Perhaps we can help Steven to find better ways to deal with such emotions. Helping 
Steven to recognize and control his own emotions will better enable him to appreciate Matthew's 
feelings — and hopefully approach feelings of sympathy for Matthew and remorse for what he 
caused Matthew to suffer. Even if we can't help Steven to come to recognize his wrongdoing and 
to sympathize with Matthew, punishing him isn't going to help him. And, in fact, we have reason 
to think that it will be detrimental. (If Steven cannot see that his behaviour is wrong, and he can-
not sympathize with Matthew, he quite likely needs some serious intervention, not punishment.)
And whether we can help Steven or not, we can at least verbally censure Steven's actions,
and act compassionately towards Matthew. Intentionally causing distress to Steven is not neces-
sary in order to censure his actions; refraining from intentionally causing distress to Steven does 
not carry the "meaning" that his actions are not censured. Ignoring Steven's actions would carry 
that meaning, but our options are not only ignore or punish.
Similarly, in a criminal case, even if an offender cannot be helped in any way, society can
at least censure an offender's action, act compassionately towards victims, and in some cases, 
compel the offender to take steps to make amends. (Eg They can be made to repair the damage 
the caused, not as a punishment, but because this is owed to the victim.) Making amends is not a 
punishment because, although it might cause distress, that distress is not intended (or it shouldn't 
be). The offender's distress does not form part of the reason for insisting that the offender make 
amends.
Duff makes this mistake and thinks that reparations are punishment because they are bur-
densome or distressing etc. But they are not punishments because the distress is not intended 
(even if it's foreseen). The point of reparations is not to cause the offender distress, it's to give the
victim what they are owed. Reparations should happen whether the offender minds or not. They 
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don't fail if the offender is happy to return the property. Suppose an offender steals someone's 
valuable pedigree dog. They should be compelled to return the dog in order to make amends, to 
take steps towards reparation. Even if the offender is delighted to return the dog (maybe it turned
out to be a bigger pain in the butt to take care of than they anticipated) that doesn't mean that 
reparation has failed. But if a punishment is something that the offender enjoys, then a punish-
ment has failed.
Making amends
Although officially Hampton is a moral education theorist, she hints at another value she has — 
that of the importance of actually repairing the damage done. She speaks approvingly of punish-
ments that "force the offender to compensate the victim, and thus help to heal more effectively 
the "moral wound" which the offense has caused."385 If Hampton is correct that it is important for
the offender to take steps to compensate the victim, then we need a reason to prefer punishment 
over non-punitive methods of helping an offender appreciate the harm they've caused and having
them make amends. Is sending an offender to prison better than having an offender literally 
make amends (e.g. by apologizing, returning stolen property, helping to install a burglar alarm, 
paying the victim's medical bills, painting over the graffiti, performing community service, or 
whatever)? Furthermore, like Sayre-McCord (2001), we might even be inclined to hold that it's 
an injustice "if a person who commits a crime is denied an opportunity to make amends".386 And 
it may be an injustice to both offender and victim. By incapacitating offenders in prison, we 
385Hampton (1984), p. 228
386Sayre-McCord (2001), p. 512
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might enforce a metaphorical "making amends", but in many cases, we simultaneously make it 
impossible for them to make literal amends. 
This point perhaps has even more force with respect to children. They are learning how to
navigate both the physical world and the social world, and they will inevitably make mistakes. It 
seems plausible that children should be encouraged and enabled to make amends to anyone nega-
tively affected by their actions. So, we would need a reason to punish a child, rather than (or in 
addition to) having them make amends in some way. Why is punishing a child preferable to hav-
ing them make amends (eg by apologizing, returning the toy to their playmate, cleaning up the 
mess they made, paying to replace the broken vase, being especially nice to their sibling, or 
whatever)? Intuitively, it also seems that making amends will help a child to understand the im-
pact her actions can have on other people and, importantly, help her understand that she can (for 
most of the kinds of mistake a child makes) make things better; she is not helpless. She can 
recover from her mistakes. 
It's important to note that making amends is not necessarily easier (or less distressing) 
than a punishment. A child might even prefer to have a time-out or a spanking for purposefully 
breaking their sibling's toy rather than, say, having a parent insist that they use their allowance 
pay for the toy to be repaired or replaced. The time-out or spanking doesn't actually fix or im-
prove anything, so if a parent's goal is for the child to make amends, then it's not justified to in-
flict a time-out or a spanking that doesn't contribute to that goal. Only if there is reason to think 
that the distress will actually succeed in its goal of "making amends" or "repairing the damage 
done", could it be justified to inflict it as a means to that goal. A child using their allowance to re-
place or repair the toy might (or it might not) cause distress, but even if it does cause distress it 
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may well be justified because it really does serve to "make amends" or to "repair the damage 
done".
Empathic concern and personal distress
At this point, I would like to refer back to the psychologist's notion of "personal distress" that 
came up in Chapter 3, on behavioural training/deterrence theories of punishment.
In psychological research, "personal distress" is a technical term that contrasts with "em-
pathic concern". However, both "empathic concern" and "personal distress" count as distress in 
the broad sense that I have been using the term. Feeling guilt and sympathy are also both ways of
experiencing distress. Personal distress is more specific than distress — it is an intense form of 
distress (including feelings of shame) that results from witnessing distress in others.
Unlike sympathy (i.e. empathy for someone experiencing negative emotions) and guilt, 
personal distress does not motivate wrongdoers to make amends. Indeed, excessive personal dis-
tress tends to make us avoid the source of our distress, which might make us avoid our victim, 
rather than be motivated to help them. There is evidence that for an agent to be motivated to 
make amends, they need to feel empathic concern for the person who was negatively affected by 
their action.387  
As Lamm et al (2007) says, "the observation of pain in others may... instigate an altruistic
motivation to help the other, which is quite different from the egoistic motivation to reduce per-
sonal distress."388 And personal distress — or, at least, excessive personal distress — is detrimen-
tal to such altruistic behaviour. Excessive personal distress can lead an agent to withdraw from 
387"Empathic concern" is "an important instigator for helping behavior." Lamm et al (2007), p. 42
388Lamm et al (2007), p. 42
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the source of the distress (i.e. the person who was affected by their action), rather than attending 
to and helping that person.
So while we do want to encourage (or allow, or enable) kids to feel sympathy and guilt 
(even though these are somewhat distressing emotions) — we should not want children to feel 
excessive personal distress when they've harmed another person. So if a child is very distressed 
about the harm they've caused someone else, the best thing to do may be to calm and comfort 
that child  — with the aim that, over time, the child will come to be able to calm themselves in 
such a situation. Once the child is more calm, less emotional, they are better able to respond em-
pathically and positively towards the person they harmed:
Importantly, it has been demonstrated that individuals who can regulate their emo-
tions are more likely to experience empathy, and to interact in morally desirable ways
with others... In contrast, people who experience their emotions intensely, especially 
negative emotions, are more prone to personal distress, an aversive emotional reac-
tion (e.g. anxiety or discomfort) that is based on the recognition of another's emotion-
al state or condition.389
[I]f perceiving another person in an emotionally or physically painful circumstance 
elicits personal distress, then the observer may tend not to fully attend to the other's 
experience and as a result fail to display sympathetic behaviors.390 
[E]mpathic concern for sadness does lead to prosocial resource allocation in young 
children [3 year olds and 5-6 year olds] both by promoting sharing and decreasing 
envy.391
389Decety & Lamm (2009), p. 12. Italics added.
390Decety & Lamm (2009), p. 7-8 
391Williams et al (2014), p. 52 
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Even neuroimaging data seems to support there being a fundamental difference between empath-
ic concern and personal distress, with the latter involving greater activity in the amygdala, which 
plays a crucial role in "fear-related behaviors".392 If an agent has caused someone harm through 
their wrong action, and then they feel overwhelming personal distress, they are more likely to 
have a fear-related response and to attempt to remove themselves from the situation — instead of
staying and trying to make amends to their victim. 
Here I will indulge in a little empirical speculation. I suspect that the distress caused by 
punishment is likely to function in a way similar to the psychologist's "personal distress". I sus-
pect that a child who is punished (especially if the punishment causes significant distress) is like-
ly to be less inclined to feel sympathy, and less inclined to help anybody they've harmed through 
their wrongdoing, than a child who is not punished in an otherwise similar situation. Further-
more, I expect that the mechanism — a neurological fear response — is similar in children who 
experience excessive personal distress (as a result of witnessing others' distress) and in children 
who experience punishment. And that such a response interferes with feelings of empathy and 
guilt.
However, even if my empirical speculation turns out to be mistaken, it's nevertheless the 
case that parents should avoid intentionally inflicting (self-oriented) distress in the form of pun-
ishment and should instead help their children to appreciate any harm they have caused and help-
ing them to make amends. Gentle censure (i.e. censure that doesn't cause too much distress) and 
encouraging (or allowing, or enabling; not preventing) feelings of guilt are what is needed in or-
der for a child to be motivated to apologize and make amends. Yes, a child may feel some dis-
tress or discomfort as a result of another's child's upset, but parents can play the role of helping 
392Decety & Lamm (2009), p. 9 
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their child deal with those feelings and one of the best ways is for them to learn how to express a 
genuine apology and how they might make amends.
It might be objected that if a parent intends a child to experience distress, albeit in the 
form of sympathy and guilt (eg by bringing their attention to another child's upset, with the hope 
that first child will feel sympathy), then this is just another form of punishment. This is not 
correct, however. Recall the distinction between punitive and non-punitive discipline from the 
Introduction:
Goals of both punitive and non-punitive discipline are things like recognition of 
wrongdoing, moral education, taking responsibility, the experience of guilt, sympathy
for victims, improved future behaviour, justice, fairness, and so on. How such goals 
are approached can be punitive or non-punitive. If they are approached via some oth-
er (typically self-oriented) distress that is intentionally inflicted, the method is puni-
tive. If they are not approached via some other distress that is intentionally inflicted, 
the method is not punitive.
Instrumentalist theories of punishment maintain that punishment is intentionally inflicted 
on a child as a causal means of reaching a certain goal, such as moral education, behavioural 
training, etc. And, long term, it's hoped that because of such punishments — as well as non-puni-
tive discipline — a child will gradually learn right from wrong, behave better, be guided by em-
pathy, and so on. The punishment is the means, and when a parent imposes it, they are intention-
ally causing distress. The distress is the means to the further goal that they also intend. They 
intend the means (distress) and they intend the goal (moral education or whatever). They intend 
distress because it is supposed to cause something else that they intend.
A retributivist theory of punishment doesn't maintain that punishment is a causal means 
to some further goal (unless, like von Hirsch, they hold a mixed theory which combines retribu-
tivist elements with instrumentalist elements). Instead, the punishment itself is supposed to in-
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stantiate certain things that the parent intends. The punishment that the child receives instanti-
ates: the child's distress (they "feel bad"); the parent's censure of the child's action; a burdensome
apology; a ritualized, secular penance; and so on. The intentionally caused distress is not a 
means, in the causal sense, but it is a means in what me might call an instantiation sense. The ret-
ributivist intends distress (or pain or suffering) because it is supposed to instantiate something 
else that they intend (such as censure, burdensome apology, and so on).
In the case of non-punitive discipline, the parent might intend the child to feel sympathy, 
remorse, guilt etc — those are unpleasant feelings that we might call "distress", just as in the case
of punishment. That distress may be a goal of their action — sympathy and so on is something 
they are trying to achieve. But, crucially, the means of achieving this goal is not to inflict any 
other kind of (self-oriented) distress such as pain, loneliness, etc. It might be to calmly talk to the
child and explain how their action affected someone else. It might be to gently turn the child's 
body in order to bring their attention to an upset playmate. They do not cause physical pain or 
emotional upset in order to cause feelings of sympathy or guilt! The further hopes the parent 
might have are for the misbehaving child to be motivated to apologize, to make amends, and so 
on. 
As Duff (2001) says, we can hope "to communicate censure [and] thereby to persuade of-
fenders to repentance, self-reform, and reconcilation."393 But, contrary to Duff, we don't have to 
support the use punishment in order to do so. In sum:
Retributivist censure/discipline: Aims to induce remorse, repentance, guilt, self-re-
form, etc. by intentionally inflicting pain, suffering, distress etc (i.e. by inflicting a 
punishment).
393p. xix
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Non-punitive censure/discipline: Aims to induce remorse, repentance, guilt, self-re-
form, etc. without intentionally inflicting pain, suffering, distress, etc (i.e. without in-
flicting a punishment).
I hope to have shown in this chapter that contemporary retributivists are correct to emphasize the
importance of censure, which has the function of making wrongdoers "feel bad" about what 
they've done. I also hope to have shown that it is appropriate for this "feeling bad" to consist in 
(other-oriented) feelings of sympathy and guilt — which are best achieved by non-punitive cen-
sure which, unlike punishment, does not intentionally inflict (self-oriented) distress.
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CHAPTER NINE: Non-punitive discipline
This dissertation has discussed a classic philosophical issue, the problem of punishment, in a 
context that has largely been neglected by philosophers: parental punishment of children. I have 
concluded that parental punishment of children is not morally justified. Here's a reminder of my 
overall argument:
1. It's a default rule of behaviour to avoid intentionally causing distress.
2. Punishing children is an instance of intentionally causing distress (departing from 
the default rule of behaviour).
3. Intentionally causing distress (departing from the default rule of behaviour) re-
quires justification.
4. Therefore, punishing children requires justification.
5. If punishing children is not justified, parents ought not to do so.
6. Punishing children is not justified.
7. Therefore, parents ought not to punish children.
The arguments in defense of premise (6) vary, depending on the type of theory of punish-
ment being considered. For instrumentalist theories, I argued that none of the ones on offer  suc-
ceed in justifying punishment because they fail to meet the following three requirements:
(1) The distress inflicted (both intended and not intended) is not excessive, compared 
to the amount and/or type of benefit gained.
(2) The distress inflicted will likely lead to the intended goal.
(3) There is no comparably effective alternative that causes less distress.
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The empirical evidence I summarized in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 shows that they fail to meet (2) — 
that is, punishments do not tend to be useful for reasonable goals parents might have. In the one 
case in which punishments have been found to have some benefit (spanking for compliance, 
when combined with reasoning, with 2 and 3 year olds), the gain in compliance is so minimal (an
average of an additional 42 minutes of good behaviour), that punishment fails to meet (1). In the 
present chapter, the evidence in favour of non-punitive discipline will support the conclusion that
instrumentalist punishment also fails to meet (3). So even if the various goals would, theoretical-
ly, be able to justify punishment, the punishments in fact fail to achieve them. I have not focused 
on showing that various instrumentalist theories of punishment are false. Instead, I aimed to 
show that no matter what instrumentalist theory someone might hold, parental punishment of 
children fails to be justified by it. 
Note that even if the evidence in favour of non-punitive discipline was non-existent or in-
conclusive, instrumentalist theories would still fail to justify PPC (because failing to meet any of 
the three requirements is sufficient).
Like instrumentalist theories, consequentialist moral theories have to take into considera-
tion whether or not punishment is likely to have overall beneficial effects (despite the distress it 
initially inflicts). The evidence we looked at in the chapters on instrumentalist theories, and the 
evidence of risk of harms that we reviewed in Chapter 6, supports the view that consequentialism
would not be able to justify punishment. The evidence in this chapter, in favour of non-punitive 
alternatives, will lend further support to that conclusion. 
In Chapter 5, we looked at a non-instrumentalist theory of punishment: consent theory. It 
claims that punishing children is justified because, in effect, children consent to punishment 
when they break household rules (that they understand are liable to punishment when broken, 
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etc). I argued that even if children consent to punishment when they break a rule, the consent is 
not morally transformative (i.e. it doesn't turn intentionally inflicting distress into a permissible 
action). This is because parents are are impermissibly limiting their child's options —  there are 
preferable options that there is no good reason not to offer, such as non-punitive discipline. The 
evidence in this chapter is important for this argument because it bolsters the case that non-puni-
tive discipline is preferable to punitive discipline.394
And, finally, in Chapter 8, we looked at retributivist theories of punishment. I concluded 
that while the retributivist is correct that it's appropriate for children to "feel bad" when they do 
something wrong, the retributivist is mistaken that parents should attempt to induce such feelings
through punishment. This is because punishment results in the wrong kind of "feeling bad" — 
such as physical pain, self-pity, resentment, victim-blaming, and so on. Instead, a non-punitive 
response to wrongdoing can encourage a child to make amends, apologize, and so on — and to 
allow (or encourage, or enable) a child to feel guilty about their action, such as calmly pointing 
out to a child that their action has upset someone else or hurt their feelings. Helping a child to 
notice others' distress, to feel responsible or to feel guilty about their own action may have other 
positive effects:
There is accumulating evidence showing that guilt in itself serves an adaptive inter-
personal function, as it stimulates restorative actions in case of moral transgressions, 
thereby promoting the development of empathy and conscience and reducing aggres-
sion and other externalizing problems.395 
394Note that the child needn't actually prefer the non-punitive option to the punitive option. The 
point is that the non-punitive option is objectively preferable, i.e. it's better for the child (and the 
family, given the parent's goals), compared to punitive alternatives.
395Meesters et al (2017)
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It's important to note that non-punitive discipline is indeed discipline. The alternative to 
punishing is not doing nothing. Kids who receive no discipline at all, or very little discipline, are 
harmed by their parents. Discipline is guidance or teaching regarding morality and proper behav-
iour and failing to provide such guidance is arguably a way of neglecting children, and that is of 
course harmful.396 Punishment is only one form of discipline, however, and there is no evidence 
that refraining from punishing a child — and instead using non-punitive discipline — is harmful 
in any way.
Evidence that punishing children is overall at least as beneficial or more beneficial than 
alternative, non-punitive, forms of discipline simply does not exist.397 There have been very few 
studies comparing punitive discipline with non-punitive discipline, and none at all comparing 
kids who are sometimes punished with kids who are never punished — perhaps because the lat-
ter are in such short supply in rich world societies where most research takes place. In this chap-
ter, I will briefly summarize a sample of some of the research that has been done on non-punitive
discipline.
Our tendency might be to think that supporting non-punitive discipline means supporting 
praise and rewards for children — carrots instead of sticks. But non-punitive discipline isn't only 
396For example, the definition of 'neglect' at the US Department of Health and Human Services 
website includes "Permitting or not keeping the child from engaging in risky, illegal, or harmful 
behaviors". https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/neglect/chaptertwo.cfm. See also 
McCord (1991).
397Larzelere et al (1998) compared punishment, reasoning + punishment, and reasoning alone 
with a single form of non-punitive "reasoning", with a narrow age group (2-3 year olds), on a 
single dimension (compliance). It tells us nothing about harms and benefits more broadly, and it 
tells us nothing about other forms of non-punitive discipline with this age group, or with children
of other ages.
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praise and rewards, although they might be one element in successful discipline. There is some 
evidence that praise and rewards can have positive effects. 
Owen et al (2012) reports that when parents are taught to combine effective ways of 
giving instructions to children and, when children are compliant, to praise and give positive non-
verbal responses (such as pats on the back), child compliance increases (among children identi-
fied as noncompliant and at high risk for antisocial behaviour problems).
Parents often struggle with getting their kids to eat vegetables, and children's refusal to 
comply with parental demands to eat them is a typical punishment scenario. Cooke et al (2011), 
using a sample of 422 4-6 year olds, found that "rewarding children for tasting an initially dis-
liked food produced sustained increases in acceptance, with no negative effects on liking."398 Re-
wards (stickers) and praise helped children both consume more and like more a previously dis-
liked vegetable.
Praise and rewards, like punishment, are responses to particular instances of child behav-
iour. But there are parenting behaviours other than specific disciplinary actions that can affect 
children's behaviour and moral development, so that discipline itself can play less of a role. For 
example, Lee et al (2014) and Talwar et al (2016) found that telling children fictional stories in-
fluenced their lying and truth-telling behaviour. Telling children stories that emphasized the good
effects of telling the truth encouraged children to be honest:
[C]hildren between 3 and 7 years old were approximately three times more likely to 
tell the truth about their transgression (i.e. peeking at a forbidden toy) when they 
heard a story that emphasized the positive effects of telling the truth (i.e. George 
Washington and the Cherry Tree) compared with one that had no relevance to honesty
(i.e. The Tortoise and the Hare). In contrast, moral stories that focused on the nega-
tive ramifications of dishonesty (i.e. The Boy Who Cried Wolf) were ineffective in 
398Cooke et al (2011), p. 195
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promoting truthfulness and resulted in lie-telling rates similar to that of the control 
story. There were no age differences found.399
Non-punitive parenting programs, such as Triple P, tend to teach parents discipline meth-
ods alongside more general ways to improve parents' relationships with their children, which in 
turn can help with children's behaviour. Triple P has been empirically tested over many years and
it trains parents to adopt 17 different parenting strategies, approximately two thirds of which are 
about building the parent-child relationship, not about responding to misbehaviour. With respect 
to discipline, Triple P recommends that parents and children come up with household rules to-
gether and establish "logical consequences" for when these rules are broken.400 In many contexts 
(such as popular parenting magazines and websites) "logical consequence" is often used simply 
as a euphemism for "punishment", but in Triple P, a logical consequence is just what happens in 
order to stop the rule-breaking behaviour. So to use an example from earlier, separating the Nerf 
gun from the cat — by removing the Nerf gun from my daughter, or confining the cat away from
the daughter (or vice versa) — is a "logical consequence" of breaking the "don't shoot at the cat" 
rule that she and I have agreed upon. 
Triple P is an entire program designed to help parents change their own parenting behav-
iour, which helps to change their kids' behaviour. To really improve kids' behaviour over the long
term, many parents need to change their own behaviour over the long term — not simply insti-
tute a new kind of discipline method. Parents often need to pay more attention to their kids, play 
with them more, teach them problem-solving skills, increase supervision, acknowledge good be-
399Talwar et al (2016), p. 488
400Conversation with Peggy Govers, the Training and Implementation Consultant for Triple P 
Parenting Canada.
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haviour, help children learn to calm their emotions, and so on. (And, I would argue, governments
need to support parents in these efforts.) All these parental behaviours together can work to 
reduce kids' misbehaviour — more than simply adopting a different discipline method to use in 
response to misbehaviour. 
The Triple P program has various Levels (1 to 5). Level 1 is for any parents who are in-
terested in improving their parenting skills, including with children who have shown no sign of 
needing an intervention; the goal is to prevent behavioural problems before they start. Level 5 is 
for parents who are dealing with severe child behaviour problems or family dysfunction. Empiri-
cal studies tend to find larger effect sizes when children start off with more serious problems. 
(There's less room for improvement in children who don't have behaviour issues.)
A 2008 meta-analysis401 examined studies that considered any of the levels of Triple P,  
and found small to moderate effect sizes:
The results (N = 55 studies) indicate that Triple P causes positive changes in parent-
ing skills, child problem behavior and parental well-being in the small to moderate 
range, varying as a function of the intensity [i.e. the level] of the intervention.402
Another 2008 meta-analysis403 conducted by researchers in the Netherlands looked 
specifically at Level 4 Triple P, which "targets high-risk individuals who are identified as having 
detectable problems but who do not yet meet diagnostic criteria for a behavioral disorder."404 
401Nowak and Heinrichs (2008)
402Nowak and Heinrichs (2008), p. 144
403De Graaf et al (2008)
404De Graaf et al (2008), p. 715
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They concluded that "Level 4 of Triple P has moderate to large effects on behavior problems of 
children that last in follow-up measurements of 6 to 12 months."405 
Reedtz and Klest (2016) also found "medium to large" positive effects of the Triple P par-
enting program. Their sample was also a high risk, but non-clinical, sample of 189 kids and par-
ents; half were randomly assigned to the intervention and half to a "care as usual" control group. 
This study used parent-, teacher-, and self-reports, collecting data pre-intervention, immediately 
post-intervention, 1 year later, and 4 years later:
The differences between the [intervention] and control groups on parenting practices 
suggest that mothers in the intervention group use positive parenting strategies such 
as problem-solving, giving the child opportunities to correct mistakes, praising the 
child, giving compliments, offering privileges, tokens and reinforcements for positive
behaviours, as well as kissing and hugging the child, significantly more often than the
mothers in the control group.
The mothers in the intervention group dropped significantly from pre to 4 year follow-up com-
pared to the control group in the use of negative parenting strategies such as raising their voices 
and yelling at the child, threats to punish the child physically or non-physically, grounding the 
child, hitting the child, flicking the child’s ear, as well as slapping the child. The control group 
also reduced their use of such strategies, but at a slower pace, and to a lesser degree.
And there were differences in the children's behaviour, although this difference levelled off over 
time. So it may be beneficial for parents to take "refresher" courses, which makes sense given 
how much children change developmentally and behaviourally over the first few years of life:
405De Graaf et al (2008), p. 730
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The group who received the [intervention] showed an immediate drop in the intensity 
of child problem behaviour following the intervention. This significant reduction lev-
elled off and remained stable through the 4 year follow-up assessment. In contrast, the
control group, who received services as usual, maintained a higher level of child 
problem behaviour at post intervention and showed a slower decline until the levels 
matched those of the intervention group at 4 year follow-up.
In addition to the Triple P program, there is also empirical evidence in favour of The In-
credible Years Parent Training,406 which is another non-punitive parent training program. In 
Webster-Stratton et al (2001), parents and Head Start teachers participated in the intervention. 
This is a non-clinical sample (i.e. not diagnosed with any disorders), but some of the children 
were at high risk of behavioural problems. The researchers included independent blind observer 
assessments of child behaviour (not just parental reports regarding child behaviour), at home and
at school. The researchers found that, "Following the 12-session weekly program, experimental 
mothers had significantly lower negative parenting and significantly higher positive parenting 
scores than control mothers"407 and there was a difference in their children's behaviour:
Children of mothers who attended 6 or more intervention sessions showed signifi-
cantly fewer conduct problems at home than control children. Children who were the 
“highest risk” at baseline (high rates of noncompliant and aggressive behavior) 
showed more clinically significant reductions in these behaviors than highrisk control
children.408
406"Analyses of 50 IYPT studies revealed that the IYPT is effective in diminishing disruptive 
behavior and increasing prosocial behavior, according to parents, teachers, and observers." 
Menting et al (2013). See also Lessard et al (2016), Hutching et al (2016). 
407Reedtz et al (2011), p. 131
408Webster-Stratton et al (2001), p. 283
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One year later the experimental effects were maintained for parents who attended 
more than 6 groups. The clinically significant reductions in behavior problems for the
highest risk experimental children were also maintained.409
Other studies have also found effects after a year. Reedtz et al (2011) found, after a 1 year
follow-up, "reductions in harsh parenting and child behavior problems, and enhancement of posi-
tive parenting and parents' sense of competence in the intervention group",410 compared to the 
control group.
I think that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that non-punitive discipline and reduc-
ing (preferably eliminating) punishment can be beneficial for children and their families. For the 
best results, it might be necessary for parents to receive training in how to administer non-puni-
tive discipline (and also how they might change their other behaviours in order to reduce the 
need for discipline), and it might be beneficial for parents to receive periodic "refresher" courses 
as their children get older. At the moment, however, there isn't research on the effects of multiple 
courses over a period of many years.
In conclusion, we have seen throughout this dissertation that parents have multiple good 
reasons to refrain from punishing their children: 
~ Punishment intentionally causes immediate distress to children, such as pain and 
emotional upset; and we ought generally to avoid intentionally causing other people 
distress.
~ Punishing children does not have sufficient benefits (such as decreased aggression, 
better behaviour, or improved conscience) that might justify departing from the de-
fault rule, "avoid intentionally causing other people distress".
409Webster-Stratton et al (2001), p. 283
410Reedtz et al (2011), p. 131
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~ Parental punishment of children is not successfully justified by any philosophical 
theory of punishment (whether instrumentalist or consequentialist, consent theory, or 
retributivist).
~ Punishment increases the risk of various long term harms to children, such as in-
creased anxiety, increased aggression, slower moral internalization, increased 
dishonesty.
~ There is evidence for positive effects of non-punitive discipline.
 
We should be led to conclude that parental punishment of children is not justified and parents 
ought not to punish their children. They ought to spare the rod, the time-out, and every other kind
of childhood punishment too.
Parents' culpability
Are parents who punish their children culpable for doing so? If a parent knows nothing of the 
non-moral facts (such as the risk of harm of punishment, and its lack of benefit), and they are not
culpable for that ignorance, then even though, when they punish, they do something "objective-
ly" wrong, they may not be culpable at all. As Mason (2015) puts it:
Non-culpable ignorance of fact is usually a straightforward excuse. If I didn't know 
that the lever was connected to a puppy killing device, and there is no way I could 
have known or suspected that it was, then I am not blameworthy for pulling the 
lever.411
So, to take a clear example: a parent who is poor, illiterate, and lives in a remote village that is 
largely cut off from the outside world is (let's suppose) non-culpably ignorant of the non-moral 
facts. Perhaps they are following tradition in punishing their children, as do all their neighbours 
411Mason (2015), p. 3038
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in the village. Because their ignorance of the facts is non-culpable, then they may not be culpable
for punishing their children. 
Parents who have information more accessible to them are perhaps more culpable — and 
the more harsh or frequent their punishments are, the more likely they are to be more culpable. 
When it comes to spanking a child, say, I think that parents really are under an obligation to at 
least reflect on whether or not that's morally acceptable, and to look up some information on its 
purported benefits. It's now so well established in our society that hitting people other than chil-
dren is wrong, except in extreme circumstances, that I suspect that parents who do not at least 
question the ethics of hitting their children are engaging in what Moody-Adams (1994) calls (and
attributes to Aquinas), "affected ignorance":
Affected ignorance — choosing not to know what one can and should know — is a 
complex phenomenon, but sometimes it simply involves refusing to consider whether 
some practice in which one participates might be wrong.412
For some parents, it is likely difficult to think about the possibility of not spanking their children 
(and perhaps the possibility of not punishing at all genuinely hasn't even occurred to them), and 
because it's difficult, they might avoid properly facing the issue. And this is especially true when 
they are surrounded by other parents who also spank (and practice punishment more generally).
Sometimes — perhaps much of the time — cultures are perpetuated by human beings 
who are uncritically committed to the internal perspective on the way of life they 
hope to preserve.413
412Moody-Adams (1994), p. 296
413Moody-Adams (1994), p. 296
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While spanking children is not what we'd call a "way of life", punishment is generally considered
an essential part of raising children in our culture. And it's uncomfortable for parents to think that
their behaviour might be wrong (or that their past behaviour might have been wrong, if their chil-
dren are already grown). But even though it's difficult, I do think parents who don't even question
whether or not spanking is permissible are morally culpable to some degree. And the easier it is 
for them to look into it (higher level of education, internet access, leisure time, and so on), the 
more culpable they are for their ignorance. The information regarding other kinds of punishment 
is less readily available, so I doubt that parents who are ignorant of the non-moral facts regarding
nonphysical punishment are culpable for their ignorance.
So, I suspect that parents generally are not culpable for their ignorance of the non-moral 
facts regarding nonphysical punishment, even though they may well be culpable for their igno-
rance of the non-moral facts regarding physical punishment. At the bare minimum, parents (in 
our society) who spank should question the practice, and if they don't, my inclination is to think 
that they are culpable for their ignorance.
What about the default moral rule "Avoid intentionally causing others distress"? People 
who didn't recognize this rule would be morally problematic (at least). But I suspect that most 
parents do recognize that rule — in the sense that they generally abide by it and it's reflected in 
their behaviour and behavioural dispositions — but they assume that it's justified to override it in
the case of parental punishment of children. But this is because they are typically ignorant of the 
non-moral facts regarding its usefulness and its risks. I think that ignorance regarding the moral 
status of PPC is largely based on ignorance of the non-moral facts (because most parents assume 
that punishment is beneficial and not harmful, and that is why they do it). Every parent bears 
some responsibility for intentionally inflicting distress. And every parent knows that not all dis-
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cipline is punitive. (Even parents who engage in frequent harsh punishment don't always use 
punitive discipline.) But the more excusable the ignorance of the non-moral facts, the less culpa-
ble a parent is, especially when parents are surrounded by punitive parenting. It's hard for human
beings to swim alone against the tide of their communities. 
So educating parents matters. I think it's important for parents to be made aware of pun-
ishment's lack of benefits, and its risk of harms, and for them to learn about alternative methods 
of discipline. I have hope that, over time, parents will come to rely less and less on punish-
ment — which will be better for everyone, parents and children alike.
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